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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the role of corporate governance in US bank holding 
companies between 1998 to 2007. In the course of the thesis, four main 
contributions to extant literature are brought to the fore. First, the research 
facilitates a better understanding of the link between corporate governance and 
risk-taking. This is the main focus of the thesis and so this strand permeates the 
entire text. Second, it constructs a distance-to-default indicator, which is used to 
predict and compare financial conditions in banks that issued subordinated debt 
with those that did not. Third, it considers the impact of managerial incentives on 
bank risk-taking through board structure. Finally, the results provide a platform from 
which to view the various policy implications raised by the thesis. 
In analysing the extent to which distance to default is explained by bank risk 
fundamentals, it is shown that distance to default is predicted marginally better in 
sub-debt banks relative to non-sub-debt banks. For banks that issue sub-debts, 
again, it is found that charter values and bank capitalisation further increase the 
power of bank fundamentals to predict default risk. Turning to bank risk-related 
variables, capital to assets and non-performing loan ratios negatively and positively 
affect managerial ownership, respectively. This evidence is new. The percentage of 
independent directors is positively related to capital to asset and liquid asset ratios, 
and negatively related to the non-performing loans ratio. Capital to assets and non-
performing loan ratios have an observed positive and negative correlation with the 
percentage of institutional ownership. Also, excessive risk-taking is evident in ex-
ante and ex-post Sarbanes and Regulation and linked to board size. With respect 
to managerial incentives, equity- and cash-based compensation is positively related 
to bank risk. Finally, while leverage varies directly with stock options, it is inversely 
associated with cash compensation.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the objectives, motivations, contributions and background 
of the research in this thesis. The main purpose of the thesis is to investigate the 
issue of corporate governance in US bank holding companies for  the period 1998 
through 2007
1
. As such, the thesis makes a contribution to better understanding of 
the connection between the corporate governance of banks and risk-taking. To 
achieve this, therefore, three empirical chapters are examined. The first compares 
the predictive power of distance to default to bank balance sheet specific factors in 
large bank holding companies that issue subordinated debts and those that do not. 
The second empirical chapter examines the influence of board and ownership 
governance on bank risk-taking behaviour. The last empirical chapter investigates 
whether executive incentive compensation influences bank risk. Taken as a whole, 
this thesis assesses the relevance of bank corporate governance on risk-taking. 
The appealing issue in this investigation is the methodological technique – i.e. an 
option pricing model employed to construct a distance to default metric to measure 
default risk. To the best of my knowledge, there is no study that has used this 
contingent claims estimation to contrast the extent of distance to default to predict 
distress for bank holding companies that issue subordinated notes and debentures 
compared to banks that do not issue this security. Analogously, Krishnan et al. 
(2005) used yield spreads to make such a comparison of sub-debt bank holding 
companies and non-banking firms, and find an absence of market discipline. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 reports on the 
motivation of this investigation. Section 1.3 discusses the main contribution of this 
thesis, while the remaining contributions are described in sub-sections with their 
respective empirical findings. Section 1.4 discusses the institutional framework. 
Finally, the structure of the thesis is presented in Section 1.5. 
                                            
1 It is commonly referred to as the United States, the USA, the United States of America, or 
America. The US was a former British colony until it declared independence on July 4, 1776. It is 
a federal constitutional republic made up of fifty states and federal districts. 
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1.2 Motivation of the thesis 
In this thesis, bank risk-taking is considered from a corporate governance 
perspective. Thus, the evident research question is whether corporate governance 
influences the risk-taking behaviour in banking firms. To respond, the thesis makes 
use of the academic literature and has gathered inherent stylised facts. The 
research question is motivated by the following considerations. First, most empirical 
evidence shows support for the increased usage of market discipline by supervisors 
to assess risk exposures of banks (Flannery, 1998; Sironi, 2003; Gropp et al., 
2006). The market indicators used by regulatory bodies to assess bank risk 
changes are two - i.e. subordinated debenture yield spreads and distance to 
default. While the former is the more commonly used market signal of banks 
financial distress, the latter is quite new.  
Generally, the literature supports the theory that sub-debt yield spread and bank 
balance sheet risk data are closely associated - and thus, mandatory subordinated 
debts shape risk taking. Indeed, whether distance to default is important to market 
participants in assessing banks’ risk exposure is a still an unanswered question. 
Campbell et al. (2008) define distance to default as “the difference between the 
asset value of the firm and the face value of its debt, scaled by the standard 
deviation of the firm’s asset value”. The interpretation of this definition is that the 
higher the number of standard deviations the value of the firms’ assets are away 
from the face value of the outstanding debt reflects greater stability in firm. With 
this position, a firm is less vulnerable to the risk of default.  
Second, much of the academic literature and popular debate about corporate 
governance has as its focus, industrial firms. Remarkably, very few studies have 
made a concerted effort to analyse these phenomena in financial firms, and most 
conclusions are generalised from the industrials’ perspective. In fact, the literature 
confirms the fact that banks have unique features which distinguish them from 
industrial firms. It should, therefore, be argued that corporate governance forces 
that work in unregulated firms could affect banks differently. As such, this may help 
to infer the relevance of corporate governance to shaping risk-taking in banks.  
From a theoretical perspective, the principal-agent framework suggests that 
board, ownership and compensation structure affect risk taking (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; John et al., 2008; Cheng, 2008) in industrial firms. In banks, the 
following papers exemplify the link between risk and corporate governance: board 
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structure (i.e., Staikouras et al., 2007; Akhigbe and Martin, 2008; Pathan, 2009), 
ownership structure (i.e., Saunders et al. 1990; Laeven and Levine, 2009; among 
others), and executive compensation (i.e., Houston and James, 1995; Chen et al., 
2006; DeYoung et al., 2010; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2010). Laeven and Levine 
(2009) argued that regulations might have an extreme impact on corporate 
governance control mechanisms and on bank risk-taking behaviour.  
Third, subsequent to the Riegle-Neal of 1994 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley of 
1999 (GLBA) legislations, banking firms, operations and financial services are 
generally considered as increasingly too complex and opaque. Indeed, these new 
pieces of legislation significantly changed the opportunity investment sets in the 
banking sector from the mid 1990s onwards. Given this deregulated banking 
environment, banks shifted to an “originate-and-securitize” lending model from the 
traditional “originate-and-hold” lending model (Stiroh, 2006; DeYoung et al., 2010)2. 
Today, this innovation in the financial industry generates banks’ substantial non-
interest revenues relative to “originate-and hold” lending model. Ultimately, banks 
found themselves motivated to engage in excessively risky and imprudent bank 
lending behaviour. As many contend, this conduct, a root cause of bank failures, 
downward economic spirals and business cycle fluctuations, can increase 
systematic risk3. In turn, this adversely impacts the entire financial system – and 
society as a whole. According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation report, 
472 banks failed between October 13, 2000 and July 6, 2012 (see Figure 1-1). This 
number is substantially less if compared to the number of 1,617 banks with $302 
billion in assets debacle (1980-94)4. However, the recent financial crisis (2007/09) 
had severe impact on the global entire economy in comparison to the past financial 
crises.  
 
                                            
2 In originate-and-securitize lending model, banks derive fee income from securities 
underwriting, insurance underwriting, merchant banking, mortgage-backed securities (MBS)/ 
asset-backed securities (ABS) and other expanding product lines, while earning assets are 
major source of interest income in traditional bank lending model. 
3 Systematic risk refers to an incident in which a sizeable number of financial firms default 
systematically (Lehar, 2005). For instance, the US subprime mortgage crisis that started in June 
2007 broadened into the entire financial sector before affecting the national and global financial 
and economic systems in less than two years. 
4 See Heffernan (2005) and Cebenoyan et al. (1999) for the US bank and thrift crises during the 
period 1980-1994. 
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Finally, in the wake of corporate scandals, default risk, business failures, 
bankers’ excessive pay packages, and the current financial market stress, the 
question of the efficacy of corporate governance has spawned vibrant global 
discussion. In corporate governance failures, especially, the boards are suspect in 
corporate scandals and the financial crisis (Adams, 2009; Mehran et al., 2011) and 
the presence of institutional investors on the boards enhanced banks’ risk 
exposures (Laeven and Levine, 2009). Therefore, to stave off future unprecedented 
risk and repeated crises (as the financial market crisis of 2007-09 and many others) 
perhaps public authorities can be prudently expected to safeguard the financial 
systems. Along with the “last resort” doctrine, on October 3rd 2008, the US House 
of Representatives approved a $700 billion bail-out package for US financial 
institutions to reduce the escalation of the sub-prime mortgage risk exposures5.  
Based on the above discussion, researchers, practitioners, and policy makers 
have placed a focus on bank corporate governance research. Consequently, these 
arguments make it a central and motivating case for my thesis to conduct research 
in this topical issue.  
1.3 Contribution of the Thesis 
This section discusses the contributions to extant academic literature and policy 
making. The main contribution of the thesis is to improve understanding of the 
importance of a diversity of corporate governance elements and risk-taking in the 
financial sector. With this, the thesis considers four elements of corporate 
governance and their impact on bank risk. As such, it casts doubt on the relevance 
of corporate governance to bank risk-taking behaviour. The corporate governance 
forces looked at are the boards, ownership, executive compensation, and market 
discipline (see Figure 2-1, pp. 19, for synopsis of corporate governance 
framework). Existing academic research considers the impact of agency control 
mechanisms on bank risk-taking in isolation - i.e. ownership, board, and 
compensation structures (i.e., Saunders et al., 1990; Gorton and Rosen, 1995; 
Anderson and Fraser, 2000; Konishi and Yasada, 2004; Chen et al., 2006; 
Staikouras et al., 2007; Akhigbe and Martin, 2008; Laeven and Levine, 2009; 
Pathan, 2009; DeYoung et al., 2010), and market discipline (Flannery and Sorescu, 
                                            
5 See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/house-approves-700bn-rescue-plan   
-950581.html  
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1996; Flannery, 1998; Martinez-Peria and Schmuckler, 2001; Goyal et al., 2005; 
Gropp et al., 2006, among others). In the thesis are references to Tables 2-1 to 2-4, 
which reviews the literature attempting measures of corporate governance on bank 
risk proxies.  
To my knowledge the following evidence is not yet considered for banking firms: 
The first is a positive association between the percentage of independent directors, 
and total capital to total assets and liquid asset ratios. There is also the negative 
link between the percentage of independent directors and non-performing loans 
ratio. This relationship is also true for large complex banks. Thus, it is suggested 
that policy reforms should carry more weight in independent directors’ decisions in 
shaping bank risk-taking behaviour. The second is a positive tension between CEO 
stock options and bank leverage. Finally, there is the comparison of distance to 
default on bank balance risk measures in banks that issued subordinated debt with 
those that have not. These new findings, therefore, have policy implications over 
bank risk-taking activity and corporate governance. The rest of the contributions are 
discussed in the next sub-sections along with the respective empirical evidence. 
1.3.1 Distance to default, subordinated debt, and market discipline 
The first empirical investigation relates to the degree to which distance to default 
can be explained by bank risk fundamentals in sub-debt and non sub-debt banks6. 
One of the major contributions from the results is the contrasting and comparing of 
the extent of distance to default in predicting bank distress for those banks that 
issue subordinated notes and debentures with banks that do not issue sub-debts. 
Existing academic research that analyses the link between distance to default and 
bank specific risk characteristics, does not make such comparisons. In this regard, 
my analysis adds to studies by Gropp et al. (2006) and Akhigbe et al. (2007) by 
highlighting that distance to default is more relevant in sub-debt banks. The second 
contribution is to examine distance to default on banks with low charter value 
through high-chartered value banks, as well as low capitalised banks against high 
capitalised one. By employing charter value (Tobin’s Q) and capitalisation ratio 
ranking portfolios, these results lend credence to the theory that distance to default 
                                            
6 In this thesis, “sub-debt” may be used interchangeably with “subordinated debt” to mean bank 
holding companies that issued subordinated debt. 
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has higher predictive power in higher charter value and low capitalised sub-debt 
banks. This evidence is new.   
Third, I add to the literature on leading indicators of bank financial distress by 
evaluating the connection between default likelihood and bank risk fundamentals. 
Presently, distance to default is considered as one of the leading market-indicators 
in predicting a bank’s financial fragility (Gropp et al. 2004, 2006; Akhigbe et al. 
2007). Bank supervisors and policymakers are interested in and have seen 
distance to default to have higher predicting ability than yield spreads. Thus, as 
argued by previous researchers, it may be complementary to accounting risk-based 
data to signal the possibility of bankruptcy. Such analysis allows for some 
inferences under which market signals may be substitute or complementary to 
regulatory intervention. Fourth, the investigation contributes to ongoing mandatory 
market-based policy reform, in which, large BHCs are required to have 
subordinated notes and debentures in their tier 2 capital.  
The main empirical findings are summarised below. Distance to default is slightly 
predicted by bank-specific risks on sub-debt banks in comparison to banks that had 
not issued subordinated debt. This association explains some of the existence of 
market discipline, that is, sub-debt issuance restrains risk-taking in bank holding 
companies. That is with the theoretical keystone, sub-debt investors priced bank 
risk-accounting information. Thus, these investors will incorporate any readily 
available information in banks’ risk changes for their future security issues. By so 
doing, they can constrain greater bank risk-taking tendencies by demanding higher 
risk premium compensation for any additional default risk on their future debt sales 
(Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Sironi, 2003).  
In the quintile of banks with highest charter value (Q5), bank risk fundamentals 
explain the higher share of the variation in distance to default relative to the quintile 
of banks with lowest charter value (Q1). The interactions of return on assets and 
market leverage and reserve loan losses and market leverage are negatively and 
positively related to distance to default. These associations support the supposition 
of credit default reduction via efficient management and credit risk in highly 
leveraged banks, respectively (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Sironi, 2003). To avoid 
losing valuable charters - a self-imposed risk disciplinary control mechanism, banks 
located in Q5 are disincentivised to take on greater risk activities (Keeley, 1990). As 
such, asymmetric information in larger publicly traded banks is less likely to reflect 
the real asset values through the bank risk-fundamentals. The results show that 
- 7 - 
 
distance to default sensitivity to bank risk fundamentals is higher in 
undercapitalised banks relative to those which are well capitalised.  
Generally, the empirical evidence presented shows that there is a relationship 
between balance sheet accounting information and distance to default. This link is 
important to bank sub-debt investors. In fact, this private monitoring mechanism 
mitigates excessive bank risk-taking despite the fact that it might be weakened by 
government protections or bail-outs. More importantly, evidence presented sheds 
some light over the discussion on policy issues in regard to mandatory sub-debt 
requirements by large complex banks.  
1.3.2 Corporate governance and bank risk-taking behaviour 
This second empirical research strand investigates the impact of board and 
ownership structure on bank risk. The empirical evidence adds to the literature in 
four ways. First, this thesis is not aware of any investigation that considers the 
effect of board and ownership structure on bank balance sheet risk and its 
reflection on capital adequacy, asset quality and liquidity status. The weakening risk 
information of these indicators is essential from the supervisory and policymakers’ 
perspective. With this appeal, this analysis suggests that board and ownership 
structure are relevant for risk-taking in banks. For example, while insiders’ 
shareholdings and smaller boards exacerbate agency problems; independent 
directors are important in shaping excessive bank risk-taking behaviour. In effect, 
corporate governance of banks ought to be structured in a manner consistent with 
downsizing managers’ incentives to greater risk-taking.  
Second, the link between board structure and risk adds to the evidence by 
examining the effect of boards on bank risk-taking (Staikouras et al., 2007; Akhigbe 
and Martin, 2008; Pathan, 2009). Third, it advances the existing literature by 
comparing the balance sheet risk-based sensitivity to board and ownership 
structure in small and large banks. Consistent with the view for complex firms 
requiring greater advice by larger boards (Coles et al., 2008) - large banks have 
larger boards in connection with liquidity risk management advisory needs. Fourth, 
comparison of bank risk-taking behaviour and board structure ex-ante and ex-post 
Sarbanes enactment and Regulation A in the 2003 amendment is somehow 
overlooked. Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) proffer the theory that firms 
which practice mandatory risk disclosures have higher market risk. Analysing board 
- 8 - 
 
characteristics and risk-taking patterns over the two regimes, it seems that board 
size is an indispensable characteristic as per Sarbanes enactment.  
Finally, the chapter sheds some light on the discussion on policy issues related 
to bank governance. In particular, the relevance of board independence in 
formulating bank policies. Given the findings in this empirical chapter, a rethinking 
and new direction in governance monitoring devices is imperative in banks. By 
adopting sound bank governance, risk-taking could be kept at an acceptable level. 
The evidence presented in this empirical analysis is in line with the hypothesis 
that corporate governance influence bank-risk-taking. Systematically, the findings 
indicate a statistically significant negative association between managerial 
ownership and capital to asset ratio, which, in turn, reduced bank capital levels. 
Liquid asset ratio varies with managerial ownership and is nonlinear. As predicted, 
non-performing loans ratio initially decreases before it increases as a function of 
managerial ownership in nonlinear form. One possible explanation for this is that as 
managerial shareholdings increase, managers’ incentives tend to be more closely 
aligned to those of shareholders. As such, they are incentivised to pursue risky 
strategies that enhance the value of shareholders equity call-option.  
In addition, while the capital to assets and the liquid asset ratios increase as a 
function of the percentage of independent directors, the non-performing loans ratio 
decreases. Evidence suggests that the independent directors may play an 
important monitoring role in shaping managerial risk-taking behaviour. The findings 
are consistent with those indicated by Akhigbe and Martin (2008) and Pathan 
(2009), and Cheng (2008) for industrials. With this position, one may also argue 
that bank independent directors are complementary to regulation devices in 
controlling excessive risk-taking. Another positive result relates to the presence of 
institutional investors. Both total capital to total asset and non-performing loans 
positively are related to the percentage of institutional investors.  
Throughout, board size is negative and statistically significantly related to bank 
risk - capital to assets, non-performing loans and liquid assets ratios. These results 
suggest that smaller boards increase bank risk level in capital and liquidity. In this 
atmosphere, smaller boards may not be good monitors for the owners due to their 
greater extreme decision making problems. By contrast, smaller board can improve 
credit portfolio status. Finally, the evidence confirms that in respect to bank risk-
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taking, smaller boards remain an explanatory characteristic of board governance 
ex-ante Sarbanes and ex-post Sarbanes and Regulation A legislations.  
1.3.3 Managerial incentives and risk-taking in banking 
The last empirical chapter investigates the impact of CEO compensation on bank 
risk. It documents four main contributions to academic literature. One, it considers 
the literature on bank risk-taking and executive compensation. The evidence 
presented adds to the literature that managerial compensation incentives motivate 
risk-taking in banking institutions. This body of research has been until now narrow 
and somewhat contradictory (Houston and James, 1995; Angbazo and Narayanan, 
1997; Brewer et al., 2003; Chen et al. 2006; Mehran and Rosenberg, 2008; 
DeYoung et al., 2010; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2010). In addition, the empirical 
chapter analyses leverage-observable risk on executive compensation and the 
findings reveal that managerial compensation incentives encourage managers to 
pursue an aggressive debt policy. Two, it contributes to banking literature by 
examining the link between bank risk and executive compensation through the 
corporate board. The evidence presented shows that both compensation and board 
structure are determinants of bank risk-taking and debt policy. Because executive 
compensation and boards are substitutes in managerial alignment and monitoring, 
however, their simultaneous application could promote excessive bank risk-taking.  
Three, it examines numerous theories - they consist, as well as agency, moral 
hazard, contracting, information asymmetry, and deregulatory environments and 
their impact on managerial compensation and bank risk. In this theoretical 
combination, it is suggested that these cornerstones reinforce the principal-agent 
models for the analysis related to managerial incentives and bank risk-taking. To 
assess the connection between managerial compensation and risk-taking, prior 
research mainly focuses on the principal-agent model. Houston and James (1995) 
evaluate moral hazard and contracting hypotheses and report that compensation 
does not promote bank risk-taking. Chen et al. (2006) indicate a strong positive 
association between executive option compensation and risk, which, they 
contended, was attributable to the information asymmetry hypothesis and not 
principal-agent model.  
Finally, the chapter offers a consideration of policy implications. The culture of 
excessive bankers’ pay and boards’ failures are generally accepted to have 
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triggered excessive risk-taking during the financial crisis. With this fractious 
dialogue among stakeholders, it is proposed that bankers’ compensation structure 
should be re-designed. Executive compensation contracts, therefore, should now 
consider firm performance and the risk aspect as well, rather than emphasising 
maximisation of shareholders’ wealth value alone.  
This empirical analysis reveals strong support that both bank risk and debt policy 
vary directly with equity-based compensation. The evidence is consistent with that 
indicated in Chen et al. (2006), Mehran and Rosenberg (2008), and Vallascas and 
Hagendorff (2010) and is supportive of risk-aversion models. More specifically, it is 
indicated that stock ownership and stock option impact positively and are 
statistically significant in equity return volatility. Leverage varies directly with stock 
option, indicating how executive compensation structure influences aggressive debt 
policies. Moreover, while equity return volatility is positively related to cash-based 
compensation, the latter is inversely associated with leverage. Evidence of a 
positive association suggests that cash compensation (perhaps bonuses) promotes 
risk-taking as does equity-based compensation – i.e. stock ownership and stock 
options. 
 With respect to board governance, both bank risk and leverage are a decreasing 
function of board size. The evidence explains that banks with larger boards which 
are amply rewarded by means of equity-based remuneration are more likely to 
select riskier investment portfolios and implement aggressive debt policies that are 
commensurate with neutral shareholders preferences. For control variables, 
throughout, market to book ratio affects negatively in bank risk and leverage 
regression, consistent with the moral hazard models. Overall, across all regression 
models, the natural log of bank size impacts positively in both equity return volatility 
and leverage. Finally, executive compensation and board structure are jointly 
determined with bank risk and leverage.  
In summary two dominant issues emerge in this thesis. First and most important 
is the key contribution of the thesis re the effect of different corporate governance 
forces on bank risk-taking. On this point, the thesis analyses the board and 
ownership, executive compensation, and market discipline governance systems 
and provides an understanding of their effect on bank risk. Second, it offers 
potential policy motivations. It is proposed, therefore, that good corporate 
governance is essential for banks in converging managers’ interests with those of 
shareholders and other recognised multi-constituents. To this end, this thesis is 
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beneficial and of interest to not only to academics, but also to practitioners and 
policymakers.  
1.4 Institutional Framework 
In this section, the thesis discusses the institutional framework within which the 
research is based. It is worth mentioning that this investigation cannot ignore the 
institutional framework. Petschnigg (2005) defines the institutional framework as 
“the organisational entities, procedures and practices of financial regulation and 
supervision, including issues such as competences and the distribution of powers”. 
Institutional framework is important to readers in interpreting and understanding 
subsequent chapters relate to the corporate governance of banks. One key finding 
highlights the point that legal framework (both laws and their enforcement), and 
regulatory and institutional foundations, are essential aspects in sound corporate 
governance. This evidence is exemplified by Craig (2004) who contends that some 
part of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 provisions (i.e., compensations) had been 
borrowed from bank governance.  
According to Heffernan (2005), the shape and structure of the US banking 
system is dominated by the world’s complex banking firms and many small banks. 
As of September 2004, the largest 50 banks represent approximately 70 percent of 
all commercial banks’ assets (for example, see Petschnigg, 2005, p. 34, Annex IV). 
In response to repeated bank collapses, counteractive institutional measures were 
enacted to ensure the safety and soundness of the US financial system. This 
institutional framework has been formulated on an anecdotal and situational basis. 
Petschnigg (2005) also documents that the institutional regime of the US financial 
system is featured by high institutional density – i.e. with both federal and state 
regulatory agencies as discussed below.  
1.4.1 The main bank regulators 
The US financial system includes, in addition to commercial banks, savings and 
loans and thrifts, stock and bond markets, options and futures exchanges, firm 
pension schemes, and securities firms. Under a modern economic definition, a 
bank is a financial institution “that accepts demand deposits and makes loans” 
(Haubrich and Santos, 2003, p. 124).  
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The main US banking system federal regulators are four. First, with regard to the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) this was established by the 
National Currency Act of 1863. As a federal supervisor, OCC is responsible for 
nationally/federally chartered banks. Second is the Federal Reserve System (FED) 
this was enacted by the Federal Reserve Act (Shull, 1994), subsequent to a 
banking crisis episode. The Act was signed into law on December 23, 1913 to form 
a central bank for the US banking system that ended the National Banking Era 
(Gorton, 1988). FED charters and regulates state banks. The existence of both 
state and national banks is known as a “dual banking” system.  
Third, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was created by the 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Act of 1933. The FDIC is responsible for chartering 
state banks that are not within the jurisdiction of FED. The FDIC guarantees public 
confidence by safeguarding deposits to customers of member banks and FED’s 
member banks to the standard insurance amount (the current caps is $250,000). 
However, banks have charter and regulatory authority options – i.e. can choose 
national or state charter (Adams, 2009). Fourth, with regard to the Office of Thrift 
Supervision this is a successor of Federal Home Loan Bank. It was passed by the 
Office of Thrift Supervision Act of 1989 to charter and regulate thrifts.  
Finally, in respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission these are responsible for investment 
banks. The role of the SEC is to ensure the enforcement of the Securities 
Exchange Act, and to guarantee that investors are protected and well-informed. It 
also requires the disclosure of securities information and, has enforcement 
authority over those who violate the securities laws - accounting frauds, provision of 
misleading information, self-dealing or insider trading7.  
1.4.2 Types of regulation 
Regulations in the financial sector are mainly for systematic stability and protection 
of consumers from monopolistic exploitation. Regulation can be classified into three 
categories, namely - systematic, prudential and conduct of business. According to 
                                            
7 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) exemplified self-dealing to include executive perks, excessive 
compensation, transfer pricing, appropriation of corporate opportunities, self-servicing financial 
transactions-directed equity issuance or personal loans to insider dealers, as well as outright 
theft of corporate assets. 
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Goodhart et al. (1998), systematic regulation is public policy intended to ensure the 
safety and soundness of the financial system through minimising bank runs risk. 
Examples of these public reforms are deposit insurance, lender-of-last-resort, bail-
out waves, or special re-organisation.  
A prudential regulation refers to capital adequacy, constraints on large exposure, 
management capability, earnings ability, and liquidity position. Bank capital 
requirements and assets are the keystones of supervision and regulation for 
controlling bank risk-taking. Capital buffers a bank as coinsurance against adverse 
outcomes associated with huge losses due to default risk. With this, the Basel 
framework also (Basel Accord I & II) places stress on the association between 
capital adequacy and portfolio credit risks in regards to risk-weighted assets 
[Flannery and Rangan, 2008].  
Basel II published in 2004, is designed to encourage individual banks to use their 
internal methods to calculate capital charges, to improve the level of their risk 
management system and to enhance disclosure and transparency levels through 
one of its pillars - Pillar 3 (Market Discipline). While assessment of capital 
adequacy is covered under Pillar 1, reduction of risk exposure or capital charges 
above the minimum requirement falls under Pillar 2. Overall, sceptics of regulation 
have argued that regulations are counterproductive and no longer effective in 
preventing excessive risk-taking and bank failures. They propose corporate 
governance to complement or substitute for the traditional regulatory monitoring 
system.  
1.4.3 Aspects of corporate governance 
The “corporate governance” terminology was first articulated in the 18th century by 
Adam Smith (1776) [(Jensen and Meckling, 1976)]8. Vishny and Shleifer (1997) 
refer to corporate governance as “the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting return on their investment”. From the 
banking perspective, corporate governance “involves the manner in which the 
business and affairs of individual institutions are governed by their board of 
                                            
8 Denis and McConnel (2005) defined corporate governance as “the set of mechanisms – both 
institutional and market-based – that induce the self interested controllers of a company (those 
that make decisions regarding how company will be operated) to make decisions that maximise 
the value of the company to its owners (the suppliers of the capital).” 
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directors and senior management, which affects how they set corporate objectives, 
operate the bank’s business on a day-to-day basis, meet the obligation of 
accountability to their shareholders and take into account the interests of other 
recognised stakeholders, align corporate activities and behaviour with the exception 
that banks will operate in a safe and sound manner, and in compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations, and protect the interest of depositors (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, p. 4)”.  
Indeed, financial firms differ from non-financial firms in a number of aspects. 
Banks are characterised by greater regulation, opacity in asset composition and 
different organisational structure (Morgan, 2002; Adams and Mehran, 2003). In 
addition to these banks’ exclusive features, a diversity of stakeholders is interested 
in the behaviour of banks – i.e. stockholders, debtholders, depositors and 
regulators. Theoretical foundation upholds that bank insiders could possess 
important private information about bank loan portfolio risk as well as portfolio 
management efforts. Greenspan (1996) as quoted by Flannery et al. (2004, p. 
420), notes that “bank loans are customised, privately negotiated agreements that, 
despite increases in availability of price information and in trading activity, still quite 
often lack transparency and liquidity. This makes the risks of many bank loans 
rather difficult to quantify and to manage”. 
 Similarly, opacity in banks not only aggravates information asymmetry and 
agency problems, but also, weakens their corporate governance to a greater 
degree than occurs in industrial firms (Levine, 2004). Therefore, it is worth noting 
that the role of banks within the economy is not only to channel financial resources 
to economic units, but also to be vigorous in the governance of industrial firms 
(Caprio et al., 2007) – i.e. in German governance model countries. However, the 
US banks continually implement good corporate governance practices and best 
practices that are believed to boost performance.   
1.4.4 Corporate governance and failures 
The importance of corporate governance in the US has been evidenced by 
accounting scandals and bankruptcies in Enron, Tyco International, Adelphia, 
Peregrine Systems and WorldCom in the early 2000s. Poor corporate behaviour in 
firms ranged from conflict of interest, self-dealing, deceptive financial reporting, as 
well as too-friendly oversight by boards (Craig, 2004). Reacting to the highlighted 
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instance of corporate explosion events, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 was 
passed. This legislation is intended to enhance corporate financial transparency, 
disclosures behaviour, director independence, and oversight through strengthening 
corporate governance. For example, Enron was rated as being “investment grade” 
only a few days before the company defaulted (Bharath and Shumway, 2008). To 
be investment grade rated, the company would have received a BBB or above 
score - implying low default-risk and financial strength.  
Most recently, an example of a high profile scandal in the banking industry was 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers motivated by balance sheet manipulation and 
insufficient disclosure9. Surprisingly, Lehman’s was well capitalised before and was 
refused a bail-out at the time of failure. It may be thus argued that to avoid massive 
costly bailouts, banks should sometimes be allowed to go to the wall (see Figure 1-
1). By contrast, Armitage and Marston (2008, p. 315) contend that “the primary 
motives for disclosure to the stock market are to promote the company’s reputation 
for openness and to maintain confidence in the company among shareholders and 
others”. Ultimately, this explains the greater attraction of investments at better 
terms for investors. Consistent with Akhigbe and Martin (2006), dataset used in this 
thesis indicates that many US banks adopted the provisions on Sarbanes-Oxley.  
Board of directors: The BCBS (2006) underscores the role of board of directors 
and top executives’ governance for the safety and soundness of banking 
institutions. Traditionally, banks’ boards of directors had legal obligations to debt 
claimants and not to shareholders interest (Macey and O’Hara, 2003). Compared to 
industrials, the business and affairs of the US banks are controlled by the boards. 
In their oversight, boards of directors set the bar for the highest standards of ethical 
and conduct and performance of management. To avoid conflict of interest, these 
benchmarks also affect directors and employees. That is each member in an 
individual bank has to comply with all laws and legal requirements. To achieve the 
highest performance of boards and committees, many banks have in place self-
evaluation and orientation/training systems. For highest performance, a board 
member is required to attend (as a minimum) 75 per cent of the annual total 
meetings held. Based on this evaluation feedback, boards alleviate any detected 
deviation to enhance bank’s financial performance status.    
                                            
9 For example, see FT.com Financial Times, March 12 2010-00:41. 
- 16 - 
 
Furthermore, banks have board committees, including audit, compensation, risk 
management, asset quality, corporate and governance and executive. Membership 
of both board and committees is determined by boards and merit-based - i.e. 
experience foundation and academic qualifications. As defined by Sarbanes and 
the self-regulatory organisation (SROs), boards are largely dominated by 
independent directors. The exchange regulatory authorities/SROs include the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
and the American Stock Exchange. In many cases, audit, compensation, and 
corporate and governance and executive committees are composed of 
independent directors. The audit committee is responsible for overseeing the 
corporate audit function. It is chaired by a financial expert. With all these elements 
in place, the question of whether the board of directors acted in the best interest of 
bank shareholders and other constituents is a largely answerable question.  
Ownership structure: Ownership structure is an important monitoring and 
controlling mechanism for firm’s agency conflicts. Institutional and legal set-up 
restricts ownership and control by institutional shareholdings (banks and other 
financial institutions) to own and control equity in industrial firms (Gilson, 1990). 
Subsequent to ownership restriction, Craig (2004) advances the idea that US firms 
depend on the capital markets to raise liquidity and on the legal system for 
monitoring corporate governance. For banks to pursue excessive risk-taking, 
capital regulations require owners to have a large enough ownership stake with a 
view to align their incentives with those of insurance firms (Boyd and De Nicolό, 
2005). Moreover, the Sarbanes law requires disclosure of transactions involving 
directors, management and principal shareholders owning more than 10 percent of 
any class of any equity security excluding exempted security.   
Code of ethics: Under Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act subscribing public 
firms are required to have in place codes of conduct for top executive officers, 
employees and directors. The adoption of these codes provides numerous benefits 
for a company, such as increased investor confidence, reduced staff turnover, as 
well as reducing insider abuses (Painter-Morland, 2006). In a banking context, the 
code of ethics offers a foundation for all associates to demonstrate integrity and 
high ethical standards in their personal and professional dealings. Associates in 
banks must maintain the highest standards of good banking practice and behave 
honestly in the eyes of depositors, shareholders and other stakeholders. The code 
of ethics is exemplified by Macey and O’Hara (2003) - i.e. bank directors should 
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take solvency risks explicitly into account when making corporate strategic 
decisions or else face personal liability for non-compliance. 
1.4.5 Global financial crisis (2007/09) 
Allen and Gale (2000) advocate that the legal system, political factors and financial 
crises have all impacted considerably on the historical development of the financial 
system. In response to the recent global financial shock, numerous remedial 
measures were put in place. They include bank bailout packages, capping or 
rescinding generous extravagant bonuses and G20 leaders collectively agreeing on 
joint strengthening supervision and regulation at the London Summit10. These 
politicians and policymakers contended that an incentive compensation culture in 
banks escalated greater risk-taking behaviour, and ought to be more closely 
aligned with long-term performance.  
Overall, there are key lessons to be learned by policymakers, politicians and 
regulators in regard to institutional framework. One, it is time to re-examine the 
efficacy of the current US institutional setting in managing systematic risk. In effect, 
long-term and permanent institutional building challenges remain critical. To 
achieve this, a joint consensus and coordination between the US and other affluent 
economies is the major aspect. Two, regulatory agencies should constantly keep 
an eye on legal framework, regulatory and institutional foundations, and bank 
governance policies to avoid unprecedented events and excessive risk-taking. 
Finally, to enhance market discipline in the banking industry, the institutional 
environment reforms need to relax the legal and regulatory protocols that suppress 
sound corporate governance of banks – i.e. restrictions on hostile takeovers.  
                                            
10 See http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/en/summit-aims/communique-explanation/ for the real 
action agreed and other steps to be taken.  
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       Figure 1-1 US Bank Failures:  2000 – 06 July 2012 
 
1.5 The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the corporate governance 
literature of financial institutions. It supplements this with industrial literature. 
Chapter 3 presents data sources and collection, construction of variables, and 
analysis of descriptive statistics. Chapter 4 reports and discusses the first empirical 
study, which deals with distance to default, subordinated debt, and market 
discipline. This empirical chapter is published in Accounting and Finance 50, (2010) 
pp. 853-870. Chapter 5 reports the second empirical study; bank risk is 
parameterised as a function of corporate governance – i.e. characteristics of board 
and ownership to control agency conflicts. Chapter 6 presents the last empirical 
study; managerial incentives and risk-taking. Chapter 7 closes the thesis by 
summarising and concluding the main contributions and findings, and proposing 
implications for new research avenues. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter surveys literature on financial institution corporate governance. It 
focuses on four governance aspects: the boards, ownership, executive 
compensation, and market discipline, as depicted in Figure 2-1. Robust corporate 
governance has become a priority in banking institutions. With supervisors having 
“a keen interest in sound corporate governance as it is an essential element in the 
safe and sound functioning of a bank and may affect the bank’s risk profile if not 
implemented effectively” BCBS (2006, p. 4). Similarly, Caprio et al. (2007) 
advances that good corporate governance model is important to both industrial and 
financial institutions. 
Figure 2-1 Synopsis of corporate governance framework 
This figure presents the summary on four lines of bank corporate governance research. The 
governance topics investigated are market discipline, boards, ownership, and executive 
compensation. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organised into three sets as follows. Section 
2.1.1 discusses the nature of agency problems in banks. In general, agency 
conflicts in banking firms differ from those found in non-financial firms. Section 2.2 
discusses a number of mechanisms to mitigate agency problems related to 
ownership and board structure, managerial compensation, and market discipline. 
Stylised facts and tables of main findings of empirical studies are summarised at 
the end of each subsection. The literature suggests that mechanisms to control 
agency conflicts are essential in shaping executives’ opportunistic behaviours. 
Understanding this literature, thus, helps in formulating hypotheses, forming 
predictions, providing interpretations, and discussing results. More importantly, it 
identifies the gaps in the current literature that lead to the original contribution of 
this thesis. Section 2.3 takes a look at the literature gap and research focus.  
2.1.1 The nature of agency problems in the banking industry 
Since the pioneering work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), a body of literature has 
argued that standard agency theory grounds the contractual rights and obligations 
of managers and shareholders in the modern corporation. Jensen and Meckling’s 
(1976) principal-agent framework represents the agency costs of shareholders11. 
These costs can be divided into two groups – equity and debt agency costs. Jensen 
and Meckling (ibid, pp. 308) defined an agency relationship as a “contract under 
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent”. The theory posits that conflicts between managers 
and owners tend to increase as a result of unobservable managers’ actions that 
involve withholding adverse financial information from shareholders. Hence, why 
does the corporate governance of bank vary from the company?  
The corporate governance of banks differs from that of industrials for a number 
of reasons. A large number of stakeholders, regulations, high information 
asymmetry and institutional density (i.e. the institutional system in US), 
                                            
11 By agency costs, Jensen and Meckling (1976) refer to use ‘agency costs’ to refer to the 
monitoring expenditures by made by the principal; the bonding expenditures by made by the 
agent, plus the residual loss incurred due to the costs of enforcing the contracts that fully exceed 
the benefits. Costs suffered by WorldCom, Enron, Société Générale, Lehman Brothers, AIG, 
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organisational structure, nature and complexity of financial services, ownership 
restrictions, anti-takeover activity legislations, less competent qualified and 
inexperienced directors, larger board size - all these, make governance in banks 
difficult. (Morgan, 2002; Adams and Mehran, 2003; Becht et al., 2011). However, 
the board of directors have de facto the same fiduciary duty of loyalty and to act in 
a good-faith in moderating inherent hurdles and to ensure sound governance of 
banks. 
In addition to the standard agency problem, the banking literature also raises the 
moral hazard problem (Demsetz et al. 1997). Along with Ely (1999, p. 241), this 
thesis holds that a moral hazard “exists when a decision maker takes risks that he 
otherwise would not have taken, because the adverse consequences of the risk-
taking have been transferred to a third party in a manner that is advantageous to 
the risk-taker and, more important, is disadvantageous and potentially even 
destructive to the party to whom the risk has been shifted”. There are two sets of 
relationships within which moral hazards arise in banking. The first occurs between 
lenders and borrowers, as the lender can benefit from private and superior 
information production that is used to monitor the borrower. The second can be 
found in the relationship between banks and deposit insurance firms. The latter 
moral hazard was highlighted by Merton (1977) in pricing the deposit insurance 
framework.  
Merton (1977) showed that the characteristics of put-options and deposit 
insurance are identical. Indeed, the fixed deposit insurance premium on depository 
institutions leads to a put-option that is regarded as a subsidy by bank equity-
holders. Eventually, the latter ascertain claims on deposit insurance agencies by 
holding a put-option of the bank’s asset value with exercise price equal to the 
claims of the depositors. In a moral hazard environment, depositors have no 
incentives to monitor shareholders and prevent them from pursuing excessive risk-
taking. The underlying argument sanctioning this behaviour is that the depositors’ 
have the perception that their wealth portfolios are guaranteed by the government 
once the bank fails. In the end, limited liability and deposit insurance policies 
increase the value of shareholders equity call-option and equity put-option, 
respectively, by increasing the risk of banks’ assets or reducing the capital level.  
                                                                                                                                
Merrill Lynch, housing finance companies, and the recent financial market crisis are cases 
worthy of examination in this regard. 
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Generally, the moral hazard problem of excessive risk-taking by bank 
shareholders is exacerbated by the convexity of the levered equity payoff caused 
by limited liability, deposit insurance and other federal bail-out schemes (John et 
al., 1991). The moral hazard view assumes that shareholders make the lending 
decisions and can take on risk to maximise the value of the insurance if they so 
desire. And moral hazard models predict that the wealth of shareholders is an 
increasing function of their asset risk.   
2.2 Corporate Governance Elements 
The theoretical postulates of agency literature recognise that the corporate 
governance system helps to level agency problems between owners and 
managers. As such, it keeps agency costs down and limits managerial self-serving 
behaviours that hinder the achievement of shareholder objectives. Two competing 
hypotheses are offered in the corporate governance literature – the shareholder 
“convergence of interest” or “corporate control” hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling’s, 
1976), and the managerial “entrenchment” hypothesis (Stulz, 1988).  
The "convergence of interest” hypothesis advocates a positive relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance, implying the maximisation of 
shareholder value. The managerial “entrenchment” hypothesis, on the other hand, 
contends that a negative association exists between insider ownership and firm 
performance (Stulz, 1988)12. This occurs because managers’ undesirable 
behaviours are imperfectly controlled by shareholders. When managerial holding 
levels increase substantially, risk-averse managers may find it worthwhile to 
engage in risk-mitigating strategies (Smith and Stulz, 1985). According to this 
corporate hedging theory, such strategies may lead to a decline in risk-increasing, 
positive net present value projects (i.e., the underinvestment problem). The 
literature advances the thesis that managers’ ‘nonhuman wealth’ - i.e. undiversified 
wealth portfolios or personal benefits factors - can lead them to behave 
                                            
12 Under Stulz’s theoretical prediction model, initially, the value of a firm varies directly with the 
percentage of managerial shareholdings before declining as managerial shareholdings tend to 
become more concentrated. Berger et al. (1997) defined entrenchment as “the extent to which 
managers fail to experience discipline from the full range of corporate governance and control 
mechanisms, including monitoring by the board, the threat of dismissal or takeover, and stock- 
or compensation-based performance incentives”. 
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conservatively in directing corporate investment resources (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; John et al., 2008).  
In that state, managers will have incentives to reduce the firm’s stock return 
volatility by selecting more safe assets. Accordingly, a negative relationship 
between managerial ownership and risk is expected. This association explains the 
dominance of the risk-aversion hypothesis over the risk-taking hypothesis. 
Generally, agency theory predicts that managerial ownership can generate either a 
convergence effect or an entrenchment effect on management behaviour in the 
firm. Based on these stylised facts, positive and negative association proposes the 
convergence of interest hypothesis and the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, 
respectively. Thus, a combination of these two hypotheses may produce a 
nonlinear association between managerial ownership and the risk of a firm. This is 
also true for firm performance.  
2.2.1 Ownership structure 
One branch of corporate governance literature looks at the ownership structure and 
its influence on managerial decisions in industrial firms. Undoubtedly, the corporate 
governance literature has ranked ownership structure as the top agency control 
mechanism between owners and managers (Demsetz, 1983). Empirical evidence 
on ownership structure produces both positive and negative relationships between 
the levels of managerial holdings and firm value (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Miguel et al., 2004; Davies et al., 
2005)13. Indeed, it appears intuitive to argue that Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
classic convergence of interest theory is not robust owing to the mixed findings. 
The sample size, methodological approach, distinct time period, and prevailing 
regulatory regime may have motivated these opposing findings. Nevertheless, 
research by Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) are silent on 
the issue of endogeneity whilst other studies shed some light on it. Instinctively, this 
                                            
13 The results of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) differ remarkably. 
While the entrenchment effect range is 5% to 25% in the former, it is between 0% and 40% to 
50% in the latter. Differences in model specifications and sample size should be attributed to 
variations in findings. Short and Keasey (1999) proxy firm performance with market to book 
value ratio, and return on shareholders’ equity equal to profits attributable to shareholders 
divided by shareholders’ equity reserves, and they find cubic association. Furthermore, their 
analysis does not control the endogeneity problem, notwithstanding the fact that they recognise 
“reverse” causality running from managerial ownership to firm performance.  
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modelling infers that the causalities between ownership structure and corporate 
value/risk are likely to run in two directions. 
  A great deal of empirical research has examined the question of whether 
ownership structure is relevant to traded depository institutions’ risk-taking 
behaviours, and has produced contradicting results (Saunders et al., 1990; Gorton 
and Rosen, 1995; Cebenoyan et al., 1995; Chen et al., 1998; Mudambi and Nicosia 
1998; Anderson and Fraser, 2000; Lee, 2002; Konishi and Yasada, 2004; Laeven 
and Levine, 2009). Following Saunders and his co-authors’ lead, several measures 
of depository institution’s risk-taking are modelled on managerial ownership, 
controlling for the effects of insider ownership on risk-taking. In a manner 
consistent with agency theories, the main findings from this strand of research 
(other than those of Chen et al. [1998]) show that risk is positively related to insider 
ownership. The main risk measures employed in this body of empirical research 
are capital market risk (i.e., total risk, idiosyncratic risk, and interest rate risk) and 
insolvency risk. However, Gorton and Rosen (1995), Cebenoyan et al. (1995) and 
Laeven and Levine (2009) use bank balance sheet risk measures, with control 
variables including firm size, bank charter value, leverage, return on equity, and 
equity market value to book value ratio.  
Saunders et al. (1990) highlight that ownership structure and risk-taking are 
positively related in stockholder-controlled banks, which is consistent with 
managerial incentives to increase the value of their call and put options. Their 
findings not only ignore the entrenchment effect that Cebenoyan et al. (1995) and 
Gorton and Rosen (1995) analyse, but also, utilise small sample and, linear 
specifications. Cebenoyan et al. (1995) used insolvency risk to proxy risk-taking for 
thrifts relative to the bank stock market risk measures used by Saunders et al. 
(1990). They defined insolvency risk as being equal to one if the institution’s equity 
to capital ratio is below the 3 percent regulatory minimum, and zero otherwise. 
Together, they indicate that managers holding a relatively large percentage of stock 
ownership engaged in higher risk-taking behaviour within certain specific time-
periods: between 1979-1982 (Saunders et al., 1990), in 1988 (Cebenoyan et al., 
1995), and between 1987-1990 (Lee, 2002).  
The above authors, including Anderson and Fraser (2000), have also pointed out 
that managerial ownership and capital market risk measures were negatively 
related between 1992 and 1994. Thus, the above body of research reveals an 
interesting pattern in the connection between ownership structure and risk-taking in 
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the financial sectors. It is evident that the changes in the regulatory environment – 
i.e. the forbearance and leniency regime during 1979-1990, and the tight 
regulations during the period 1992-1994 – have proved to be driving forces for risk-
taking.  
Cebenoyan et al. (1995) document that thrift firms with managerial ownership 
over the 25 percent and 23-28 percent marks engaged in greater risk-taking 
behaviour during the period of regulatory leniency and low charter value 
respectively. Specifically, in cross-sectional findings, the coefficients of insider 
ownership and insider ownership squared enter risk models negatively and 
positively, respectively. Cebenoyan et al. (1995) also show that institutional investor 
ownership is negative and significantly associated with insolvency risk. Moreover, 
they indicate that institutional investor ownership and the equity to assets ratio are 
both positive and significantly related. Knopf and Teall (1996) consider the effect of 
institutional shareholdings on risk-taking measures (i.e., equity return variability and 
real estate to total asset ratio). They demonstrate that these parameters are 
negatively related in deregulatory and regulatory regimes, and are comparable to 
those found in Cebenoyan et al. (1995). These findings suggest that institutional 
investors are less susceptible to greater risk-taking, and they ensure that capital 
adequacy is in place for a healthy financial system – i.e. one that is consistent with 
the efficient monitoring hypothesis14
,15. 
By contrast, Demsetz et al. (1997), Konishi and Yasada (2004), and Laeven and 
Levine (2009) have documented that institutional investors promote risk-taking in 
banks. While Demsetz et al. (1997) indicate that the capital to asset ratio varies 
negatively with large blockholdings, Laeven and Levine (2009) report a negative 
association between the activity restrictions index and the z-score (a measure of 
                                            
14 To shore up the efficient-monitoring hypothesis, McConnell and Servaes (1990) document a 
strong association between q and the fraction of institutional investor holdings. Cornett et al. 
(2007) also report relationship between the percentage of institutional stock ownership and 
operating cash flow returns in pressure-insensitive institutional investors. These two papers are 
supportive of the hypothesis that corporate monitoring by the institutional investor could lead to 
managers paying more attention to corporate performance rather than self-serving behaviour. 
Cornett et al. (2007) contend that due to corporate governance failures (i.e., the malfunctioning 
of boards), institutional investors are increasing pressure on managers to align the interests of 
shareholders.  
15 Smith (1996) and Carleton et al. (1998) demonstrate that shareholder activism by institutional 
investors (i.e., via insurance firms, pension or mutual funds vehicles) is largely successful in the 
changing governance structure, leading to the maximization of shareholder wealth. Examples of 
activist institutions in governance movements include the largest pension funds – i.e., California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) and the Teachers’ Insurance and Annuity 
Association College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF). 
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bank risk) when a large shareholder is a board member. In contrast, in Japanese 
banks, Konishi and Yasuda (2004) show that initially, market risk measures 
decrease proportionally with the impact of stable shareholders, a trend that 
reversed to positive as the asset substitution effect dominates the effect of 
managerial entrenchment for greater risk-taking16. The “prudent-man” hypothesis 
postulates that institutional investors that are large blockholders are characterised 
by greater expertise, opportunity, resources and higher monitoring incentives, with 
less information asymmetries relative to other shareholders. Thus, the link between 
institutional ownership and risk has been contradictory, and remains an empirical 
question. 
Lee (2002) provides evidence that greater risk-taking behaviours are prevalent 
for stockholder-controlled banks relative to managerially controlled ones – i.e. ones 
with larger asset sizes, lower stock return volatilities and lower capital to asset 
ratios. This is also consistent with the findings of Saunders et al. (1990). At low 
charter value banks, Demsetz et al. (1997) have found that ownership structure and 
risk (total risk and specific risk) are positively related in a piecewise specification 
when insider holdings are 0 to 5 percent. The negative value that occurs when 
insider holdings are 5 to 25 percent implies the entrenchment effect in the latter 
association (see, for instance, Morck et al. (1988) for similar findings). Moreover, 
Gorton and Rosen (1995), Cebenoyan et al. (1995), and Chen et al. (1998) 
consider insider ownership on risk-taking to have a nonlinear form, and have all 
found that managerial ownership and risk-taking are negatively related when 
managers are entrenched, which is consistent with the risk-aversion hypothesis. 
Their findings are also inconsistent with those of Saunders et al. (1990) and Lee 
(2002).  
While Chen et al. (1998) employ both linear and nonlinear variation in the 
logarithmic forms of the percentage of the depository owned by the officers and 
directors, Gorton and Rosen (1995) use insider ownership value squared in their 
model’s specifications. In both models’ specifications, Chen et al. (1998) show the 
negative relationship between risk and ownership structure, which is unexpected, 
but consistent with the risk-aversion view of Smith and Stulz (1985). Gorton and 
Rosen (1995) indicate that insider ownership and insider ownership squared are 
                                            
16 Stable shareholders can be defined as institutional investors holding stocks for long term 
horizon and they are likely to monitors managers.  
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significant, positive and negative, respectively, when the non-performing loans ratio 
is regressed against them – i.e. an inverted U-shaped relation. This function is 
comparable to that reported by Morck et al. (1988). Gorton and Rosen (1995) also 
report that insider ownership and insider ownership squared enters negatively and 
positively in the equity to assets ratio. Moreover, the non-performing loans and 
return on asset ratios are both positively related to outside blockholders. Thus, they 
contend that their results are in line with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis 
rather than moral hazard hypothesis. And they argued that bad managers take 
excessive risks when the banking industry is unhealthy.  
Brewer and Saidenberg (1996) document a U-shaped link between insider 
holdings and risk-taking in S&Ls, and their findings support both the moral hazard 
and managerial entrenchment hypotheses, as well as being partially consistent with 
those in Gorton and Rosen (1995). In contrast to the previously discussed papers, 
Brewer and Saidenberg (1996) use the volatility of daily equity returns to the 
standard deviation of asset returns rather than the balance sheet risk measures.  
Along with Gorton and Rosen (1995), other studies analyse risk-taking in relation 
to some of the bank’s balance sheet-specific risk information. Knopf and Teall 
(1996) document a correlation between insider shareholding and risk ex-ante the 
regulatory stringency in thrift institutions. In particular, risk measures (log hi-low 
stock price ratios, including balance sheet proxies for risk-brokered deposits to total 
assets, and real estate to total assets ratios) are positively associated with insider 
shareholding. The equity to total assets ratio is negatively related to insider 
shareholding. Following ex-post tight regulation through the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, these measures carry the 
expected predictions (i.e., negative signs) except in relation to the equity to total 
assets ratio (i.e. predicted positively). The authors argue that banking risks could 
have adversely impaired a bank’s capital position before the regulatory pressure 
era and can explain the continual negative coefficient sign for the equity to total 
assets ratio. 
 Sullivan and Spong (1998), show that bank credit risk measures are determined, 
to varying extents, by ownership and diversification wealth (manager’s bank 
investment to personal net worth). Specifically, net loan losses to total loans and 
hired-manager ownership are positively associated. Hired-manager ownership is 
negatively related to other real estate to total assets and equity to total asset ratios. 
Variability in net earnings is positively associated with hired-manager ownership. 
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Hired-manager ownership also enters the survival likelihood index regression 
negatively and is statistically significant. It should also be noted that the above 
studies differ in terms of the angles they take. Whilst Sullivan and Spong (1998) do 
not impose a nonlinear model, Gorton and Rosen, (1995) and Knopf and Teall 
(1996) consider it to analyse the entrenchment effect. Sullivan and Spong (1998) 
also analyse manager’s diversification, which is not examined by the other 
researchers.  
Further empirical evidence for ownership structure comes from international 
analysis. Laeven and Levine (2009) find that cash flows (CFs) and z-score 
regression are negative, statistically significant and related. This is consistent with 
the findings of Cebenoyan et al. (1995) and Sullivan and Spong (1998), implying 
that greater bank risk-taking is associated with substantial cash-flow rights of large 
shareholders17. A higher z-score suggests that the default probability risk is 
remote. Furthermore, Laeven and Levine (2009) indicate that CF enters volatilities 
in equity and earnings regressions positively, and is statistically significant, as 
Saunders et al. (1990), Lee (2002), and others have also found. The seminal article 
by Laeven and Levine (2009) differs markedly from the work of others. Firstly, in a 
cross-sectional analysis, they show that there is a negative relationship between 
the interaction term cash-flow and the capital stringency index. Second, they 
constructed an alternative primary proxy for risk in order to capture insolvency and 
z-score and use large international bank sample. 
 In contrast to the research discussed above, some studies have examined the 
convergence of interest and the entrenchment hypotheses from the performance 
perspective. This empirical study examines the bank performance and corporate-
control relation. Earlier, Glassman and Rhoades’ (1980) made a comparison 
between shareholder-controlled and manager-controlled banks in relation to bank 
performance (cost efficiency, growth and profit). They found that shareholder-
controlled banks exhibit higher profitability than manager-controlled banks 
(compare to Saunders et al., 1990; Cebenoyan et al., 1995; Lee, 2002 for the 
managerial risk-hypothesis). Glassman and Rhoades (1980) also report that in 
banks that have five percent or above shareholder ownership, profit rate is positive 
and statistically significant. This supports the hypothesis that good performance is 
linked with a higher degree of owner corporate control, and Glassman and 
- 29 - 
 
Rhoades (ibid.) further indicate that there is a nonlinear correlation between bank 
performance and the extent of owner control, thus supporting the entrenchment 
effect. 
 Finally, they report that cost efficiency measures are negatively related to 
insider-ownership. However, Glassman and Rhoades’ (1980) findings here differ 
from those of Pi and Timme (1993). The latter show that bank performance (cost 
efficiency and return of assets) is unrelated to ownership structure – institutional 
and large blockholders ownership. In their most recent work, Elyasiani and Jia 
(2008) show that BHC performance and institutional ownership stability are 
positively related, suggesting that institutional investors have incentives to monitor 
banks with a view to mitigate agency conflicts18. Using a simultaneous equations 
framework, Schranz (1993) analyses the impact of takeover activity restrictions 
through examining the influence of the concentration of equity ownership and 
management ownership on bank performance. She finds that banks located in 
takeover markets are more profitable than those that are not and, in particular, that 
bank’ profit margins are significant and positively related to the concentration of 
equity and management ownership of their stock. 
In the UK financial industry, Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) provide additional 
support for the convergence of interest hypothesis and the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis. They show that the relationship between director 
ownership and firm performance is non-monotonic. Their work bears similarities to 
that of Morck et al. (1988), in that they proxy managerial ownership according to the 
level of equity ownership by the board of directors. Moreover, both sets of authors 
find the convergence effect occurring in the range of 0 to 5 percent, and 25 percent 
of managerial ownership afterwards, and that the entrenchment effect range is 
between 5 percent and 25 percent of managerial ownership. Exceptionally, 
Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) use return on the stock market to measure firm 
performance, while Tobin’s Q and balance sheet risk are utilised in Morck et al. 
(1988) and Gorton and Rosen (1995), respectively.  
In the past decade, Fogelberg and Griffith (2000) and Griffith et al. (2002) 
investigated the same question, and found a nonlinear relationship between bank 
                                                                                                                                
17 Cebenoyan et al. (1995) and Sullivan and Spong (1998) use insider shareholdings instead of 
cash flow rights to measure stockholder control of lending institutions.  
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performance and ownership, consistent with the results of Glassman and Rhoades 
(1980). Compared to other studies, these papers employ economic proxies – i.e. 
market value added and economic value added – for measuring bank performance. 
Fogelberg and Griffith (2000) and Griffith et al. (2002) observe that management 
entrenchment may offset the convergence of interest hypothesis in the banking 
sector because increased owner control does not necessarily increase the value of 
the bank.  
Sometimes, managers may give less attention to shareholder wealth 
maximisation or be constrained by regulations to align their interests with those of 
shareholders. Recently, Caprio et al. (2007) have found that large cash flow rights 
held by controlling shareholders are associated with high bank valuations, and they 
suggest that ownership structure has relevance on the governance of industrial 
firms as well as the banking business. 
DeYoung et al. (2001) analyse the effect of managerial shareholdings on 
performance (profit efficiency) at small, closely held commercial banks that hire 
outside managers. In general, their findings are supportive of the conceptual model 
of manager entrenchment, predicting an inverse U-shaped connection between firm 
performance and hired manager ownership. In particular, they show how 
entrenchment behaviour peaks when shareholdings are greater than 17 percent. 
They argue that when managerial shareholdings are under-utilised, hired managers 
have less incentive to pursue risk-taking, which does not maximise the corporate 
value for shareholders. Conversely, over-utilisation of managerial shareholdings 
leads to hired managers being entrenched.  
A. Summary  
Most of the findings above suggest that a predominance of managerial ownership 
translates into greater bank risk-taking and increased performance, as predicted by 
the theory. This camp of empirical evidence thus indicates that both risk and 
performance are positively related to managerial ownership. Although there is also 
some evidence of a negative association between managerial ownership and risk 
(Chen et al., 1998), consistent with the risk-aversion hypothesis, this evidence may 
                                                                                                                                
18 Hartzell and Starks (2003) found that institutional investors’ preferences affect managerial 
compensation structures, firm performance and risk-taking.  
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be accounted for by the managerial entrenchment effect. It is evident that 
stockholder-controlled banks have more incentive to pursue risky activities than 
managerial-controlled banks during a period of greater deregulation and regulatory 
forbearance on bank closures. 
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Table 2-1 Summary of ownership structure for financial institutions 
This reports a summary of research into ownership structure. Unless otherwise stated, all studies in this table refer to ownership structure.   
Explanatory 
variable 
  Sample 
characteristics  
Measure of risk Sign  Measure of 
performance  
Sign  
  Author(s) Data 
period 
Institutions 
Number 
    
Insider 
ownership  
Saunders et 
al. (1990) 
‘78-‘85 
 
38 BHCs Equity volatility  Positive    
    Two unsystematic risk 
proxies from the two-index 
model with short- and long-
term interest rates as the 
second factor 
Positive    
 Cebenoyan et 
al. (1995) 
‘88-‘91 275 thrifts  Insolvency probability Positive/negative 
nonlinear.  
  
    Equity to asset ratio No association    
    Repossessed assets to 
total assets ratio 
Positive    
    Sheshunoff performance 
ranking  
Positive    
 Gorton and 
Rosen (1995) 
‘84-‘90 458 BHCs Non-performing loans ratio Positive/negative 
and nonlinear  
  
    Equity to asset ratio  Negative/Positive 
and nonlinear 
relationship 
  
      ROA No association 
 Brewer and 
Saidenberg 
(1996) 
‘85:1-
‘89:4 
100 thrifts  Equity volatility Negative and 
positive nonlinear  
  
 Knopf and 
Teall (1996) 
’86-‘88 466 thrifts Log hi-lo stock price ratio  Positive    
  ‘86-‘92  Real estate to total assets/ 
brokered CDs relative to 
total assets  and 
insolvency probability  
Positive    
  ‘90-‘92  Log hi-lo stock price ratio  Negative    
  ‘86-’92  Equity to asset ratio Negative    
 Demsetz et 
al. (1997) 
‘91-‘95 400 BHCs Equity volatility  Positive and 
nonlinear 
relationship 
  
- 33 - 
 
    Systematic risk and 
unsystematic measures 
Positive and 
nonlinear 
relationship 
  
 Chen et al. 
(1998) 
 
‘88-‘93 302 thrifts Capital market risk 
measures  
Negative and 
nonlinear 
  
 Sullivan and 
Spong (1998) 
’90-‘94 1421 banks z-score, equity to asset 
ratio, real estate to total 
asset ratio & net loans 
losses to total loans 
Negative    
 Anderson and 
Fraser (2000) 
‘87-‘89 150 banks Equity volatility and specific 
risk 
Positive    
  ‘92-‘94   Equity volatility and specific 
risk 
Negative    
  ‘87-’89 
& ‘92-
‘94 
 Systematic risk Unrelated    
 Lee (2002) ‘87-‘96 65 BHCs  Equity volatility   Positive    
    Loan to asset and 
commercial loan to 
investment securities 
Positive    
    Systematic market and 
interest rate risk  
Negative/positive 
and nonlinear 
  
Cash flows 
rights  
Laeven and 
Levine (2009) 
‘96-‘01 279 banks*  z-score  Negative    
    Equity volatility  Positive   
    Earnings volatility Positive    
Institutional 
ownership 
Cebenoyan et 
al. (1995) 
‘88-‘91 275 thrifts  Insolvency probability Negative     
    Equity to asset ratio Positive    
    Repossessed assets to 
total assets 
Negative    
    Sheshunoff performance 
ranking 
No association    
 Knopf and 
Teall (1996) 
‘90-‘92 466 thrifts Log hi-lo stock price ratio  Negative    
  ‘86-‘92  Real estate to total assets  Negative    
  ‘86-‘92   Equity to asset and 
brokered CDs relative to 
total assets ratios 
Positive    
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Institutional 
ownership 
stability 
Konishi and 
Yasuda 
(2004) 
‘90-‘99 48 Japanes 
banks  
Total and specific risk  Negative/positive 
and nonlinear 
  
 Demsetz et 
al. (1997) 
‘91-’95  400 HBCs Capital to asset ratio  Negative    
Outside 
blockholders  
Gorton and 
Rosen (1995) 
‘84-‘90 458 BHCs Non-performing loans ratio Positive    
    Equity to asset ratio  No association    
      ROAs  Negative  
Ownership 
concentration  
Glassman 
and Rhoades 
(1980) 
’75-‘76 1,406 banks   Profit rate & 
bank growth 
Positive  
      Cost efficiency  Negative  
Insider 
ownership  
Pi and Timme 
(1993) 
‘88-‘90 112 banks   Return on 
assets & cost 
efficiency  
Positive  
 Schranz 
(1993) 
‘79-‘87 197 banks   Profit margin Positive  
 Cole and 
Mehran 
(1998) 
‘83-‘87 94 thrifts   Mean adjusted 
stock return 
Positive  
 Mudambi and 
Nicosia 
(1998) 
‘92-‘92 111 UK 
financial 
firms  
  %capital 
appreciation 
plus the dividend 
yield 
Negative and 
nonlinear 
relationship 
 Fogelberg 
and Griffith 
(2000) 
‘96 100 BHCs   Economic value 
added  
curvilinear 
association 
 DeYoung et 
al. (2001) 
 266 small 
banks 
  Profit efficiency Positive/negative 
and nonlinear  
Cash flows 
rights  
Caprio et al. 
(2007) 
’00-‘01 244 banks*    Tobin’s Q Positive  
Institutional 
ownership  
Elyasiani and 
Jia (2008) 
‘92-‘04 110 BHCs   ROA, Tobin’s Q, 
and EBIT to total 
assets 
Positive  
*International sample used in the analysis. ROA refers to return on assets ratio. 
- 35 - 
 
2.2.2 Board structure 
In addition to ownership structure, the corporate governance literature has also 
investigated the relevance of board structure in representing shareholders’ 
interests. From the perspective of agency theory, the board of directors – as the 
apex of the internal control system – is responsible for monitoring, advising, hiring, 
firing and compensating top executive officers (Jensen, 1993). By contrast, 
theoretical papers categorise primary activities of the board structure governance 
as comprising monitoring and advising roles for the maximisation of shareholder 
value. (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Raheja, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; 
Harris and Raviv, 2008). Board structure is also central to the Sarbanes legislation 
that came about as the result of corporate scandals and failures – i.e. the 
bankruptcy of Enron. The Sarbanes legislation is designed to enhance and 
strengthen corporate governance and improve disclosures on finances, and the 
importance of board independence is emphasised by Sarbanes governance model 
as well as in the provisions of NYSE and Nasdaq.  
From the banking industry’s perspective, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision’s consultative document (2006) on enhancing corporate governance 
for bank firms refers to the role and composition of boards. This document and 
pillar 2 of the supervisory review process identify the role of board of directors with 
regard to regulatory reforms and their central part in risk management in banking, 
respectively. However, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Linck et al. (2008), 
among others, have pointed out that there is still no formal general economic 
theory of board structure. Because of the absence of such conceptual support, 
existing empirical studies appeal to agency theory instead, which suggests that 
boards should represent shareholders’ aspirations – i.e. they should maximise 
corporate value. Jensen (1993) highlights three board relevant monitoring 
characteristics – board size, board independence and board leadership – and, 
owing to this, the selection of board features is based on extant theoretical studies.  
One body of literature looks at the link between board size and industrial firm 
performance, and its results have varied considerably. Board size and firm 
performance are negatively related, suggesting that larger boards decrease 
corporate value (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Bhagat and Black, 2002; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). This research supports Jensen’s (1993) thesis that 
larger boards are susceptible to greater agency problems than smaller ones. The 
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inherent agency risks of larger boards range from a lack of coordination and 
communication, extremism in group decision-making, formulating and agreeing on 
corporate strategies to director free-riding. Nevertheless, large boards are 
perceived to be more observant monitors and better advisors (Dalton et al., 1999). 
On the contrary, Mak and Li (2001) and Beiner et al. (2006) indicate a positive 
correlation between firm performance and board size. This positive association 
seems unlikely, and opposes the popular host views supporting small boards. 
Coles et al. (2008) show that the association between q and board size is U-
shaped, and is positive in complex diversified firms because of the larger boards’ 
advisory expertise and responsibilities to the CEO and top executive officers. The 
U-shaped relationship suggests the possibility of board entrenchment, and, the 
positive association in complex firms is driven by dominance from outside the 
board. 
Additional studies examine the role of independent directors and firm 
performance, and reveal conflicting predictions. Yermack (1996), Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996), Bhagat and Black (2002) and Coles et al. (2008) indicate that 
these parameters are negatively associated. In fact, their results do not support the 
view that outside representation on boards leads to improvement through efficient 
monitoring19. In contrast, other studies have found board independence and 
performance to be unrelated20. There are three plausible explanations for these 
different results. Firstly, Harris and Raviv (2008) have argued that exogenous 
factors (i.e., the importance of information of other parties, profit potential, and the 
opportunity cost of outside directors) can produce negative, positive or no relations 
between firm performance and, board size, and outside directors. Secondly, 
smaller boards and insider director-dominated boards centre on their effectiveness 
in monitoring firms with hard project evaluations (Raheja, 2005). That is, the 
likelihood of quick decision-making, superior information accessibility and industry-
specific knowledge is higher in firms with smaller and more insider-dominated 
boards, leading to more efficient investment opportunity decisions.  
                                            
19 Yermack (1996) indicates a positive association between the fraction of independent 
directors and corporate value in fixed-effect regression, and Coles et al. (2008) report a negative 
relationship in high R&D firms. 
20 Exceptions include Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Mehran (1995), Mak and Li (2001), and 
Beiner et al. (2006). 
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Besides monitoring corporate behaviour, outside directors also play a vital 
agency role for shareholders’ interests. Rosenstein and Wytt (1990) highlight the 
fact that the appointment of outside directors and excess returns are positive and 
statistically associated, and that this is consistent with the interests of shareholders. 
Finally, the lack of a significant association between board independence and 
performance does not imply that board structure is irrelevant in reducing agency 
conflicts. According to Coles et al. (2008), the need for an adequate number of 
independent directors was emphasised by pioneers of corporate governance 
reforms after the corporate scandals. The guidelines for sound governance are laid 
out by TIAA-CREF, CaLPERS, Sarbanes, NYE and Nasdaq. 
The banking literature on the efficacy of board structure on bank performance is 
mixed (Adams and Mehran, 2005; Sierra et al., 2006; Akhigbe and Martin, 2006; 
Staikouras et al., 2007; Andres and Vallelado, 2008). Adams and Mehran (2005) 
and Andres and Vallelado (2008) connect performance and board size. While 
Adams and Mehran (2005) report bank performance (measured by Tobin’s Q) to be 
positively related to board size, Andres and Vallelado (2008) indicate both an 
inverted U-shaped relation and positive associations between the pattern. The 
findings in these two papers compare with those reported in industrial firms by Mak 
and Li (2001), Beiner et al., (2006), and Coles et al. (2008). However, Adams and 
Mehran (2005) argued that a larger board is not value-decreasing in BHCs, which 
poses an important empirical question about the strength of small boards. The 
positive relationship between board size and bank performance is contrary to 
popular views supporting small boards. Three factors have a bearing on the board 
structure of US banks – i.e. M&As waves, complex organisational forms, and bank 
loan relationships. In contrast, Andres and Vallelado (2008) argue that their results 
hold when institutional and regulatory framework, ownership structures, and the 
weight of the banking system have been controlled for.  
Consistent with Coles et al. (2008), Andres and Vallelado (2008) also indicate an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between the percentage of outside directors and 
bank performance. In a nonlinear model, Andres and Vallelado (ibid) again show 
that nineteen directors represent better number for monitoring and advising roles. 
In contrast, Sierra et al. (2006) and Akhigbe and Martin (2006) have constructed 
board-monitoring indexes for banks. They report that a higher index score 
(representing stronger boards) is positive and significantly related to bank 
performance (proxied by ROA and average abnormal return). Additionally, Akhigbe 
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and Martin (2006) find that there is a positive association between the degree of 
board independence and average abnormal return.  
Employing a similar methodological approach, Staikouras et al. (2007) and 
Pathan et al. (2007) investigate the impact of board structure on European and 
Thai banks’ performance (ROA, ROE and q), respectively. These researchers 
indicate an inverse relationship between bank performance and board size. Their 
results are consistent with the literature that analyses this link (for example, see 
Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998 for industrials), and inconsistent with Adams 
and Mehran (2005) and Andres and Vallelado (2008). To further analyse the effect 
of the board structure on bank-characteristic variables, Staikouras et al. (2007) 
show that board size enters risk models – loans to total assets and equity to total 
assets – negatively when bank size is not controlled in the models. While this paper 
partially focuses on bank asset quality and capital adequacy risk measures, the 
issue of liquidity risk is given far less attention. 
Existing empirical studies of the association between board composition and 
bank performance are inconclusive. Pi and Timme (1993) show that bank 
performance (measured by cost efficiency and ROA) is unrelated to whether 
directors are insiders or outsiders. Adams and Mehran (2005), Akhigbe and Martin 
(2006), and Staikouras et al. (2007) fail to establish any systematic connection 
between board independence and its impact on bank performance, notwithstanding 
the fact that prior research explicates significant tensions21. However, the failure to 
find an association between the two parameters does not conclude that inside or 
outside board representation is unimportant in adding firm-specific information or 
value, respectively. In contrast to the above researchers, under a panel fixed-effect 
modelling approach, Pathan et al. (2007) find that there is a strong and positive 
connection between independent directors and bank performance. 
Another strand of corporate governance literature analyses the relationship 
between board structure and risk-taking. Research on this topic is almost non-
existent, but recent research undertaken by Cheng (2008) on corporate firms 
indicates that board size and corporate performance variability are negatively 
associated. He measured risk through variability in monthly stock returns, ROA, 
and Tobin’s Q, and noted that larger boards have a lower variability in corporate 
                                            
21 See for example, Rosenstein and Wytt (1990) and Yermack (1996) for research in this area 
relating to industrial firms. 
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performance. He also reports that Tobin’s Q residuals decline in the percentage of 
independent directors. This ground-breaking study offers invaluable insights into 
board size and risk. In contrast, Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001) indicate that the 
presence of amakudari officers on the boards of Japanese banks is positively and 
negatively related to non-performing loans to asset and capital to asset ratios, 
respectively22. They note that amakudari is a “practice of officials retiring from 
government to accept a new positions in the Japanese private sector”. They 
concluded that this representation in boards increased risk-taking in Japanese 
banks. However, Konishi and Yasuda (2004) found no impact from amakudari 
participation in bank boards.  
Pathan (2009) assesses the importance of board governance along with risk-
taking in banking institutions, and reports that risk is negative and statistically 
significantly associated with board size. He also shows that bank risk-taking (capital 
market risks and distance to default measures) is negative and statistically 
significantly associated with board size. This is consistent with the finding of Cheng 
(2008). As expected, Akhigbe and Martin (2008) and Pathan (2009) demonstrate 
that board independence and bank risk are negatively related. This relationship can 
be partly explained by the role of the board of directors in banks, which covers not 
only shareholders interests, but also extends to other stakeholders including 
regulators and depositors. Indeed, directors are owed a fiduciary duty of loyalty and 
to act in a good-faith in making decisions for their shareholders (Macey and 
O’Hara, 2003). By contrast, Staikouras et al. (2007) indicates a strong positive 
relationship between board independence and loans to total assets. While Akhigbe 
and Martin’s (2008) results are based on capital market risk measures, Staikouras 
et al.’s (2007 employ bank risk-related variables.  
With regard to the power of the CEO, literature has argued that the separation of 
powers between the CEO and the chairman of the board mitigates rather than 
accentuates agency costs and enhances performance23. For instance, a board 
becomes more independent as the CEO-Chair positions are split (Jensen, 1993). 
Agency theory can predict a negative or positive effective power of firm 
performance variability (risk) on a CEO’s power (Adams et al., 2005). In large 
                                            
22 Konishi and Yasada (2004) defined amakudari as senior pensioners in Ministry of Finance 
and Bank of Japan appointed to banks’ boards. 
23 Linck et al. (2008) concluded that these dual positions occur in large firms, and are held by 
older CEOs who have been in their positions for a long period of time. 
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boards, agency problems seem to be higher, as entrenched CEOs are able to 
influence and control board decisions, leading to impairments of firm performance 
(Jensen, 1993). One study reports that the CEO’s power and firm performance 
variability (i.e., in stock returns, ROA and Tobin’s Q) are positively related (Adams 
et al., 2005). In particular, CEO=founder indicator. This finding supports the view 
that a less risk-averse CEO with substantial stock holdings has incentives to pursue 
more high-risk activities. Cheng (2008) does not find any association between CEO 
power and risk. 
 In banking firms, risk is negatively correlated with the CEO’s power (Pathan, 
2009), and CEO duality decreases the likelihood of financial distress (Simpson and 
Gleason, 1999). These authors’ findings explain risk-aversion behaviour exhibited 
by the CEO. In addition, they support the perception that a powerful CEO has 
incentives to pursue personal interests over shareholders’ goals of directing 
corporate investments. There are three main differences between Pathan’s (2009) 
and Simpson and Gleason’s (1999) approaches, however. Firstly, in the former, 
powerful CEOs are given a dummy variable equal to one when the CEO is both the 
chair and is internally-hired, and as zero otherwise, whilst in the latter the CEO 
dummy variable is equal to one when the CEO is the chair. Second, while Pathan 
(2009) included CEO ownership in his model specification to control the effect of 
CEO’s incentives in risk-taking behaviour, Simpson and Gleason (1999) tested it, 
and were unable to reject the null hypothesis because of lack of relationship. 
Finally, bank risk proxies are used in quite different ways. Fogelberg and Griffith 
(2000) and Griffith et al. (2002) indicate that CEO duality and bank performance 
(ROA) are unrelated, and negatively correlated in Pi and Timme (1993).  
B. Summary  
The theoretical keystones and the empirical evidence in the board structure 
literature suggest that small boards (Yermack, 1996) and more independent 
directors (Jensen, 1993) are better. However, in this literature, board structure’s 
impact on bank performance is considerably varied. Firstly, there is evidence that 
supports the thesis that tension between board size and bank performance is 
positively related (Adams and Mehran, 2005; Andres and Vallelado, 2008), and 
negatively associated (Staikouras et al., 2007; Pathan et al., 2007). The negative 
association between the attributes supports conventional wisdom, but other studies 
fail to establish any correlation between board independence and bank 
- 41 - 
 
performance (Adams and Mehran, 2005; Akhigbe and Martin, 2006), with the 
exception of Pathan et al. (2007). Secondly, evidence indicates that risk-taking is 
statistically significant and negatively related to board size and powerful CEOs.  
Thirdly, board independence and risk-taking are negatively associated (Akhigbe 
and Martin, 2008; Pathan, 2009). This evidence can be interpreted as supporting 
the idea that bank-independent directors are being more responsive to regulatory 
compliance risks. Finally, there is a positive association between the percentage of 
independent directors and risk (Staikouras et al., 2007).  
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Table 2-2 Summary of board structure for financial institutions 
This reports a summary of research into the board structure. Unless otherwise stated, all studies in this table refer to Board structure.   
Explanatory 
variable 
  Sample 
characteristics  
Measure of risk Sign  Measure of 
performance  
Sign      
 Author(s)   Data 
period 
Institutions 
Number 
        
Board size  Staikouras et 
al. (2007) 
‘02-‘04 58 banks* Loans to total assets, equity 
to total assets, and loan loss 
provisions to total loans 
ratios 
Negative     
 Pathan (2009) ‘97-‘04 212 BHCs Equity volatility, systematic, 
idiosyncratic and z-score  
Negative     
Board 
independence 
Staikouras et 
al. (2007) 
’02-‘04 58 banks* Loans to total assets ratio Positive      
 Pathan (2009) ‘97-‘04 212 BHCs Capital market risk proxies 
and z-score  
Negative     
 Akhigbe and 
Martin (2008) 
  Total risk and unsystematic 
risk  
Negative     
Board size  Adams and 
Mehran 
(2005) 
‘52-‘99 35 BHCs   Tobin’s Q Positive   
 Andres and 
Vallelado 
(2008) 
‘96-‘05 69 banks*    Tobin’s Q Positive/negative 
and nonlinear 
 
 Staikouras et 
al. (2007) 
’02-‘04 58 banks*   ROA, ROE and 
Tobin’s Q 
  
 Pathan et al. 
(2007) 
‘99-‘03 25 banks   ROE and 
Sharp ratio 
Negative   
Board 
independence  
Adams and 
Mehran 
(2005) 
‘52-‘99 35 BHCs   Tobin’s Q No association  
 Akhigbe and 
Martin (2006) 
‘01 201 banks   Average 
abnormal 
return 
Positive   
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 Pathan et al. 
(2007) 
’99-03 25 banks   ROE and 
Sharp ratio 
Positive   
 Andres and 
Vallelado 
(2008) 
‘96-‘05 69 banks*    Tobin’s Q Positive/negative 
and nonlinear 
 
Board 
monitoring 
index  
Sierra et al. 
(2006) 
’92-’97 76 BHCs   ROA  Positive   
 Akhigbe and 
Martin (2006) 
‘01 201 banks   Average 
abnormal 
return 
Positive   
CEO-Chair 
position 
Simpson and 
Gleason 
(1999) 
‘89-‘93 375 banks Logit (financial distress) Positive     
 
 Pathan (2009) ‘97-‘04 212 BHCs Equity volatility, systematic, 
idiosyncratic and z-score 
Negative     
*International sample used in the analysis. ROA refers to return on assets ratio. 
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2.2.3 Executive compensation   
A third body of governance literature focuses on executive compensation. Agency 
theory has been widely used in the executive compensation literature since the 
1980s (Murphy, 1999). Under this theoretical cornerstone, the view is that the 
executive compensation structures can be shareholders’ value-enhancing 
incentives designed to reduce agency conflicts. Long-term managerial incentive-
based awards to managers have extremely high sensitivity to changes in firm value 
relative to cash-based contracts. As such, stock and stock option (long-tem 
compensation) can be employed by shareholders to encourage risk-averse 
managers to direct corporate resources into risky value-enhancing investment 
projects (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Likewise, short-term fixed compensation (cash-
based incentive) may discourage entrenched CEOs from direct investment into risk 
increasing net present-value projects. However, a competing theory from Noe et al. 
(1996) posits that cash bonus remuneration may lead to risk-shifting in financially 
distressed banks during a deregulatory regime. 
On the empirical front, one substantial body of literature examines the sensitivity 
of the CEO’s wealth to performance or delta (Barro and Barro, 1990; Hubbard and 
Palia, 1995; Crawford et al., 1995; Fields and Fraser, 1999; Harjoto and Mullineaux; 
2003)24. Delta can be defined as the sensitivity of wealth to a percentage change 
in stock price. These articles indicate a statistically significant and positive 
association between CEO pay and bank performance, consistent with the principal-
agent model. Barro and Barro (1990) document a positive and statistically 
significant association between CEO pay and bank performance (measured by 
stock returns to shareholders, and rate of return). They also show that CEO’s pay-
performance sensitivity is a decreasing function of both the CEOs’ experience and 
the length of period CEOs continue in office. The latter four articles provide 
evidence that bank performance measures are positive and statistically significant 
in CEO pay regression models, which is consistent with contracting theory (Smith 
                                            
24 Stylised facts on industrials can be found in Jensen and Murphy (1990), Murphy (1999), and 
Hartzell and Starks (2003). For instance, Murphy (1999, p. 53) documented that “pay-
performance sensitivities are driven by stock options and stock ownership and not through other 
forms of compensation”. However, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) report that the association 
between stock return volatility and pay-performance sensitivity is negative. According to Guay 
(1999), delta exposes a manager to more risk, and he defined it as the dollar change in the 
value of CEO stock and option portfolio (wealth) coming from a one percent increase in the 
firm’s stock price (wealth for a 1% change in stock price). 
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and Watts, 1992). This theory predicts that substantial managerial equity-based 
compensation reduces agency risk. The contracting theory predicts higher levels of 
executive compensation in firms with more growth options and investment 
opportunity sets, and lower ones in regulated firms. The substitutive effects of 
regulatory intervention, ownership restrictions and meagre stock options are 
perceived to support the failure of this theory in banks.  
In their most recent paper, Cuñat and Guadalupe (2009) indicate the substitution 
of cash-based compensation (fixed pay) for stock option grants (variable pay). They 
report a positive pay-performance sensitivity following increasing competition during 
the second wave of deregulations in the 1990s. By way of comparison, 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) report that return on assets is significant and 
negatively related to dollar gain for a 1% increase in shareholder value. This finding 
suggests that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the 
interests of shareholders performed badly through the recent credit crisis. 
Some researchers compare pay packages. Houston and James (1995) and John 
and Qian (2003) have made a comparison between bank deltas and those of non-
bank firms, which resulted in mixed findings. Houston and James (1995) found that 
pay-performance in banks is higher than in non-banks, with John and Qian (2003) 
finding the converse. The differences in CEO compensation measurements, and 
distinct time periods might explain this variation. Besides, Houston and James 
(1995) find no direct link between CEO compensation and bank risk-taking, 
indicating no support for the moral hazard hypothesis25. They also highlight the 
fact that CEOs receive both less cash compensation and a lower percentage of 
their total compensation, hold fewer stock options and are less likely to participate 
in stock options. They attribute these differences to the nature of a firm’s assets 
and investment opportunity sets, which is consistent with the contracting 
hypothesis. Collins et al. (1995) demonstrated that total real compensation and a 
proportion of incentive compensation to total compensation increased significantly 
with investment opportunity sets at regional bank holding companies over the light-
touch regulatory environment. Growth opportunity is proxied by noninterest income 
to total revenue and natural log of firm size. 
                                            
25 Houston and James (1995) regress the ratio of CEO stock to total stock outstanding, and the 
value of options granted to cash compensation on variance in stock returns. 
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Additionally, fixed payment and total pay packages of executives decreased and 
increased, respectively (Cuñat and Guadalupe, 2009), and the equity-based 
compensation received by directors in banks in the early 1990s was significantly 
less than those in industrial firms, but was comparable by 1999 (Becher et al., 
2005)26. DeYoung et al. (2010) found that boards adjusted bank CEO 
compensations to induce managers to pursue new growth opportunity sets. They 
report the presence of larger risk-taking incentives in banks relative to non-financial 
firms around the year 2000. In particular, they show that distance to default is 
negatively related to vega and delta, respectively. They argued that policies 
associated with deregulation and reform - i.e. the GLBA - should be attributed to 
contractible risk-taking behaviour.  
The central insight of the above stream of research is that, subsequent to these 
programmes, together with the exogenous shock and innovation in the financial 
sector, the bank managerial compensation structure and level have changed to 
mirror those in industrial firms. From the empirical evidence to date, the 
“contracting theory” does not predict less equity-based compensation in regulated 
sectors. Angbazo and Narayanan (1997) and Harjoto and Mullineaux (2003) 
indicate that CEO pay (stock and options grants) positively influence BHCs 
leverage-measurement of observable risk. Harjoto and Mullineaux (2003) also 
indicate a positive association between stock return volatility and incentive 
compensation for CEOs (stock and option grants). Angbazo and Narayanan (1997) 
find no association between these parameters, possibly because stock and option 
grants were still on the low side when this research was conducted.  
Besides, Harjoto and Mullineaux (2003) report that CEO salaries (but not 
bonuses) increase when there is stock return volatility. John and Qian (2003) and 
Harjoto and Mullineaux (2003) also report that CEO incentive pay is a decreasing 
function in the interaction of the variability of total return to shareholders, as do 
Garen (1994) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999)27. Similar to the above papers, 
Brewer et al. (2003) regress managerial incentives on bank risk. They find that 
equity-based compensation is positively related to stock return volatility, and argue 
that their results were produced by the competitive deregulatory environment in 
                                            
26 Murphy (1999) documents a substantial increase in stock options, and a major increase in 
top executive remuneration over the period 1992-1996. 
27 Theories suggest that the determinants of the structure of CEO pay include firm 
characteristics (risk, leverage, market-to-book ratio, risk) and CEO characteristics (tenure).  
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which banks were operating. In addition, Brewer et al. (2003) highlight lower levels 
of stocks and options grants in banks, as found by Houston and James (1995).  
Another drawback of the above research is that it lumps stock and option grants 
together when, according to John and John (1993) and Narayanan (1996), it is 
important to disentangle them because each aspect of the contract invokes 
different incentives to managerial investment decisions. After separating all-stock 
from all-cash contracts, Narayanan (ibid) shows that they lead to long-term 
overinvestment and underinvestment, respectively. He also reports that when 
equity and cash incentives are lumped together; can lead to efficient corporate 
investment decisions. Empirical research that regresses bank risk on managerial 
incentive compensations includes that of Chen et al. (2006), Mehran and 
Rosenberg (2008), DeYoung et al. (2010), and Vallascas and Hagendorff (2010). 
This strand of the literature argues that equity-base incentive is important in 
mitigating managerial risk-aversion behaviour in banking firms28. The above 
empirical studies provide evidence of apparent managerial risk-taking incentives 
and equity-based compensation. Principally, equity-based compensation induces 
risk-averse managers to pursue risky operational and policy choices.  
In US commercial banks, Chen et al. (2006) find that risk varies directly with 
CEO stock-options. Mehran and Rosenberg (2008) have found that CEO option 
pay (portfolio vega) and bank risk (measured by total equity return volatility, 
residual of stock return volatility and asset volatility) are strongly positively 
connected. The vega, or the sensitivity of CEO wealth to the volatility of equity 
value (risk), is defined as the dollar change in the value of CEO stock and option 
portfolio for 0.01 changes in the standard deviation of stock returns (Guay, 1999). 
DeYoung et al. (2010) point out that market risk measures and policy variables 
increase in CEO portfolio vega. Specifically, they show that total risk, systematic 
risk, idiosyncratic risk, noninterest, and private mortgage-backed securities are 
positive and significantly related to vega, as Mehran and Rosenberg (2008) have 
                                            
28 In industrials, extant empirical work is associated with business policy choices. This study 
connects CEO portfolio vega to risk-taking. For instance, while stock return volatility (Guay, 
1999; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002) is positively related to the contemporaneous vega, leverage 
(Coles et al., 2006) is positively associated with previous vega and negatively related to delta, 
respectively (Coles et al., 2006). Conversely, modelling vega endogenously, Coles et al. (2006) 
indicate that CEO risk-taking incentive is a positive function of stock return volatility. Both stock 
return volatility and leverage have been utilised as measurements of firm risk. Low (2009) notes 
that firms responded to the increased legal rules and institutions of Delaware takeover protection 
through increasing CEOs’ portfolio vega. 
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also found. Delta enters negatively on these risk measures. In line with the 
theoretically predicted directions, Vallascas and Hagendorff (2010) show that 
distance to a default indicator is negatively related to CEO stock options and 
positively associated with bonus payment. By contrast, Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
(2011) find no relation between vega and banks performance (ROA) through cross-
sectional regressions. In fact, evidence from this study suggests that higher CEO 
vega did not lead to greater risk-taking during the recent banking crisis (in particular 
with respect to stock options).  
C. Summary  
The above stylised facts offer some insights into managerial risk-taking incentives 
and executive compensation in banking firms. However, conflicting results have 
been produced. Firstly, widespread empirical evidence documents a positive and 
statistically significant relation between the CEO compensation package and the 
performance of the bank. Secondly, there is evidence of a positive and significant 
relationship between risk-taking and equity-based compensation, which is 
consistent with the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence (Chen et al., 
2006; Mehran and Rosenberg, 2008; DeYoung et al. 2010; Vallascas and 
Hagendorff, 2010). Thirdly, a recent stream of research shows that the larger the 
equity-based compensation of the executive package, the higher the vega (driven 
by larger stock option composition), and this leads to greater managerial risk-taking 
incentives. However, in early studies of regulated firms, the contracting theory is 
not supported by the promotion of risk-taking (Houston and James, 1995), and tight 
restrictions and meagre managerial stock option holdings were drivers for the 
failure of this hypothesis. 
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Table 2-3 Summary of managerial compensation for financial institutions 
This reports a summary of research into managerial compensation. Unless otherwise stated, all studies in this table refer to managerial compensation.   
Explanatory variable  Sample characteristics  Risk measures  Sign  Performance  
measures 
Sign  
  Author(s) Period Institutions Number   Sign  Measure   
Panel A: Compensation as independent variable  
Stock and option DeYoung et al. 
(2010) 
’94-‘06 114 banks  Total, systematic, and 
idiosyncratic risk  
Negative     
 Mehran and 
Rosenberg 
(2008) 
‘92-‘02 549 Equity volatility and 
residual volatility 
Positive    
        
Vega /stock option grants Mehran and 
Rosenberg 
(2008) 
‘92-‘02 549 Equity volatility and 
residual volatility 
Positive    
 DeYoung et al. 
(2010) 
’94-‘06 114 banks  Total and systematic 
risk, and noninterest 
income  
Positive      
Stock option-
compensation  
Vallascas and 
Hagendorff 
(2010) 
’93-‘07 172 banks Distance to default Negative    
 Chen et al. 
(2006) 
’92-‘00 68 banks Capital market risk 
proxies 
Positive    
Stock  compensation Saunders et al. 
(1990) 
‘78-‘85 38 BHCs Capital market risk 
proxies 
Positive    
 Chen et al. 
(1998) 
‘88-‘93 302 thrifts Capital market risk 
measures 
Positive    
Salary and bonus Vallascas and 
Hagendorff 
(2010) 
’93-‘07 172 banks  Distance to default Positive    
Delta (pay-performance 
sensitivity) 
Barro and Barro 
(1990) 
‘82-‘87 330 banks   ROA and stock 
returns 
Positive  
 Crawford et al. 
(1995) 
‘76-‘88 124 banks   CEO wealth Positive 
 Hubbard and 
Palia (1995) 
‘80-‘89 147 banks    Shareholder 
wealth  
Positive  
 Fields and 
Fraser (1999) 
‘81-‘95 56 banks   Net income and  
shareholder value 
 
Delta (pay-performance 
sensitivity) 
John and Qian 
(2003) 
‘92-‘00 120 banks   Change in 
shareholder value 
Positive  
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Delta (pay-performance 
sensitivity) 
Harjoto and 
Mullineau (2003) 
‘92-‘00 438 BHCs   Return on 
dividend yield 
Positive  
 Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz (2011) 
‘06  98 banks    ROA Negative  
Vega  Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz (2011) 
‘06  98 banks    ROA No 
association  
Panel B: Compensation as dependent variable  
Explanatory variable     Dependent(risk 
measures)  
   
Delta (pay-performance 
sensitivity) 
Houston and 
James (1995) 
‘80-‘90 134 banks  Equity volatility No 
association  
  
 John and Qian 
(2003) 
‘92-‘00 120 banks Volatility of the equity 
value change  
Positive    
    Leverage  Negative    
Stock and option Harjoto and 
Mullineau (2003) 
‘92-‘00 438 BHCs Equity volatility  Positive   
    Leverage  Positive   
Total equity-based 
compensation/total 
compensation 
Brewer et l., 
(2003) 
’92-‘00 100 BHCs Stock return volatility Positive    
 Cuñat and 
Guadalupe 
(2009) 
‘99-‘02 Financial services   Shareholder 
wealth  
Positive  
Salary and bonus  Cuñat and 
Guadalupe 
(2009) 
‘99-‘02 Financial services   Shareholder 
wealth  
Positive  
Stock return volatility Harjoto and 
Mullineau (2003) 
‘92-‘00 438 BHCs Salary  Positive     
Leverage  ‘92-‘00 438 BHCs Stock and option 
grants 
Positive     
Leverage Angbazo and 
Narayanan 
(1997) 
‘89 97 banks Equity based 
compensation 
Positive    
Market to book value of 
equity 
Benston and 
Evan (2006) 
‘88-‘94 141 banks Bonus  Positive    
*International sample used in the analysis. ROA refers to return on assets ratio. 
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2.2.4 Market discipline and subordinated debts and debentures 
Flannery (1998) observes that reasonable market discipline measures should be 
included in the corporate governance of large publicly traded bank holding 
companies. This is also emphasised in pillar 2 of Basel II. Flannery and Sorescu 
(1996, p. 1356), note that “market discipline can be described as the process by 
which informed market investors gather and evaluate information about a firm's 
activities and prospects, and incorporate that information into its traded securities”. 
From this definition, it can be seen that the key issue is that uninsured market 
investors face bank sub-debt costs that increase as banks pursue risky strategies 
as a result of federal guarantees - i.e. there is a positive association between bank 
risk-related accounting information and subordinated debt yields.  
Accordingly, if banks compensate unprotected depositors disproportionally, they 
may punish banks for greater risk-taking. These private sector agents can discipline 
banks by partly withdrawing uninsured deposits, demanding higher rewards, or 
shifting to credible and low risk-profile banks (Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 
2001). This move can help banks to reduce the extent of risk-taking, thus, avoid 
collapsing, and is consistent with the market discipline hypothesis, which centres 
primarily on interest rates paid on deposits, deposit growth, and market information 
signals. Market investors in equity differ from uninsured market investors in bank 
sub-debt securities. However, the former are generally junior claimants over the 
firm’s assets, whereas the latter are senior ones (Gorton and Santomero, 1990). 
One branch of the literature analysing market discipline examines interest rates 
(Baer and Brewer, 1986; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; Martinez-Peria and 
Schmuckler, 2001) and level or growth rate in deposits (Martinez-Peria and 
Schmuckler, 2001). While the former empirical evidence shows that bank risk 
factors (i.e., the non-performing loans ratio or standard deviation of stock returns) 
and yields on deposits are positively associated, the latter evidence indicates a 
negative correlation between bank risk fundamentals (i.e., the non-performing loans 
ratio) and deposit change. By contrast, Park and Peristiani (1998) find that yield on 
deposits and deposit growth are positively and negatively associated with the 
probability of failure in the thrift institutions, respectively. The results found by these 
research papers support the theoretical predictions. Alternatively, the explicit 
deposit insurance (i.e. the bank safety net) generates moral hazards that increase 
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bank risk-taking by weakening market discipline (Baer and Brewer, 1986; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huzinga, 2004; Gropp and Vesala, 2004)29.  
Previous empirical studies that analyse financial markets’ disciplining of banks’ 
actions through pricing their uninsured debts according to their risk profiles have 
produced diverse results. These securities refer to jumbo certificate of deposits 
(CDs), subordinated notes and debentures, and federal funds30. Compared to 
insured depositors, claimants of uninsured securities are more vulnerable to 
systematic risk in the event of bank failures. During bank runs, market depositors 
reallocate their expectations of future deposit losses31. This strand of research 
examines market discipline around the sensitivity of subordinated notes and 
debentures spread or yield sensitivities to balance sheet risks. The findings of 
these studies are inconclusive.  
The credit spread of subordinated notes and debentures (SNDs) is defined by 
Krishnan et al. (2005, p. 344) as “the difference in basis points between the yield to 
maturity of the issue and the yield of an equivalent Treasury security”. Some 
studies find that SND yields are not statistically related to bank-specific balance 
sheet information (Avery et al., 1988; Gorton and Santomero, 1990; Krishnan et al., 
2005). However, the absence of strength does not mean that investors are 
insensitive to a bank’s specific risk. Gorton and Santomero (1990) argue that the 
lack of tension between bank risk-accounting data and market indicators could be 
due to the failure to employ theoretical framework models for estimating bank 
SNDs. In addition, some literature contends that lenders of last resort and 
conjectural government protection absorb enormous default losses on large banks 
                                            
29 Demirgüç-Kunt and Tolga (2001) define ‘explicit deposit insurance’ as that in which some 
form of legislation (such as a central bank law, banking law, or other constitution) establishes a 
guarantee scheme for deposits. Other countries, for example Hong Kong, promote the private 
sector monitoring of banks through the “no insurance policy” (Gay et al., 1991). 
30 While federal funds refer to uninsured and uncollateralised deposits borrowed from other 
banks (i.e., interbank loans), a CD is a receipt for time deposit that can be traded in the 
secondary market issued by deposit accepting (negotiable) institutions. Generally, CDs are 
denominated in substantial monetary values – e.g. US$. 
31 The insolvency at Northern Rock Bank in September 2007 was accompanied by the global 
banking panic. In response to this episode, Gordon Brown, the UK former Prime Minister 
proposed that the bank be privatised, and put in place a bank bail-out policy to head-off banking 
fragility and economic spiral. The bank was nationalised as the most risk-averse way to protect 
depositors, and of which indirect bail-out costs were passed on to taxpayers 
(http://www.moneymorning. com/2008). Brown’s model was later borrowed and adopted by other 
nations, including the US, on similar grounds. 
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attributed to a weaker predictive performance of yield spread (Flannery and 
Sorescu, 1996; Gropp and Vesala, 2004, and others)32.  
Numerous studies show that SNDs risk premia are sensitive to bank balance 
sheet characteristics (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Flannery, 1998; Evanoff and 
Wall, 2001; DeYoung et al., 2001; Hancock and Kwast, 2001; Sironi, 2003; Goyal, 
2005). These findings have been prominent since the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 enactment. For example, Flannery and 
Sorescu (1996) and Sironi (2003) demonstrate that yield spread is positively 
associated with financial leverage and the non-performing loans ratio, which is 
consistent with the theoretical predictions. Risk premia on SNDs is also negatively 
or positively related to profitability (return on asset). While the former relationship is 
attributed to either profit monopoly or greater efficiency, the latter positive sign on 
the return on asset is generated through compensating for more risk-taking. These 
two studies conclude that bank risk fundamentals explain the cross-sectional 
differences in SND yields. That is, private investors do discipline and mitigate bank 
default risks. Using sub-debts from different data sources that were issued by the 
same banks, Hancock and Kwast (2001) indicate that sub-debt yield spreads are 
generally consistent across surrogate sources for the most liquid bond issues. 
These were bonds characterised by relatively large issuance in size, relatively 
young in age, issued by relatively large BHCs, and relatively traded in strong overall 
bond market.  
In a different context, Evanoff and Wall (2001) take the reverse approach, and 
demonstrate that risk-capital-based ratio indicators have poor predictive powers on 
a bank’s condition in comparison to sub-debt yield-problem bank indicators. In 
Evanoff and Wall’s (ibid) paper, bank fragility is proxied by CAMEL composite or 
BOPEC composite supervisory rating downgrades. In fact, this study offers insights 
into the existence of causation of the bank risk characteristics and sub-debt yield 
association. However, the endogenous problem is not controlled in other studies, 
with the exception in those employing fixed-effect estimators. Generally, these risk 
premia papers on SNDs support the theoretical position that the credit risk portion 
of sub-debt yield spreads reflect default risk  
                                            
32 A recent forestall occurred on 3 October 2008, when the US House of Representatives 
approved a $700 billion (396 billion pound) Wall Street bail-out package for US banks with poor 
loan portfolios/toxic assets. The government equity participation move was designed to shore up 
banks’ capital with taxpayers’ money, and was perceived as a form of part-nationalisation. 
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A further strand of research looks at financial markets from the distance to 
default indicator perspective. The thread running through this research offers a 
theoretical framework for understanding the structural model of default probabilities 
derived from Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) – BSM. Distance to 
default is a special model derived from the corporate debt structural default model. 
The BSM has previously been used in empirical work33. Default occurs when the 
value of assets to debt ratio is less than one – i.e. when its natural log is negative 
(Vassalou and Xing, 2004).  
Vassalou and Xing (2004) delineated a number of advantages that the BSM 
framework has over others, which are based on the fact that BSM does not require 
assumptions related to the integration of bond and equity markets. Firstly, it uses 
the market value of the firm’s equity to calculate its default risk. Secondly, it 
estimates its market debt value instead of using the book debt value, and takes into 
consideration the firm’s asset volatility in estimating the firm’s default risk. Out of 
eight assumptions, the BSM model looks at two salient assumptions, which are that 
both the dynamics for the total value of a firm and a firm’s trading in assets take 
place continuously over time34. The former assumption necessitates that price 
movements are continuous, and that (unanticipated) returns on securities are 
serially independent, which is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, 
although the former assumption presupposes that market securities are frequently 
open for trading. 
As a result of the influential work on default probabilities by Moody’s/KMV [1990], 
Merton’s (1974) distance to default model has also become a popular market risk 
proxy in the banking industry (Duffie et al., 2007). Based on this theoretical 
keystone, distance to default is deemed to be a potentially useful tool due to its 
ability to model and predict corporate default risk relative to traditional accounting 
ratio-based models, as it carries more information (Hillegeist et al., 2004; Gropp et 
al., 2006; Campbell et al., 2008). Agarwal and Taffer (2008) compare the 
performance of a market-based approach with accounting-ratio-based models (i.e., 
Altman’s (1968) z-score or Ohlson’s (1980) z-score) in bankruptcy prediction. 
                                            
33 Examples of empirical studies on industrials include, amongst others: Hillegeist et al. (2004), 
Vassalou and Xing (2004), Duffie et al. (2007), Bharath and Shumway (2008), and Campbell et 
al. (2008). 
34 Merton (1974) argues that many of these assumptions (i.e. the remaining six) are not 
necessary for the model to be obtained, but are chosen for expositional convenience. 
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Interestingly, the authors demonstrate that the variation in predictive accuracy 
between the two models is insignificant, as Hillegeist et al. (2004) illustrate. In 
essence, the accounting-ratio system is criticised for lacking a theoretical 
foundation. Similarly, Agarwal and Taffer (2008) underscore Basel II’s flexibility in 
enabling banks to use internal rating-based approaches to set capital charges with 
respect to the credit risks of their portfolios, as poor credit models could lead to 
sub-optimal allocations of capital. 
In recent times, studies that utilise risk with equity market-based distance-to-
default are growing slowly in the banking firms. The only published works that 
employ a similar methodology, and connect distance to default with a specific 
balance sheet of information are those of Gropp et al. (2004, 2006), and Akhigbe et 
al. (2007). In a sample of European banks, Gropp et al. (2004, 2006) examine 
whether the spread on SNDs and distance-to-default indicators are appropriate 
predictive indicators of the banking condition. Gropp et al. (2004) indicate that bank 
fragility (i.e., proxied by either negative distance to default or the spread on sub-
debt) decreases as the market value of the firm’s assets increase, and increases 
with respect to leverage and asset volatility. Moreover, they argue that the distance 
to default indicator is characterised by a superior predictive power, and is thus more 
revealing than the SND spread signal.  
Gropp et al. (2006) also show that negative distance to default is statistically 
significant and positively related to composite score35. An increase in negative 
distance to default (DD) explains a higher bank distress condition, similar to that of 
spread. Contrastingly, Akhigbe et al. (2007) find that the default likelihood indicator 
is negatively related to capital, size, and the market to book ratio, but positively 
related to financial leverage and return on assets, in a manner consistent with the 
theoretical predictions. They contend that the Fed policy actions can have different 
impacts on the conditions of banks. For instance, during a period of explosive 
increases in interest rates, default likelihoods also increase, and vice versa. 
Although both these papers analyse commercial banks, they have differing 
approaches.  
                                            
35 The composite score is obtained by summing up the score of capital adequacy, asset quality, 
management, and earnings indicators. The study by Gropp et al. (2006) comes close to that by 
Evanoff and Wall (2001) with respect to the construction of the composite score of CAMEL 
supervisory rating grades. 
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While Gropp et al. (2006) use composite scores for bank balance information, 
Akhigbe et al. (2007) employ numerous accounting indicators. The former and the 
latter proxy bank fragility with negative distance to default and default likelihood 
indicators, respectively. However, the above research on distance to default 
analyse commercial banks. Equity price signals have been considered 
inappropriate for bank regulatory supervisors (Gropp et al., 2006). This is because 
equity holders benefit from the upside gains that accrue from increased risk-
shifting, which leads to increased asset volatility. Other research examines distance 
to default from the bank’s capitalisation perspective (Elyasiani and Jia, 2008; 
Flannery and Rangan, 2008). These two studies show that well capitalised-banks 
are associated with lower default risks – i.e. they have greater margins for 
defaulting and vice verse. Importantly, some literature has proposed that large 
banks should issue mandatory subordinated debts and debentures as part of their 
capital structures, which would not be covered by guarantees (Evanoff and Wall, 
2001; Flannery, 2001; Hancock and Kwast, 2001; Sironi, 2003; Krishnan et al., 
2005). The mandatory SND issuance is referred to as a market discipline tool and 
the surveillance of excessive risk-taking in large banks is examined by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision’s consultative paper on capital adequacy 
(1999) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of (1999).  
  Finally, the literature that advertises a valuable bank charter as a decreasing 
function of bank risk-taking includes Marcus (1984), Keeley (1990), Gorton and 
Rosen (1995), Galloway et al., (1997), and Goyal (2005). A bank’s charter-value is 
here understood as the sum of all the benefits enjoyed by bank stakeholders 
(including reputational effects as well as scale and scope economies) that would be 
lost in the event of default. Higher charter values may thus help to constrain risk-
taking behaviour of bank managers, as valuable bank charters cannot be sold on in 
the event of default. That is this tends to discourage them from engaging in 
excessive self-harming risk-taking. Contrastingly, banks with higher market power 
(i.e. with a higher market to book value ratio) hold more capital relative to assets, 
which leads to a lower default risk (Keeley, 1990). Equally, higher-quality banks are 
allowed a relatively larger asset base than lower quality ones, and are subjected to 
lower capital adequacy requirements (Elyasiani and Jia, 2008). Hence, a higher 
bank capital ratio is important, and provides an incentive for mitigating risk-taking 
behaviour. Generally, bank capital and risk are negatively related. 
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D. Summary  
To conclude, the survey of the literature supports the thesis that bank-distress risk 
is captured by market discipline signals. Firstly, the evidence indicates that yields 
on deposits and deposit growth are sensitive to banks’ balance-sheet specific risks. 
Secondly, empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that both equity market-
based distance to default and the spread on SNDs are suitable signals for 
predicting bank stability (Gropp et al., 2004, 2006; Akhigbe et al. 2007), but that the 
distance to default signal performs better in predicting stability than the risk premia 
on SNDs. However, the two may work well in conjunction. Thirdly, findings show 
that negative distance to default is a decreasing function of the market value of the 
firm’s equity, and an increasing function of the volatility of its assets and leverage 
(Gropp et al., 2004). Finally, the issuing of mandatory subordinated notes and 
debentures by large bank holding companies is a policy issue. Taken as a whole, 
market discipline resulting from private investment in bank sub-debts is important 
for regulating banks, both in terms of assessing their condition or stability, and for 
attenuating risk-taking behaviour. 
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Table 2-4 Summary of market discipline in banks  
This reports a summary of research into market discipline. Unless otherwise stated, all studies in this table 
refer to market discipline.   
Dependant 
variable 
 Sample 
characteristics 
 Risk measures/ 
explanatory variable (s) 
 
  Author(s) Period Institutions 
Number 
Measure  Sign  
CD rates  Cargill  (1989)  
 
‘84-‘86 58 banks  Capital  to asset ratio, 
loan loss provision, 
interest  
rate exposure, and 
average maturity of the 
outstanding CDs 
Positive  
Interest rates 
paid 
Martinez-Peria 
and Schmuckler 
(2001) 
‘80s-‘90s  Banks* Capital  to asset ratio Negative  
    Non-performing loans 
ratio 
Positive  
    cash to 
assets  
Negative  
    Bond to assets  Negative  
 Demirguc-Kunt 
 and  Huzinga 
(2004) 
‘90-‘97 Banks*  Capital  to asset ratio Negative  
    ROA Negative   
    liquid assets to total 
assets 
Negative  
Deposit 
growth  
Martinez-Peria 
and Schmuckler 
(2001) 
‘80s-‘90s  Banks* Capital  to asset ratio Positive  
    Non-performing loans 
ratio 
Positive  
    real estate loans to 
total loans 
Positive  
    ROA Positive  
    Bond to assets  Negative  
 Demirguc-Kunt 
 and  Huzinga 
(2004) 
‘90-‘97 Banks*  Capital  to asset ratio Positive  
CAMEL 
ratings   
Evanoff and 
Wall (2001) 
 100 BHCs SND yield spreads Positive  
    Capital ratios Positive  
Insurance 
status  
Wheelock and  
Kumbhakar 
(1995) 
‘10-‘20 212 banks Capital  to asset ratio Negative  
    Surplus to loans and 
ROA 
Negative  
    Bonds to assets, loans 
to assets, deposits to  
assets, accruing loans 
past due 90 day to total 
assets, real estate 
owned to total 
 assets, and financial 
leverage 
Positive  
Equity capital 
to debt  
Nier and  
Baumann 
‘93-‘00 729 banks in 
32 countries 
ROE Positive  
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and deposits 
ratio 
(2006) 
     Provision for loan 
losses  
Positive  
      Asset volatility  Negative  
SND yield 
spread 
Avery et al.,  
(1988) 
‘83-‘84 100 BHCs US treasury securities 
and cash to total assets 
(liquidity)  
Negative  
  Gorton and 
Santomero 
 (1990) 
‘83-‘84 37 BHCs Balance sheet 
information  
No 
association   
  Flannery and  
Sorescu (1996) 
‘83-‘91 83 banks Non-accruing loans to 
total assets  
Positive  
   Krishnan et al. 
(2005) 
‘94-‘99 185 banks & 
3,265 non-
banks 
Balance sheet 
information  
No 
evidence  
  DeYoung et al. 
(2001) 
‘86-‘95 1,079 banks Liabilities to market 
value of equity (financial 
leverage) 
Positive  
    Loans past due ninety 
or more days to assets. 
(Asset quality)  
Negative  
    Other real estate 
divided to assets (asset 
quality) 
Negative  
  Sironi (2003) ‘91-‘00 407 banks ROA Positive  
    Leverage  Positive  
    Interaction of leverage 
and ROA 
Negative  
  Goyal (2005) ‘74–‘95 414 BHCs Market-to-book 
 assets ratio 
Negative   
    Demand deposits to 
total deposits 
Positive  
Distance to 
default  
Gropp et al. 
(2006) 
‘90-‘01 103 banks* Composite score**  Negative  
Default 
likelihood 
indicator  
Akhigbe et al. 
(2007) 
‘99-‘03  1,689 banks Capital to asset and 
market-to-book ratios. 
Negative  
    ROE and financial 
leverage 
Positive  
*International sample used in the analysis. ROA refers to return on assets ratio. ** The composite index is 
calculated exclusively with four indicators, namely capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency 
and profitability. Liquidity was removed due to data limitation.  
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2.3 The Gap in the Literature 
To sum up, the extensive literature synthesized in this chapter has revealed that 
there are several gaps which require filling. Firstly, whilst there is research 
examining the association between risk-taking and ownership structure (see Table 
2-1) - a body of empirical research that limits itself to testing ownership structure on 
bank risk measures in isolation – this research does not ‘parameterise’ bank risk 
measures as a function of the diversity of governance mechanisms that might 
influence bank risk-taking. Therefore, examining board and ownership structure is 
also desirable here. Secondly, this investigation is not aware of any study that 
compares and analyses risk-taking behaviour ex-ante and ex-post the governance-
strengthening standards introduced by the Sarbanes enactment and Regulation A 
in the 2003 amendment. In their cross-sectional analyses of the association 
between influence of disclosure and the governance on risk of financial firms, 
Akhigbe and Martin (2008) control for ownership structure. Thirdly, the literature on 
the relationship between managerial incentives and risk-taking incentives has never 
been tested by controlling board structure governance (Chen et al., 2006; Mehran 
and Rosenberg, 2008; DeYoung et al. 2010; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2010). 
Lastly, as a result of unsettled empirical and theoretical conclusions, together with a 
limited number of studies, empirical research on board structure and risk-taking 
studies is an invaluable contribution to this literature (Staikouras et al., 2007; 
Pathan, 2009).  
 In reviewing the market-discipline literature the following emerges: First, the link 
between the bank-specific balance sheet information and distance to default – the 
risk market measure – is not fully addressed (Gropp et al., 2004, 2006; Akhigbe et 
al., 2007). In fact, this is fundamentally an empirical question. Two, the literature is 
limited as it does not compare the predictive power of SND banks against that of 
non-SND banks. This has not (to my knowledge) been systematically examined 
using the distance to default indicator.  
Research focus: The objective of this study is two-fold. Firstly, the connection 
between bank risk fundamentals and distance to default in sub-debt and non sub-
debt banks will be explored. The underlying question here is whether distance to 
default exhibits higher predictability in sub-debt banks in comparison to banks that 
do not issue mandatory subordinate debt. Market indicators are perceived as 
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important by supervisors in terms of being either complementary to accounting data 
or providing substitutions for it in predicting a bank’s financial status (Flannery, 
1998; Sironi, 2003; Gropp et al., 2006). Secondly, this thesis undertakes further 
investigations into the impact of board and ownership governance and executive 
compensation on bank risk. Some studies note that unsound bank governance and 
managerial compensation contributed to greater risk-taking in depository 
institutions (Chen et al., 2006; Adams, 2009; Pathan, 2009; Walker, 2009; 
DeYoung et al., 2010). In the present day, boards’ failures to execute their fiduciary 
duties of loyalty, and bankers’ excessive pay have become policy issues.  
Moreover, in undertaking this investigation, a number of further issues are 
considered. One is the conflict of interest between bank managers and 
shareholders in risk-taking (Saunders et al., 1990). Addressing this problem is 
crucial for this relationship, as it extends to cover other parties as well – i.e. bank 
regulators and depositors – and in doing so, this study assesses the importance of 
multiple corporate control mechanisms in explaining alternative bank risk 
fundamentals. It also analyses executive incentive compensation and board 
governance on risk-taking and, finally, it considers how predictable distance to 
default and a number of bank risk fundamentals are in sub-debt banks in 
comparison to non-sub-debt banks (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Gropp et al., 
2006). More details on methodological issues will be provided in Chapters 3-6. 
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Chapter 3:  Data Collection and Construction of Variables 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the data sources and sample constructions that are used in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Data has been collected from two surrogate databases. The 
financial data is taken from Worldscope and the Fitch-IBCA Bankscope database 
and the annual reports are used to supplement this information to reduce the 
probability of the results being affected by missing observations. Data for financial 
variables are in US GAAP. This is because reports prepared in accordance with the 
GAAP system are deemed to contain maximum quality disclosures (Nier and 
Baumann, 2006). Data on corporate governance variables including ownership, 
board structure, and compensation was hand-collected using proxy statements 
(DEF-14A forms) submitted under SEC proxy rules. Proponents of archived data 
assert that data from proxy statements can be relatively expensive to access, and 
time consuming to collect, but it is a wealthy information surrogate source in terms 
of updating and ranking of ownership statistics (Anderson and Lee, 1997). 
However, Form 20 of the SEC requires banks to disclose more information than 
that required by regulators. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents the 
sample selection criteria. In Section 3.3, variable definitions are discussed. Section 
3.4 reports some of the key descriptive statistics for the entire sample. In Section 
3.5 and 3.6, I report descriptive statistics. Lastly, the summary and concluding 
remarks of this chapter are provided in Section 3.7. 
3.2 Sample Selection Criteria 
The sample for this investigation is based on 445 identified publicly traded BHCs 
accessed from the Bankscope database as at September 2006. In order for BHCs 
to remain within the final data set, the following criteria need to be met: Each BHC 
must have data on the Bankscope for at least two years during the period 2000-
2005. In fact, this process does not address survivorship bias. This problem is 
minimised by creating 146-bank subsets of banks that are available for the whole 
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sample period36. Further to this point, failed, delisted, or acquired banks are 
insignificant and this assures sample continuity over time37. During the search for 
this data, a considerable number of missing financial observations in the 
Bankscope database was discovered. To address this problem, the Worldscope 
database was used. The information from these two sources was matched by using 
tickers and company names, so that information about the same firms was collated 
from these different databases. 
 Every depository institution in the sample was either a national commercial bank 
(SIC: 6021) or a state commercial bank (SIC: 6022), with proxy statement filings in 
the SEC. A national/federal chartered bank is perceived to be a high quality bank 
that receives first class supervision. Since the data sample used was from bank 
holding companies: thrifts (124), security brokers, dealers and floatation companies 
(2), real estate investment trusts (1), mortgage bankers and loan correspondents 
(3), miscellaneous business credit (1), life insurance (2), money centre (1), and 
commercial banks not classified elsewhere (1) are discarded from 455 BHCs38. 
Banks with no annual proxy statements on SEC (18) and banks with annual proxy 
statements on SEC, but with a notable number of missing financial observations 
(38) are also removed. Finally, 45 BHCs were searched and identified direct from 
SEC and the data re-collected from the proxy statement to ensure that the sample 
used is not less than 300 BHCs. As a consequence, the resulting final data sample 
contains 301 bank holding companies, and is presented in Table 3-1. 
The sample selection of national or state commercial banks is important in the 
sense that they are regulated and supervised by almost the same legal institutional 
framework, namely: the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve 
System and the FDIC. The sample is categorised into three groups on the basis of 
asset portfolio size and q, hereunder: That is, small banks are those that fall in Q1, 
medium banks are those in Q2-Q4 and large banks are those in Q5. As pointed out 
by Gatev et al. (2009) large banks not only trade shares regularly, but are also 
                                            
36 Adams and Mehran (2003) advocated that large distressed banks are liquidated by 
regulators. In the event of bankruptcy reorganisation, via acquisition by another bank, the 
target/failing bank often (but not always) loses its identity. In the worst-case scenario, the bank 
management of the target bank can be removed. However, its identity continues and, in turn, 
this minimises potential survivorship bias in the banking firm samples.   
37 According to the FDIC report, 24 banks failed between 2000 and 2005. 
38 Number of institutions discarded is indicated in brackets. 
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more active in lending than small banks and hold the majority of the US’s banking 
assets.  
This investigation focuses on US bank holding companies for a number of 
reasons: Firstly, with respect to asset portfolios, the US’s economy is largely 
diversified in comparison to those of other countries. Secondly, the first decade of 
the 2000’s was the era for new investment opportunities exploitation - following the 
deregulation and reform policies of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. Thirdly, 
this banking sector is composed of both the world’s large and small banking firms, 
suggesting a lower concentration in this industry than is present in other economies 
(Allen and Gale, 1995; Hanc, 2004). Finally, big depositors, in particular, sub-debt 
holders, are not protected by the depositor insurance scheme in BHCs, which gives 
them incentives to monitor and enhance market discipline in BHCs.  
3.3 Proxies Construction 
Data construction is divided into two parts – variables that are related to corporate 
governance, and firm-level characteristics. Data on corporate governance variables 
- ownership, boards, and compensation was hand-collected using proxy statements 
(DEF-14A forms) submitted under SEC proxy rules. 
3.3.1 Construction for ownership and board variables 
The source of ownership and board variables are the definitive proxy statements 
(DEF-14A forms) filed under SEC website. To provide investors with valuable 
information, publicly traded firms (including bank holding companies) are required 
by the Security Exchange Act of (1934) to file DEF-14A form with SEC. Each form 
consists of information on ownership structure – i.e. management, institutional and 
blockholders. It also contains information on board structure – i.e. board size and 
board composition-independent, gray and insider directors, as well as the position 
of the CEO in the board. Today, the separation of the CEO from Board Chairman’s 
duties in the boardroom is emphasised the by legal and regulatory protocols.  
Ownership structure: This includes managerial ownership, CEO ownership, 
institutional ownership and blockholder ownership. Managerial ownership is labelled 
as INSOWN and is used to proxy for insider ownership (Saunders et al., 1990; 
Anderson and Fraser, 2000; Booth et al., 2002). It is defined as the percentage of 
ordinary outstanding shares held directly by top executive officers, including the 
- 65 - 
 
CEO and directors. This variable is important in controlling for agency conflicts 
have in firm behaviour that significantly influence corporate value. As the 
managerial ownership level increases, managers have higher incentives to 
represent shareholders’ value maximising interests. CEO Ownership is another 
proxy for insider ownership, denoted as CEOWN. It is used to proxy for the 
potential entrenchment of the CEO in terms of ownership concentration (Hillier et 
al., 2005; Coles et al., 2008; Cheng, 2008). It is defined as the CEO’s percentage 
of shareholdings. It is based on outstanding shares and known under the acronym 
CEOWN.  
 Institutional ownership refers to the percentage of ordinary shares held by 
institutional investors. The institutional investors are characterised by their activism 
in pressurising managers to maximise value for shareholders – i.e. monitoring 
corporate behaviour. It is based on common equity shares under their voting 
control and is denoted as INSTOWN (Adams and Mehran, 2003; Konishi and 
Yasuda, 2004; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Elyasiani and Jia, 2008). This proxy is 
used to capture ownership concentration. Blockholder ownership is a proxy for the 
percentage of shares held by blockholders with >=5% ownership of the banks’ 
outstanding shares39. The measure for blockholders includes individuals, 
institutional investors and corporate business, and is denoted as BLOCK. 
Blockholders are influential in managerial decisions as they are associated with 
shareholders’ value-maximising (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Mehran, 1995).  
Board structure: Board structure variables are divided into board size, board 
composition, and Chairman/CEO split. The board size variable is used to proxy for 
the number of directors in the firm at the end of the financial year and is denoted as 
BDSIZE as used by Yermack (1996), Adams and Mehran (2005), Linck et al. 
(2008), Andres and Vallelado (2008), Pathan (2009), and others. The stylized fact 
from this empirical evidence supports the view in Jensen (1993) that larger boards 
in comparison to smaller ones are susceptible to higher agency problems as they 
can easily be controlled by CEO. Board size is an important element in firm 
governance. Compared to very large boards that are easily controlled by CEO, 
small boards are independent in corporate decision-making and activities co-
ordination (Jensen, 1993).  
                                            
39 This definition of blockholder ownership takes into accounts both institutional ownership and 
individual ownership. In this sense, it differs from that of Cremers and Nair (2005), which 
excludes non-institutional blockholders due to the difficulty of collecting reliable data.  
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Percentage of independent directors is denoted by the acronym FINBD, and 
used to proxy for board composition. This refers to outsider membership on the 
board, and is measured as the fraction of the board seats held by non-executive 
officers (with no financial or family relationship to management) divided by the total 
number of directors on the board (Yermack, 1996; Mak and Li, 2001; Booth et al. 
2002; Cheng, 2008; Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Pathan, 2009). “Outside directors 
have incentives to carry out their tasks and do not collude with managers to exploit 
residual claimants” (Fama and Jensen, 1983, p. 315). An alternative view holds that 
they have closer incentives as those of shareholders. The power originating from 
CEO duality may affect the ability of the board’s monitoring capability (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1998).  
SPLIT is a dummy variable equal to 1 where the chairman is also the CEO, but 
otherwise is set at 0. Brickley et al., (1997), Raheja (2005), and Adams and 
Ferreira (2007) argued that a CEO with a dual role faces a trade-off between 
information disclosure and intensive scrutiny by an independent board. TENURE 
captures the number of years served by the current CEO. Theoretically, as the 
tenure of the CEO increases, so does the firm’s performance. A CEO who 
performs well and has served for a long period has a higher probability of holding 
dual CEO-Chair posts (Brickley et al., 1997). This behaviour can be viewed as CEO 
entrenchment.  
3.3.2 The construction of compensation measures 
CEO compensation is gathered direct from the proxy statement of each bank SEC 
website. A diversity of proxies has been used to capture the structure of 
compensation for the CEO. The level of pay or direct compensation is defined as 
including the total of salary, bonuses, and the value of stock and options grants. 
Each form of compensation affects CEO behaviour differently on the corporation 
(Nayaranan, 1996). Virtually, cash-based and equity-based compensation are 
separated to ascertain their implications and incentives on risk-taking. 
Cash compensation is defined as the total salary and bonus compensation 
(Mehran, 1995; John and Quin, 2003; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Brick et al., 2006; 
Benston and Evan, 2006; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2010). Equity-based 
compensation is defined as including stock option and common stock values. 
Again, consistent with the proposal by Nayaranan (1996), equity-based 
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compensation is disentangled from stock and stock options. Theoretically and 
empirically, incentive effects of stock ownership or stock option compensation on 
managerial investment decision vary as do to firm performance and risk-taking. 
Accordingly, the relevance of executive compensation on firm performance is well-
documented (see Table 2-3). The common stock value is calculated by multiplying 
the number of shares of each CEO holdings and closing stock price at the end of 
each period, and is denoted as CEO-STOCK. CEOs’ holdings information for the 
years is gathered as the date of the proxy statement. Information on closing stock 
price is downloaded from Datastream database. CEO stock option valuation is 
based on Black-Scholes methodology and it is discussed below.  
3.3.2.1 CEO stock option value estimation 
Stock options granted are valued using the Black-Scholes option-pricing model 
(1973), on the assumption that investors are risk-neutral and that all assets 
appreciate at the risk-free rate. The information regarding the number options 
granted to the CEO, exercise price per option share and expiration date or time to 
maturity in years were hand collected from the proxy statement on yearly basis - 
i.e. from the executive compensation section. Where the exercise price is not 
reported in the statement, this price is estimated by taking the mean of the stock 
prices – i.e. opening price plus closing price divided by two. Information over 
closing stock price, dividend yield and equity return volatility is gathered from 
Datastream database. Following Guay (1999), Chen et al. (2006), Coles et al. 
(2006), among others, the Black-Scholes formula for European call option 
valuations, as modified by Merton (1974), to account for continuously paid 
dividends is used. Thus, call option value is estimated in equation (3.1): 
 
where; 
  
 
 
N:  Cumulative probability functions for the standard normal distribution. 
S: Price of the underlying stock as of December 31 for each period. 
X:   Exercise price of the option is obtained from the proxy statement, as at December 31. 
For missing observations, the exercise price is estimated by dividing the total of the 
stock prices at the beginning and closing over two (Guay, 1999).   
   
 
    Call option value= [Se -dT N(Z) – Xe -rT N(Z - σT1/2).....................………….…(3.1) 
Z is the [In (S/X) + T(r-d+σ
2
/2)]/ σT
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σ:   Annualised equity-return volatility from the Datastream. 
r:   ln (1+risk-free interest rate), where, r is the natural logarithm of the risk-free interest rate 
of the yield on a 10-year US government Treasury-Bond, with constant maturities on 
December 31, 2000. 
d:  ln (1+dividend yield), d is the natural logarithm of the expected dividend rate on the 
underlying  stock paid during the year. 
T:   Remaining time to maturity of the option in years. In case grant date information is not 
available in the proxy statement, T is set equal to 10 years at the grant date. This is 
because a large number of options issued in the sample have ten-year duration. 
 
Subsequently, for a portfolio of N stock options, the option value is equal to the call 
option value (estimated by Black-Scholes model) multiplied by the number of 
options granted to the CEO. Black-Scholes option value is denoted as CEO-OPT. 
In the end, the CEO option value is used as a component of equity based 
compensation and total compensation/direct compensation. Accordingly, 
managerial compensation incentives are presented in Chapter 6. 
3.3.3  Construction for firm specific variables 
Information to compute financial variables are downloaded direct from Worldscope 
and the Fitch-IBCA Bankscope databases.  
Tobin’s Q calculation: Tobin’s Q (Q), as a traditional firm performance proxy, has 
been used in a range of studies (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 
2002; Hillier et al., 2005; Andres and Vallelado, 2008).  A firm whose Q is ≥ 1.0 is 
considered to have a market value higher than the value of the firm’s book assets. 
This explains why some firms’ assets may not be recorded. Goyal (2005) 
documents that economic rents generated from a valuable charter or franchise 
value are capitalised in the market value of the banks’ assets (but not in the book 
value). The author also indicates that the demand deposit ratio is an alternative 
measure for charter bank value, which proxies the market power resulting from 
deposit markets. Adopting Keeley (1990) and Caprio’s et al. (2007) method Q is 
estimated as follows in equation (3.2):  
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Q=(market equity value + book value of debt)/Total 
assets40............................................................................(3.2) 
 
Caprio et al. (2007) analyse the impact of shareholders protection laws and 
ownership structures on the highest valued publicly listed banks from 44 countries, 
as defined by the total assets at the end of 2001. They highlight that a stronger 
legal protection of minority shareholders is related to greater bank performance. 
They also note that the expropriation of minority shareholders is crucial for banks in 
many countries, whilst legal mechanisms restrict the expropriation of bank 
resources.  
Total Capital Adequacy Ratio: It is defined as the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital 
divided by the total risk-weighted assets and is denoted as CART. This ratio 
captures whether a bank is well capitalised, adequately capitalised, under-
capitalised, or critically under-capitalised. A bank is considered to be well 
capitalised by FDIC if its total risk assets ratio is ≥ 10%, or more than 10% of risk-
weighted assets, and the tier 1 risk assets ratio is ≥ 6% (Elyasiani and Jia, 2008; 
Flannery and Rangan, 2008).  
A. Risk Measures 
The fundamental risk proxies used in this thesis are the bank balance sheet risk 
characteristics and, leverage annual stock-return volatility. These risk measures 
were widely used in several research works (Saunders et al., 1990; Gorton and 
Rosen, 1995; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Martinez-Peria and Schmuckler, 2001; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Konishi and Yasada, 2004; Coles et al. 2006; 
Laeven and Levine, 2009). As such, the dependent variable is a risk measure - 
either accounting-based or market-based indicators. However, accounting risk 
proxies are perceived to be unbiased and precise proxies for firm financial condition 
and viability (Gorton and Santomero, 1990). Market stock return volatility measures 
the total variability in stock returns and it reflects the perceptions of the market over 
bank risks associated with both on- and off-balance sheet exposures (Demsetz et 
al., 1997).  
                                            
40 A large part of debt is composed of customers’ core deposits, as these are the major sources 
for banks cash flows (Diamond, 1984). 
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Z-score is an overall bank risk proxy. It is calculated by taking the total returns on 
assets plus capital asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset returns. 
(Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009). Practically, regulatory bodies pay a close 
eye on the banks’ overall risk measures. Leverage (debt ratio) is defined as the 
total debt divided by total assets. It is expected that risk is positively related to 
leverage (Lev, 1974; Saunders et al., 1990): and highly leveraged banks usually 
show greater stock return volatility and lower capital ratio – leading to higher default 
likelihood in bad times.  
B. Control Variables 
Many control variable specifics that might influence bank risk-taking levels are 
mainly selected based on prior research. These variables include asset size, 
leverage, market-to-book, and return on assets. Firm size (LNSIZE) is defined as 
the natural log of book value of firm’s assets. Larger banks relative to small ones 
(i.e., vulnerable to higher credit risk likelihood) are perceived as safer - as they can 
diversify their asset portfolio risk, are better managed, have lower probability of 
failure or can enjoy federal bailout schemes (Saunders et al., 1990; Cebenoyan et 
al., 1995; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Sironi, 2003; Akhigbe et al., 2007). Yet, 
larger banks are more liquid and have relatively lower information asymmetry. The 
bank asset size also measures growth opportunities. Hence, these effects suggest 
that the direction of asset size (i.e., sign on the coefficient) depends on the type of 
risk this variable is regressed on (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997).  
 Return on assets (ROA) captures the earnings of a bank. Risk is expected to be 
positively associated with higher earnings, a reflection of compensation for higher 
risk-taking (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996). On the other hand, it indicates the 
presence of monopoly or management efficiency as risk measures are predicted to 
be negatively related to ROA. Market value to book value ratio (MTB) is defined as 
market value of common stock over book value of common stock. It measures the 
value of growth investment opportunity sets (Smith and Watts, 1992) and as 
Tobin’s Q it also captures the charter value of the bank (Keeley, 1990). Risk is 
predicted to be negatively associated with MTB, suggesting lower default probability 
in higher charter value banks.  
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3.4 Summary of Statistics for the Entire Sample 
Table 3-2 contains the key descriptive statistics for ownership and board structure 
over the period 2000-2005. The average mean values of managerial ownership 
reveal a mixed pattern. They increased from 16% in 2000 to 17% in 2002 fell to 
16% in 2003, then to 14% in 2005. This pattern might be attributed to consolidation 
in the banking industry subsequent to the Glass-Steagall Act relaxation. The pooled 
mean value of this variable is 16%. These values are considerably higher than 
those of 5.77% and 13.857%, reported by Booth et al. (2002) and Elyasiani and Jia 
(2008), respectively. Median values were quite below the average mean values. 
The range is between 0% and 87%. Elyasiani and Jia (2008) report a range of 
0.534% to 98.65%, which is reasonably close to that found in this investigation. It 
may be argued that these differences are attributable to defining managerial 
ownership to take directors into account (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996).  
Average mean and median values for the percentage of CEO ownership depict 
steady trends of 4% and 2% over the entire period, respectively. Booth et al. (2002) 
and Linck et al. (2008) reported mean values of 8.97% and 6.07% for CEO 
ownership in industrial firms, respectively. These patterns suggest that insiders in 
the banking industry hold lower equity stakes than industrial firms do. This might be 
explained by the existing regulations that restrict the level of ownership of bank 
insiders at a certain percentage of core capital (tier 1), as well as by nosier 
environments, which precipitate higher agency costs (Demsetz and Lenn, 1985). 
The average mean values for the percentages of institutional ownership show a 
mixed pattern, with a pooled value of 15%, which is lower than that of 27.60% 
reported by Elyasiani and Jia (2008). Similarly, the medians for the percentages of 
institutional ownership are far below the means. The range is 0% to 96%, whereas 
Elyasiani and Jia (2008) report a range of 1.299% to 81.435%. This variation could 
be attributed to the proliferation in number of these institutions investing substantial 
equity stakes in corporate banks as pointed out by Elyasiani and Jia (2008).  
Previously, fewer institutions owned a smaller fraction of bank stocks (Adams 
and Mehran, 2003). However, institutional investors are the largest shareholders in 
bank holding companies today (i.e. with a maximum shareholding around 96% in 
my sample held in SVB Financial Group). With this pattern, one would argue that 
regulatory reforms, financial products and services, market innovations, and 
advancement in technological developments influenced institutional investors to 
shift investing more in banking firms. The average mean values for the percentages 
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of blockholder ownership also show a mixed pattern. However, the range is 5% to 
96%, which implies a higher ownership concentration for banking firms. It is 
apparent that blockholders ownership is estimated as the percentage of shares 
held by institutions or individuals with greater than or equal to 5% ownership of the 
outstanding shares.  
Institutional investors are the largest blockholders in banking firms. With this 
huge wealth capital investment, it may be logical that institutional investors should 
have greater incentives to shape bank managerial behaviour as noted by Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986) for corporate firms. In fact, their ability to discipline corporate 
behaviour may be affected by both investment agenda and horizon. For instance, 
there are times when institutional investors hold shares for a long-term (stable 
shareholders) or a short-term motive. With this opposing incentive, institutional 
investors can drive managers to boost corporate performance or self-serving 
behaviour. 
The mean and median values for board size show a slight decreasing trend (see 
Figure 3-1), with pooled values of 12 and 11, respectively. These values are higher 
than those reported in industrial firms by Linck et al. (2008) for the period 1990-
2004. In fact, Adams and Mehran (2005, p. 4) provide evidence that, “the 
proportion of outsiders in BHCs and the size of the board are large compared … 
[with] manufacturing firms”. The range is from 4 members (i.e. in the Macatawa 
Bank Corporation and Eagle Bancorp) to 33 members (in United Bancorp). This 
range is lower than that of 8 to 36 board members found by Adams and Mehran 
(2008) in the US’s BHCs for the period 1986-1999. This variation was triggered by 
the mergers of the 1980s, which brought in a large number of M&As in to the 
banking sector (Gorton and Rosen, 1995; DeLong and DeYoung, 2007). In this 
sample, therefore, the decreasing pattern in board size can be explained as follows: 
One, the pace of merger and acquisition wave of large BHCs declined relatively 
over the period considered. Two, following the arrival of the strong Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (2002) and complexity of banking business, there is a sense that individuals 
nominated to join bank boards are hesitant to avoid being held accountable in case 
things go wrong. 
The percentage of independent directors is so significant with respect to the 
composition of boards and rose from 2002. The average values show an upward 
trend from 75% (2002) to 77% (2005). These values are higher than those of 69% 
and 58% reported by Booth et al. (2002) and Adams and Mehran (2008), 
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respectively. Indeed, since 2002, figure 3-2 exhibits the stylised fact of the increase 
in the percentage of independent directors in the board composition: with the 
provisions under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and regulations at other US major 
exchanges, reformed boards are largely composed of independent directors.  
Overall, board size slightly went down, whilst independent board composition 
reversed to an upward swing. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), as well as 
amendments to the NYSE and the NASDAQ, contributed to this behaviour in board 
structure (Linck et al., 2008). Additionally, board size in banks is influenced by the 
structure of the boards of the BHC’s lead and subsidiary banks (Adams and 
Mehran, 2002). Intuitively, these patterns entail that most bank firms are adjusting 
towards greater board independence. This is consistent with the recent prominence 
of corporate governance reforms, and Basel II’s emphasis on corporate 
governance and risk management in financial institutions.  
Average values for the CEO-Chair position, SPLIT, declined from 49% in 2000 to 
47% in 2002, and then remained static until 2005. Taken as a whole, less than 50% 
in my sample are dual CEO-Chair banks. This supports the view that the extent of 
regulation in banks reduces the importance of CEO-Chair governance in mitigating 
agency costs and enhancing performance (Brickley et al., 1997; Booth et al., 2002). 
Booth et al. (2002) pointed out that the percentage of CEOs serving as 
chairpersons of the board is 80% in a cross-section; which is higher than the 50% 
found in my sample.  
Table 3-3 presents descriptive statistics for the CEO cash-based and equity-
based compensation. Cash compensation for CEOs has displayed a mixed 
declining pattern. In mean values, it exhibited a downward trend from $0.65 million 
in 2000 to $0.59 million in 2002, before it increased to $0.85 million in 2005. The 
upward trend over the period from 2003 through 2005 is consistent with and can be 
explained by the recent rise in bankers’ pay – i.e. especially in bonuses. Virtually, 
this finding adds to an earlier study - i.e. Houston and James’ (1995) who claim that 
the average cash received by bank CEOs is declining. The average, mean and 
median values for total compensations of CEOs show mixed patterns. They 
decreased from $14.2 million in 2000 to $12.5 million in 2002, before rocketing to 
$18.5 million in 2004, with a slight decrease to $17.70 million in 2005. The range is 
$0 to $1.21 billion. These values are higher than those reported by Bliss and Rosen 
(2001). Perhaps this is due to the definition used, sample period differences, and 
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the regulatory environment change which opened opportunity investment sets for 
banks. 
The CEO stock ownership-based compensation showed an increasing trend. The 
mean values increased to $16.30 million in 2005 from $12.80 million in 2000. For 
comparability, the mean value of the CEO stock option-based compensation 
indicated a mixed pattern. It decreased from $1.05 million in 2000 to $0.85 million 
in 2003 before trending to $1.02 million in 2005. The mean pooled value of CEO 
stock option is $1.03 million. Its range is $0 million to $36.30 million. This distance 
compares with a range of $0 million to $36.055 million reported by Chen et al. 
(2006) in commercial banks. 
The overall CEO total equity-based compensation drifted up from the mean 
values of $13.5 million in 2000 to $16.80 million in 2005. The trend indicates that 
the dollar value of stock ownership and stock options granted increased 
significantly ex-post deregulation as before - i.e.  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
enactment. This behaviour is supportive of findings by Chen et al. (2006) and 
Vallascas and Hagendorff (2010). However, an earlier study by Houston and James 
(1995) reports that bank executives received insignificant amounts in stock option 
compensation. The intent of deregulating the financial sector was to create a more 
competitive environment and increase the scope of investment opportunity set for 
depository institutions. With this growth in equity-based compensation position in 
mind, managers would have had higher incentives to take on newly available 
opportunities by investing in valuable risk-increasing projects.  
Table 3-4 presents the descriptive statistics for different types of assets, 
liabilities, assets quality, and capital quality. The average mean values for total 
assets are driven by earning assets-risk assets, in particular, loans, and show an 
interesting pattern of increase. This suggests that the changing regulatory 
environment drives growth in assets and increased bank lending. The average 
mean value of bank assets increased from $14.42 billion in 2000 to $24.82 in 2005. 
Median values indicate similar behaviour to mean values. Sample selection 
involved banks of varying sizes as evidenced by a range of $0.01 billion to $1,494 
billion. In general, the total assets pattern is consistent with that found in previous 
studies (Adams and Mehran, 2003; Elyasiani and Jia, 2008; Flannery and Rangan, 
2008). The customers’ deposits are the foremost component of banks’ liabilities 
that contribute towards leveraging banks. The average mean values and the 
median values of liabilities both show upward trends, as is the case with assets. 
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The message gathered is that the assets side proportionately increased along with 
the liabilities side of the balance sheets. That is compared to industrial firms; 
volatile bank deposit sources fund asset risk and loan growth. The size of bank 
assets is important and affects risk-taking incentives as large banks are better 
diversified relative to smaller ones (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997).   
The distributions of some selected asset quality indicators include the non-
performing loans to reserve loans loss ratio and the non-performing loans to total 
loans ratio. Reserve loan loss ratio refers to the amount of cash set aside to cover 
problem charged-off loan losses. Non-performing loans ratio refers to a credit 
facility whose contractual repayment is 180 days or more over due or not accruing 
interest, and it is defined as non-performing loans to total loans. Non-performing 
loan ratio measures the risk of a bank credit portfolio. As statutory reserve capital, 
the reserve loan loss account has to be replenished once its balance falls. 
Essentially, this is created mainly to accommodate the increased provisions for 
loan losses made by banks on a regular basis. That possibly means that the 
substantial loan charge-off losses are potential losses on the bank’s equity portfolio 
- i.e. it impairs bank capital status (BCBS, 2004). This occurs when the charged-off 
losses are not fully absorbed in the allowance for loan losses account.  
In this perspective, it seems that the banks’ equity capital position may be in 
danger - i.e. most likely a bank heading to insolvency. Subsequently, this may call 
for substantial capital injection for ensuring stability and good prospects in a bank. 
On the other hand, it may be logical that as bank loans are informationally opaque, 
therefore, these indicators may suffer manipulation that can drive positive net 
income41. However, the reserve loan losses account is determined by the 
magnitude of the loan portfolio and its risk profile. It is worth noting that the analysis 
reveals that both risk indicators display patterns of decrease over the entire period. 
While the mean values of non-performing loans to the total loans ratio declined to 
0.59% (2005) from 0.86% (2000), the mean values of non-performing loans to 
reserves loans loss ratio decreased to 58.03% (2005) from 65.90% (2000). These 
                                            
41 The recent high bank profile cited in the manipulation fraud is of the collapsed Lehman 
Brothers investment. With insufficient corporate disclosure, the Lehman manoeuvred its balance 
sheet by using an accounting technique known as “Repo 105” to increase profitability while 
hiding insolvency signals. Surprisingly, the bank was well capitalized, suggesting that its failure 
was more of poor governance rather than regulatory recklessness (see Editorial: The Lesson 
from Lehman’s Failure - Mar-12). 
.   
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trends imply a good quality of credit portfolio. In other words, it suggests probably 
that there are tight prudential regulations on risk management articulated in asset 
and capital restriction guidelines.  
Although to date there is no established benchmark for the above credit portfolio 
risk ratios, it is apparent that good or minimum risk indicators (i.e., reserve loan 
losses and non-performing ratios) must be trending down over time. From this 
context, the credit default rate and the expected cash flows have to decrease and 
increase, respectively. These changes in the asset portfolio can explain 
improvement in banks’ liquidity positions. Extreme maximum values of reserve 
loans losses and the non-performing loans ratios reported in 2000 and 2001 may 
have two elucidations: First, that these signals reflect corporate scandal and failure 
episodes over that period. Second, the impact of the deregulatory banking 
environment - through Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 
1999 were in part attributed to excessive contractual risk-taking incentives. The 
mean values of risk measures significantly trended down during the period 2003-
2005. The Sarbanes and Regulation A in the 2003 reforms can be highlighted as 
drivers of keeping these risk measures down. That means, many banks should 
have complied with and adopted the regulatory requirements.  
Average mean and median values of both capital adequacy ratio tier 1 and the 
total capital adequacy ratio distributions, showed mixed patterns. It is also 
interesting to note that their average mean values are above the benchmark ratios 
of 6% and 10% (complied with FDIC requirements), respectively. The range for the 
total capital adequacy ratio tier 1 is 7.20% to 54%. Overall, the US’s bank holding 
companies were well capitalised over the period investigated, suggesting that they 
were less susceptible to credit default risks. In other words, the well capitalised 
pattern (low leveraged) mirrors low bank risks. However, based on the above asset 
quality and capital adequacy patterns, it is difficult to reach an appropriate 
conclusion on the status of these banks due to asymmetric information.  
Table 3-5 shows the distribution of the bank performance using accounting and 
market information. Average mean and median values for returns on assets 
depicted an increasing pattern. These values are close to those of 0.9% reported 
by Adams and Mehran (2003), and 1.209% by (Elyasiani and Jia, 2008). The 
minimum is -10.5% and the maximum is 6.48%. A negative minimum implies that 
some banks realised losses in some periods. Moreover, a similar trend is noted in 
the return on equity. The market capitalisation indicates comparable behaviour to 
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that of assets. The average mean values in Tobin’s Q (Q) depicted a mixed trend. 
The median values are very close to the mean values, implying a symmetric 
distribution. The q value in a pooled sample is 1.08, close to those of 1.1 reported 
by Adams and Mehran (2003); 1.02 reported by Andres and Vallelado (2008) in 
Canada, Italy, France, UK, US and Spain, Caprio et al., (2007); and 0.94% reported 
by Goyal (2005).  
The mean and median values of Q are greater than 1, pointing out the rather 
high BHCs charter values over that period. In this case, the increasing patterns in 
the performance - positive return indicators (ROA or ROE) are preferred. The 
losses revealed on some of these indicators have got a direct linkage with the 
above risk proxies. The overall, performance accounting measures show a mixed 
trend characterised by loss and/or profit. This could be driven by weak credit 
management, unsound corporate governance and poor stock-market performance 
in some of the banks. But, the bank market value and profitability were better over 
this period. 
3.5 Descriptive Statistics – Sorted by Total Assets 
This section discusses and analyses the key descriptive statistics for corporate 
governance variables and firm-level characteristics sorted on a total assets basis. 
The sample is divided into five (5) groups – each quintile of 20%. The size grouping 
was done in order to ascertain whether there are any more interesting patterns to 
contrast with those discussed in Section 3.4. Q1 quintile and Q5 quintile represent 
firms with the lowest values and highest values of total assets respectively. Q3 is 
the cut-off point quintile. Q2 and Q4 come before and after Q3, representing 40% 
of the total distribution. While the largest banks focus on the regulatory agencies, 
small banks may be disproportionately affected by the regulatory reforms - i.e. 
Basel II & III, mandatory sub-debt issuance regulation and bankers pay schemes 
and bank governance. 
Table 3-6 provides descriptive statistics for ownership and board structure 
variables on a quintile-basis in Panel A and B, respectively. In analysing banks with 
the lowest total asset values, CEO ownership had the mean values of 4% in both 
Q1 and Q2. It then increased to 5% in Q3, and went down to 2% for banks with the 
highest total value assets in Q5. The range is 0% to 51%. Similarly, in examining 
firms with the lowest total asset values (Q1), the mean value of the percentage of 
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managerial ownership was 21%, which is higher than that of the banks with the 
highest total asset value (Q5), which recorded 8%. The range is 0% to 72%.  
In general, it is very interesting to note that all average mean values for CEO and 
managerial ownerships are very high in banks with the lowest total asset values, 
and relatively low for banks with highest total assets values. This can be viewed as 
a consequence of the fact that publicly traded small banks are not subject to the 
tight regulatory conditions that large banks are. It is likely that stringent regulatory 
monitoring devices bar insiders in large banks from holding substantial equity 
stakes. As Cole and Mehran (1998) show, restrictions on stock ownership can 
impair bank performance, and La Porta et al., (2000) have argued that Glass-
Steagall regulations constrain bank ownership. The percentage of institutional 
ownership and the percentage of blockholder ownership display similar mixed 
statistical patterns. The pattern is supportive of the view that institutional investment 
decisions depend on the attractiveness of firms, in terms of their book value of 
assets, or their listing in a reputable stock exchange, such as NYSE (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996).  
The separation of the CEO/Chair position shows an average mean value of 28% 
in banks with low total asset values (Q1), in comparison to 71% in banks with 
higher total assets values (Q5). The interpretation of this is that there is a higher 
likelihood of transparency and tight regulations in larger banks than in smaller ones. 
Tenure also displays an increasing pattern from Q1 through Q5, but is most 
significant in Q3. Thus, the CEOs located in Q3 banks are likely to stay longer than 
those in small and large ones and have a higher likelihood of tenure renewal. 
Stated in a different way, CEOs who outperform have longer tenure periods 
(Brickley et al., 1997; Mak and Li, 2001). The average mean values of board size 
shows an increasing pattern from small banks with low total asset values (Q1) 
through to large banks with higher total asset values (Q5). The board size 
progressively increased from 10.39 (Q1) to 15.39 in (Q5). This pattern is consistent 
with predictions and supports the view that large and highly leveraged firms need 
larger boards and more advice (Coles et al., 2008).  
It is worth noting that the analysis of both a fraction of independent directors and 
a percentage of outside directors has revealed mixed distributions and patterns of 
decrease. Both variables are higher in banks with lowest asset values (Q1) than in 
those with the highest total asset values in Q5. However, the variations are not 
significant enough to affect the interpretation, despite the fact that the size of the 
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banks and changing environment can influence bank boards. Interestingly, the 
board composition in all quintiles (Q1-Q5) is dominated by independent directors 
(i.e., mean >=72% of board size). These trends are compatible with the SEC, 
NASDAQ, and NYSE requirements (Linck et al., 2008). Thus, firm size (i.e. 
including market capitalisation) is one of the determinants of board structure. 
Furthermore, the role of the board of directors, from the banking perspective, is 
underscored by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.  
Table 3-7 reports the summary statistics for the compensation of CEOs. The 
average mean values for CEO stock ownership, stock options and total equity-
based compensation all display a pattern of increase from Q1 to Q5, as do the 
cash-based and total compensations. For instance: stock ownership increased from 
$0.83/ln13.63million in Q1 to $44.30/ln17.61 million in Q5 as do stock options that 
rose from $0.04/ln10.66 million in Q1 to $4.11/ln15.23 million in Q5. This trend is 
true for the total equity based compensation that depicted the same pattern. This 
pattern provides insight that CEOs pay is substantial at larger banks. 
Across all the structure of compensation contracts, the dispersion in the structure 
of compensation contract designs for CEOs trended up from Q1 through to Q5. 
The most obvious explanation for this pattern is that executives in banks with the 
lowest total asset values are less well compensated than their peers in complex 
banks. In other words, bankers’ pay in larger banks is more substantial in 
comparison to smaller or medium banks. Thus, these patterns are consistent with 
the prediction of contracting and firm-size views. To support the above behaviour in 
CEO compensation, Murphy (1999) provides the following stylized facts: Firstly, in 
large firms, pay levels are higher and pay-performance sensitivities are lower. 
Secondly, levels of pay-performance sensitivities are lower in regulated utilities than 
in industrial firms. For instance, Smith and Watts (1992) document systematic 
differences in managerial compensation across firm size and with the availability of 
the firm’s investment opportunity sets.  
Table 3-8 reports some summary statistics for liabilities, asset quality and capital 
quality. Banks with the lowest total asset values (Q1) had a low average mean 
value of loans ($0.19/ln$19.06 billion), as expected. In large banks (Q5), the mean 
value of loans – i.e. the largest component of total assets – is higher 
($43.51/ln$24.5 billion). Similar behaviour holds true for the total of liabilities and 
deposits. The total deposits in Q1 are the lowest ($0.23/ln$19.25 billion) and are 
the highest in banks with the greatest total assets in Q5 ($47.90/ln24.59 billion). 
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Intuitively, asset and liability patterns imply that large banks attract considerable 
deposits from all groups of customers, particularly the corporate ones. This means 
that they are, systematically, more highly levered than small banks, which is 
consistent with the deposit insurance theory (Boyd and Runkle, 1993). In addition, 
banks located in Q5 are prominent in terms of their long-term ties with corporate 
customers (Blackwell and Drew, 1997; Dewenter and Hess, 1998). Their reputation, 
compliance with bank regulations and capital markets requirements could also 
have precipitated the attraction of more deposits.  
The trend of capital adequacy tier 1 and the total capital adequacy ratios depicts 
a declining trend from banks with the lowest total asset values in Q1, through to 
those with the highest in Q5. Nevertheless, all the banks were well capitalised as, 
on average, they held more than 10% of the risk weighted assets. The higher ratios 
in banks with the lowest total assets can be viewed as incentives to pursue risky 
investments choices through moral hazard – i.e. risky loans and real estate 
investments. In other words, their capital positions are sufficient to buffer 
unexpected economic shocks vulnerable to their asset portfolios. The average 
mean values of non-performing loans to total loans ratio showed mixed behaviour, 
as did the non-performing loans to reserves loans losses indicator. This means that 
the average amount of cash provided to cover problem loans displayed a 
proportionate pattern from Q1 through Q5 banks. Intuitively, banks with poor loan 
portfolios set aside a proportional hedging cash fund for both expected and 
unexpected losses. Given this trend, it is not easy to offer a direct conclusion that 
banks in Q1 had poor loan portfolios, and hence larger reserve loan loss positions. 
Table 3-9 presents the key summary statistics for firm performance measures. 
Banks in the lowest quintile (Q1) had the lowest mean value for returns on asset 
(1.02%). This pattern increases as the quintile distribution increases through to Q5 
(at 1.70%). The standard deviations are very small and the range is from -10.55% 
to 0.29%. Likewise, the returns on equity depicted the same trend as that reported 
in the return on assets. Both ratios trended up from Q1 through to Q5. This is 
consistent with findings that larger banks are better diversified than smaller ones 
(Saunders et al., 1990; Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; 
Sironi, 2003). According to Flannery and Sorescu (1996, p. 451), larger banks tend 
to have more diversified portfolios and ultimately benefit from too-big-to-fail policy. 
Under this doctrine, all large banks deposits are de facto guaranteed (Boyd and 
Runkle, 1993).  
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Banks in Q1 show the lowest mean value of market capitalisation. This is true for 
Q1 through to Q5, supporting the view that large firms regularly trade in capital 
markets. Variations in market capitalisation are relatively small, which explains the 
low stock-return volatility in stock prices. The q values of average mean values 
increased from Q1 through to Q5, which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
banks with low q values have greater incentives to engage in risky lending activities 
(Keeley, 1990; Goyal, 2005). Generally, it is worth noting that all accounting and 
several market performance measures had lower mean values in banks with low 
total asset values than in banks with high total asset values. Moreover, the 
performance and asset quality of banking firms highlighted upward trends.  
3.6 Descriptive Statistics - Sorted by Tobin’s Q 
In order to provide a more rigorous analysis, a bank behaviour data sample was 
sorted using Tobin’s Q as a basis. The sample is divided into five (5) groups, 20% 
of each quintile, as in Section 3.5, and more interesting patterns were ascertained. 
Appealing patterns and moderately higher descriptive statistics values are reported 
on Tobin’s Q sorts. This is mainly because q takes into account the efficient market 
hypothesis and valuable bank charters. Generally, as with the total assets sorting, 
Tobin’s Q ranking portfolios preserved consistent patterns of the characteristics of 
ownership, board and compensation and firm. Their descriptive statistics are 
qualitatively identical to those reported by sorting according to the asset size 
grouping technique. In this perspective of analogous behaviour, tables of 
descriptive statistics results associated with Tobin’s Q ranking-basis are not 
reported; instead the main findings are highlighted in the next section. 
3.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter began by analysing and discussing descriptive statistics for corporate 
governance and firm-level variables in a sample of 301 banking firms during the 
period 2000-2005. Then, it constructed a number of proxies that are used 
empirically in Chapters 5 and 6. The analysis of the descriptive statistics focused 
on a pooled sample sorted by both total assets and Tobin’s Q. In the initial analysis, 
some important findings were outlined.  
First, in a pooled sample, CEO ownership showed a similar pattern to previous 
studies. Institutional ownership showed fluctuating patterns in terms of the mean 
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(median) values. However, the number of institutional investors in banking firms is 
increasingly relative as before. Second, board governance characteristics indicated 
a mixed trend. While board size decreased, the proportion of independent directors 
increased over the period investigated. Third, the bank characteristics – i.e. total of 
assets, loans, deposits and liabilities showed upward patterns and are consistent 
with previous researchers (e.g. Adams and Mehran, 2003; Elyasiani and Jia, 2008). 
Asset quality indicators imply improvement in quality of credit portfolio. The total 
capital adequacy ratios are within the benchmark of regulators, implying that, on 
average, banks are well capitalised to absorb risk and unexpected losses. 
Measures of performance indicated mixed behaviour, although they were 
dominated by good performance.  
Fourth, sorting by total assets and Tobin’s Q highlighted interesting patterns. 
Generally, the mean values of these characteristics increased from Q1 (for low 
banks) through Q5 (for large banks). Throughout this sorting technique, banks with 
the highest quintiles reveal much larger values in Q5s - i.e. ownership, boards, 
compensation, and firm characteristics. The possible explanations to this behaviour 
may go as follows: One, large bank holding companies located in Q5 are well 
diversified, regardless of being largely dominated by risky assets,  have relatively 
less information asymmetry, and have relatively good governance. In fact, banks 
located in Q5s have larger boards dominated by independent directors. This 
positive relationship between both board size and the proportion of independent 
directors on asset size is important to bank behaviour. It is supportive of the 
conventional view that larger boards are both better monitors and advisors (Dalton 
et al., 1999), and consistent with the notion that more outside representation on 
boards can result in improved efficient monitoring. 
 Two, CEOs of large and complex banks (in terms of asset size and higher q-
values) are highly compensated compared to CEOs of smaller banks who are yet 
competing to turn their banks into larger ones. This is consistent with the 
contracting theory that large firms reward their executives highly. Three, banks with 
the highest quintiles indicate the highest values of the total assets, loans, deposits, 
and liabilities. This means that the largest banks, in terms of total assets and 
market capitalisation, attract huge volatile deposits and offer greater loans to 
corporate businesses. Generally, it is very hard to draw a strong conclusion for this 
initial analysis and intuition, however. Empirical chapters 5 and 6, therefore, 
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capitalise on this unearthed analysis in the quest to find whether corporate 
governance of banks is relevant to risk-taking. 
           Table 3-1 Summary in selecting the final sample 
BHCs as at September 2006 (in BSC) 445 
Less:  Savings Institutions 124 
 Security brokers, dealers & flotation companies  2 
 Real estate investment trusts 1 
 Mortgage bankers, & loan correspondents 3 
 Miscellaneous business credit institution  1 
 Life Insurance 2 
 Money Centre/finance services  1 
 Commercial banks, not elsewhere classified (NEC) 1 
 Banks with annual proxy statements on SEC, but notable 
 amount of missing financial observations 
36 
 Banks with no annual proxy statements on SEC 18 
 Sub-Total 189 
Add: Recollected direct from SEC 45 
Final sample (SIC: 6021 & SIC: 6022) 301 
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Table 3-2 Descriptive statistics for ownership and board structure 
This table reports some summary statistics for ownership and board structure extracted from the proxy statements; DEF-14A forms. The data sample is 
301 and data period analysed is from 2000-2005. It shows the observations, mean value, median value, standard deviation value, and minimum and 
maximum value (s) in column one. Managerial ownership variable is defined as percentage of ordinary shares held by top executive officers including 
the CEO and directors. The variable CEO ownership is as the percentage of shareholdings by the CEO based on shares outstanding. Outside 
independent ownership is defined as fraction of equity to common equity shares owned by directors without any family/financial relationship to the firm. 
Institutional ownership variable is defined as percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional investors based on common equity shares under voting 
control. Blockholders ownership is a percentage of shares held by institutions or individuals with greater than or equal to 5% ownership of the shares 
outstanding. CEO-Chair split is a dummy variable equals to 1 where chairman is also the CEO, or otherwise 0. CEO tenure is the number of years 
served by the CEO. Board size is total number of board of directors on board. Fraction of independent directors refers to the fraction of board seats held 
by non-officers without relationship to the founding family divided by the board size. 
 Panel A: Ownership Structure 
  Managerial Ownership (INSOWN)  CEO ownership (CEOWN)  
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Pooled  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Pooled 
N 282 292 300 298 297 297 1,766 270 284 292 290 287 286 1,709 
Mean 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Median 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Std 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 0.87 0.82 0.79 0.78 0.75 0.68 0.87 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.51 
  Institutional  ownership (INSTOWN)  Blockholders ownership (BLOCK)  
N 138 135 151 150 162 169 905 209 220 229 227 233 230 1,347 
Mean 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.23 
Median 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Std 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Min 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Max 0.93 0.92 0.96 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.96 0.89 0.89 0.95 0.96 
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 Panel B: Board Structure 
  CEO-Chair (SPLIT)  CEO tenure (TENURE-years)  
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Pooled  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Pooled 
N 282 292 300 290 297 297 1,766 256 270 279 276 277 277 1,635 
Mean 0.49  0.49  0.47  0.47  0.47  0.47  0.48  8.61  8.61  9.40  9.89  10.18  10.44  9.54  
Median 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  6.00  6.50  7.00  7.50  8.00  8.00  7.00  
Std 0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  7.54  7.53  7.85  8.04  8.25  8.24  7.94  
Min 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
Max 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  44.00  45.00  46.00  47.00  48.00  49.00  49.00  
  Board size (BDSIZE)  Fraction of independent directors (FINBD)  
N 282 292 300 298 297 297 1,766 282 292 300 298 297 297 1,766 
Mean 12.38  12.24  11.92  11.87  11.90  11.69  12.00  0.76  0.75  0.75  0.76  0.77  0.77  0.76  
Median 12.00  11.00  11.00  11.00  11.00  11.00  11.00  0.79  0.78  0.79  0.79  0.80  0.79  0.79  
Std 4.73  4.60  4.23  407  4.77  4.59  4.18  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.13  0.13  0.12  0.14  
Min 4.00  4.00  4.00  5.00  5.00  4.00  4.00  0.20  0.22  0.22  0.40  0.33  0.33  0.20  
Max 30.00  31.00  32.00  33.00  32.00  33.00  33.00  0.96  0.96  0.96  0.95  0.94  0.94  0.96  
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Table 3-3 Descriptive statistics for compensation of CEO 
This table reports a summary statistics of compensation for CEO and executive officers extracted from the proxy statements; DEF-14A forms. The data 
sample is 301 and data period analysed is from 2000-2005. It shows the observations, mean value, median value, standard deviation value, and 
minimum and maximum value (s) in column one. Stock ownership compensation value to CEO, labelled as CEO-STOCK. Black-Scholes value of stock 
options compensation to CEO, labelled as CEO-OPT. Total equity-based compensation to CEO which includes common stock value and Black-Scholes 
value of stock options, labelled as CEOEB. Cash compensation is the summation of annual bonus and salary compensation to CEO, denoted as CEO-
CB. Total compensation is the summation of cash-based, stock ownership and stock options values, denoted as TC. All figures are US$ in millions. 
 
Stock ownership (CEO-STOCK) 
 
Stock option (CEO-OPT) 
Year  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Pooled 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Pooled 
N 267 279 291 289 289 287 1702 
 
143 145 160 149 156 141 894 
Mean 12.80 12.80 11.40 14.60 17.30 16.30 14.20 
 
1.44 1.05 0.87 0.85 0.95 1.02 1.03 
Median 0.71 1.03 1.12 1.89 2.34 2.25 1.48 
 
0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.14 
Std 77.80 74.40 51.50 44.00 47.90 41.30 57.40 
 
4.50 2.55 2.09 1.88 2.56 2.43 2.78 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 1,190.00 1,160.00 802.00 465.00 505.00 285.00 1,190.00 
 
36.30 19.70 17.50 11.20 20.40 18.00 36.30 
 
Total equity compensate  (CEOEB) 
 
Cash Compensation  (CEO-CB) 
N 267 279 291 289 289 287 1702 
 
280 291 298 296 295 295 1755 
Mean 14.50 14.40 11.90 15.00 17.80 16.80 14.80 
 
0.65 0.65 0.59 0.63 0.74 0.85 0.69 
Median 0.84 1.18 1.34 2.02 2.45 2.36 1.67 
 
0.30 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.37 
Std 78.00 74.70 52.10 44.40 48.30 42.00 57.80 
 
1.54 1.33 0.80 1.04 1.23 1.73 1.31 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 1,190.00 1,160.00 809.00 467.00 505.00 286.00 1,190.00 
 
19.50 18.00 8.00 10.90 8.86 24.70 24.70 
 
Total compensation (TC) 
        N 267 279 291 289 289 287 1702 
        Mean 14.20 14.00 12.50 15.60 18.50 17.70 15.50 
        Median 1.25 1.73 1.89 2.45 2.87 2.92 2.10 
        Std 79.20 75.80 52.30 44.60 48.70 42.40 58.40 
        Min 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
        Max 1,210.00 1,180.00 810.00 468.00 506.00 288.00 1,210.00 
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Table 3-4 Descriptive statistics for assets, liabilities, assets quality, and capital quality 
This table reports some summary statistics for assets, liabilities, assets quality, and capital quality extracted from Worldscope database-Thomson One 
Banker. The data sample is 301 and data period analysed is from 200-2005. It shows the observations, mean value, median value, standard deviation 
value, and minimum and maximum value (s) in column one. The data sample consists of book value of total asset comprising earning assets and non-
earning assets. Total loans variable labelled include personal, commercial and mortgage loans. Total deposits variable is the summation of savings, time 
and demand deposits. Total liabilities variable include total deposits and other liabilities. Non-performing Loans reserves loans losses ratio is defined as 
Non-performing Loans divided by reserves loans losses. Non-performing loans to total loans ratio variable is defined non-performing loans divided by 
total loans. Capital adequacy ratio tier 1 is calculated as tier 1 capital divided by weighted risk assets and Total capital adequacy ratio variable is defined 
as the sum of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital divided by weighted risk assets. 
  Total Assets  (TA) in US $  Bill  Total loans in US $  Bill  
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Pooled 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Pooled 
N 298 300 300 301 301 301 1,795 295 300 300 301 300 299 1,800 
Mean 14.42 15.72 16.90 18.51 22.83 24.82 18.96 7.54 7.72 8.22 8.91 11.05 12.21 9.25 
Median 0.79 0.86 0.97 1.09 1.28 1.44 1.07 0.56 0.60 0.66 0.72 0.88 0.99 0.71 
Std 79.65 85.83 91.17 101.21 131.27 139.64 107.47 36.45 36.00 38.90 42.06 54.08 58.37 45.09 
Min 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.00 
Max 902.21 1,051.45 1,097.19 1,264.03 1,484.10 1,494.04 1,494.04 392.19 391.93 447.80 478.01 548.83 583.50 593.50 
  Total liabilities in US $  Bill  Non-performing loans to total loans ratio (NPLTL %)  
N 298 300 299 301 301 301 1,806 279 283 283 282 288 284 1,779 
Mean 13.30 8.50 9.27 9.99 12.43 13.59 17.28 0.86 0.97 0.93 0.87 0.65 0.59 0.78 
Median 0.72 0.67 0.77 0.87 0.97 1.12 0.96 0.59 0.73 0.72 0.62 0.49 0.43 0.55 
Std 73.89 38.97 42.31 45.99 61.76 65.57 98.71 1.24 1.39 0.97 1.06 0.73 0.57 1.03 
Min 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 836.00 374.52 430.89 474.02 618.57 634.67 1,381.50 16.24 19.53 10.65 11.44 8.13 3.92 19.53 
  Total deposits in US $  Bill  Capital adequacy ratio tier 1 (CAR %)  
N 295 300 299 301 301 301 1,804 206 215 215 280 299 298 1,500 
Mean 7.72 8.50 9.27 9.99 12.43 13.59 10.23 12.07 12.03 12.16 12.52 12.19 12.20 12.20 
Median 0.64 0.67 0.77 0.87 0.97 1.12 0.82 11.00 10.90 11.30 11.51 11.30 11.20 11.21 
Std 35.08 38.97 42.31 45.99 61.76 65.57 49.59 4.84 4.15 4.02 4.28 4.26 4.34 4.32 
Min 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.00 6.90 6.80 7.00 6.80 6.00 6.00 6.00 
Max 364.24 374.52 430.89 474.02 618.57 634.67 634.67 53.10 41.99 42.41 43.98 41.11 40.72 53.10 
   Total capital adequacy ratio tier 1 (CART %)  NonPerformLoanPctResLoanLoss (NPLRLS %)  
N 206 214 214 279 300 298 1,498 279 283 283 282 288 283 1,696 
Mean 13.65 13.64 13.81 13.19 13.85 13.78 13.85 65.90 69.51 63.08 56.51 47.14 46.00 58.03 
Median 12.45 12.50 12.90 13.20 12.85 12.66 12.80 44.29 49.43 49.33 45.49 37.68 34.42 43.25 
Std 4.67 3.97 3.82 4.10 4.04 4.13 4.13 101.52 101.11 74.85 52.65 43.29 44.75 74.24 
Min 8.40 8.30 8.60 7.20 10.00 8.30 7.20 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Max 54.00 43.25 43.64 45.16 42.14 41.66 54.00 1,353.39 1,364.08 894.83 574.08 409.61 428.85 1,364.08 
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Table 3-5 Descriptive statistics for firm performance measures 
This table reports a summary statistics for firm performance measures extracted from Worldscope database-Thomson One Banker. The data sample is 
301 and data period analysed is from 2000-2005. It shows the observations, mean value, median value, standard deviation value, and minimum and 
maximum value (s) in column one.  The data sample consists of return on equity variable defined as net profit after tax divided by equity. Return on 
assets variable is calculated as profit before interest and tax divided by book value of asset. Tobin’s Q is denoted as Q and defined as market value of 
equity plus total liabilities divided total assets. 
 Return on equity (ROE)  Return on assets (ROA)  
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Pooled  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Pooled  
N 298 300 300 301 301 299 1,799 287 288 293 289 287 285 1,727 
Mean 10.17 11.16 10.86 11.65 11.9 11.82 11.25 1.4 1.34 1.41 1.4 1.37 1.4 1.38 
Median 12.52 12.24 12.99 12.52 12.08 12.1 12.40 1.43 1.4 1.42 1.41 1.37 1.42 1.40 
Std 17.72 8.02 20.75 13.86 5.48 7.1 13.41 1.03 0.73 0.78 0.58 0.51 0.56 0.72 
Min -171.22 -79.13 -291.65 -180.11 -11.75 -64.78 -291.65 -10.55 -5.78 -4.89 -1.24 -0.11 -2.38 -10.55 
Max 25.9 37.85 55.37 38.55 34.9 26.55 55.37 5.93 4.19 6.48 3.95 4.1 3.55 6.48 
  Market capitalisation (MKTCAP) in US $  Bill  Tobin’s Q (Q)  
N 275 281 290 292 293 291 1,720 275 281 290 291 293 291 1,719 
Mean 3.32 3.30 2.78 3.61 4.33 4.28 3.61 1.05 1.06 1.06 1.10 1.10 1.08 1.08 
Median 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.21 0.25 0.25 0.17 1.03 1.05 1.05 1.08 1.10 1.08 1.07 
Std 18.33 18.22 14.09 18.52 21.87 21.39 18.92 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.90 0.91 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.90 
Max 256.45 259.91 180.90 250.32 250.28 241.69 259.91 1.58 1.39 1.31 1.29 1.35 1.26 1.58 
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Table 3-6 Ownership and board structures descriptive statistics for sorts by Total Assets 
This table reports some summary statistics for ownership and board structures extracted from the proxy statements; DEF-14A forms. The data sample 
is 301 and data period analysed is from 2000-2005. It shows the observations, mean value, standard deviation value, and minimum and maximum value 
(s) in column one. The variable Chief executive officer ownership is as the percentage of shareholdings by the CEO based on shares outstanding. 
Blockholders ownership is a percentage of shares held by institutions or individuals with greater than or equal to 5% ownership of the shares 
outstanding. CEO-Chair split is a dummy variable equals to 1 where chairman is also the CEO, or otherwise 0. CEO tenure is the number of years 
served by the CEO. Board size is total number of board of directors on board. Fraction of independent directors refers to the fraction of board seats held 
by non-officers without relationship to the founding family divided by the board size. Firms are sorted on Total Assets basis where Q1is a quintile that 
represents firms with the lowest values of total assets, Q5 is quintile that represents firms with highest values of total assets, and Q3 is the cut-off point.  
  Panel A: Ownership Structure 
      CEO ownership Managerial Ownership Institutional  ownership Blockholders ownership 
(CEOWN) (INSOWN) (INSTOWN) (BLOCK) 
Quintile  
boundary 
Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max 
1-Min 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.48 0.21 0.14 0.03 0.72 0.14 0.12 0.05 0.56 0.21 0.14 0.05 0.68 
2-40% 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.42 0.18 0.13 0.02 0.61 0.16 0.15 0.05 0.93 0.25 0.20 0.05 0.95 
3-60% 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.34 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.59 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.54 0.22 0.15 0.05 0.68 
3-80% 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.51 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.59 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.96 0.23 0.19 0.05 0.96 
5-Max 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.39 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.87 0.17 0.19 0.00 0.91 0.23 0.22 0.05 0.93 
  Panel B: Board Structure 
      CEO-Chair  Board size CEO tenure (years) Fraction of independent 
(SPLIT) (BDSIZE)  directors (FINBD) 
1-Min 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 10.39 400 4.00 33.00 9.07 7.32 1.00 33.00 0.78 0.12 0.33 0.95 
2-40% 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 10.34 2.88 4.00 20.00 8.99 6.64 1.00 38.00 0.77 0.12 0.27 0.94 
3-60% 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 11.79 3.41 5.00 24.00 10.42 9.45 1.00 46.00 0.75 0.14 0.25 0.94 
4-80% 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 12.08 3.75 5.00 25.00 9.59 7.33 1.00 42.00 0.72 0.16 0.29 0.96 
5-Max 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 15.39 4.54 6.00 31.00 9.64 8.57 1.00 49.00 0.77 0.13 0.2 0.96 
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Table 3-7 Descriptive statistics for compensation of CEO for sorts by Total Assets 
This table reports a summary statistics of compensation for CEO and executive officers extracted from the proxy statements; DEF-14A forms. The data 
sample is 301 and data period analysed is from 2000-2005. It shows the observations, mean value, standard deviation value, and minimum and 
maximum value (s) in column one. Stock ownership compensation value to CEO, labelled as CEO-STOCK. Black-Scholes value of stock options 
compensation to CEO, labelled as CEO-OPT. Total equity-based compensation to CEO which includes common stock value and Black-Scholes value of 
stock options, labelled as CEOEB. Cash compensation is the summation of annual bonus and salary compensation to CEO, denoted as CEO-CB. Total 
compensation is the summation of cash-based, stock ownership and stock options values, denoted as TC. All figures are US$ in millions. Firms are 
sorted on Total Assets basis where Q1is a quintile that represents firms with the lowest values of total assets, Q5 is quintile that represents firms with 
highest values of total assets, and Q3 is the cut-off point.  
 
Stock ownership (CEO-STOCK) Stock options (CEO-OPT) Total equity compensation (CEOEB) 
Quintile  
boundary Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max 
1-Min 0.83 1.57 0.00 12.50 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.70 0.85 1.57 0.00 12.50 
2-40% 2.10 4.67 0.00 25.90 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.97 2.14 4.66 0.00 25.90 
3-60% 4.85 9.70 0.00 104.00 0.14 0.28 0.00 4.27 4.93 9.70 0.00 104.00 
4-80% 16.20 38.70 0.00 328.00 0.49 0.72 0.00 5.75 16.50 38.80 0.00 329.00 
5-Max 44.30 114.00 0.00 1,190.00 4.11 4.62 0.00 36.30 46.50 114.00 0.00 1,190.00 
 
Cash compensation (CEO-CB) Total  compensation (TC) 
    1-Min 0.20  0.11  0.00  0.59  1.05  1.58  0.00  12.70  
    2-40% 0.28  0.14  0.00  1.53  2.41  4.67  0.00  26.20  
    3-60% 0.40  0.21  0.00  1.59  5.33  9.73  0.00  104.00  
    4-80% 0.64  0.41  0.00  2.85  17.20  38.90  0.00  330.00  
    5-Max 1.84  2.50  0.00  24.70  48.40  115.00  0.00  1,210.00  
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Table 3-8 Descriptive statistics for assets, liabilities, assets quality, and capital quality for sorts by Total Assets 
This table reports some summary statistics for assets, liabilities, assets quality, and capital quality extracted from Worldscope database-
Thomson One Banker. The data sample is 301 and data period analysed is from 200-2005. It shows the observations, mean value, median 
value, standard deviation value, and minimum and maximum value (s) in column one. The data sample consists of book value of total asset 
comprising earning assets and non-earning assets. Total loans variable labelled include personal, commercial and mortgage loans. Total 
deposits variable is the summation of savings, time and demand deposits. Total liabilities variable include total deposits and other liabilities. 
Non-performing Loans reserves loans losses ratio is defined as Non-performing Loans divided by reserves loans losses. Non-performing 
loans to total loans ratio variable is defined non-performing loans divided by total loans. Capital adequacy ratio tier 1 is calculated as tier 1 
capital divided by weighted risk assets and Capital adequacy ratio variable is defined as the sum of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital divided 
by weighted risk assets. Firms are sorted on Total Assets basis where Q1is a quintile that represents firms with the lowest values of total 
assets, Q5 is quintile that represents firms with highest values of total assets Q, and Q3 is the cut-off point. 
 Total loans in US $  Bill Total deposits in US $  Bill Total liabilities in US $  Bill 
Quintile 
boundary 
Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max 
1-Min 0.19 0.08 0.00 0.40 0.23 0.09 0.01 0.47 0.26 0.10 0.00 0.51 
2-40% 0.42 0.13 0.12 0.83 0.48 0.13 0.22 0.82 0.55 0.14 0.31 0.94 
3-60% 0.74 0.26 0.19 1.71 0.86 0.26 0.40 1.72 1.02 0.31 0.53 1.92 
4-80% 1.76 0.77 0.18 5.13 2.08 0.84 0.60 4.99 2.54 0.99 1.08 5.73 
5-Max 43.51 93.82 1.72 583.50 47.90 103.16 2.69 634.67 82.53 209.27 3.48 1,381.50 
 Capital adequacy ratio tier 1 (CAR) Total Capital adequacy ratio (CART) Non-performing loans to total loans (NPLTl) 
1-Min 14.35 6.64 7.20 53.10 15.67 6.58 7.20 54.00 0.85 1.08 0.00 11.44 
2-40% 12.28 3.50 6.80 39.00 13.62 3.43 9.20 39.80 0.74 0.85 0.00 8.41 
3-60% 12.67 4.42 7.00 39.20 14.01 4.34 8.30 40.00 0.81 0.80 0.00 8.13 
4-80% 12.08 3.39 6.80 37.98 13.50 3.31 8.40 38.69 0.89 1.59 0.00 19.53 
5-Max 10.35 2.36 6.00 19.80 12.91 1.93 10.00 23.30 0.78 0.54 0.05 3.38 
 NonPerformLoanPctResLoanLoss (NPLRLS) 
1-Min 65.25 71.53 0.00 584.30 
2-40% 52.84 52.95 0.01 503.14 
3-60% 56.48 45.20 0.02 280.57 
4-80% 65.61 127.01 0.01 1,364.09 
5-Max 50.19 29.76 2.82 212.99 
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Table 3-9 Descriptive statistics for firm performance measures for sorts by Total Assets 
This table reports a summary statistics for firm performance measures extracted from 
Worldscope database-Thomson One Banker. The data sample is 301 and data period analysed 
is from 2000-2005. It shows the observations, mean value, median value, standard deviation 
value, and minimum and maximum value (s) in column one. The data sample consists of return 
on equity variable defined as net profit after tax divided by equity. Return on assets variable is 
calculated as profit before interest and tax divided by book value of a asset. Market capitalisation 
is defined market share price multiplied by common shares outstanding. Tobin’s Q is denoted as 
q and defined as market value of equity plus total liabilities divided total assets. Firms are sorted 
on Total Assets basis where Q1 is a quintile that represents firms with the lowest values of total 
assets, Q5 is quintile that represents firms with highest values of total assets, and Q3 is the cut-
off point. 
  Return on assets (ROA) Return on equity (ROE) 
Quintile 
 boundary 
Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max 
1-Min 1.02 1.05 -10.55 5.93 6.20 22.16 -291.65 33.50 
2-40% 1.33 0.57 -3.80 2.77 10.73 12.97 -149.51 32.88 
3-60% 1.35 0.49 -2.51 2.96 11.55 6.28 -64.78 25.02 
4-80% 1.51 0.59 -1.52 6.48 13.16 6.71 -34.38 55.37 
5-Max 1.70 0.60 0.29 4.84 14.62 10.96 -171.22 38.55 
 Tobin’s Q (q) Market capitalisation (MKTCAP) in US $ Bill 
1-Min 1.04 0.04 0.91 1.20 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.15 
2-40% 1.06 0.06 0.94 1.35 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.33 
3-60% 1.06 0.06 0.90 1.26 0.18 0.10 0.01 0.56 
4-80% 1.09 0.06 0.94 1.32 0.53 0.34 0.05 2.20 
5-Max 1.12 0.08 0.97 1.58 16.47 38.84 0.20 259.91 
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           Figure 3-1 The mean board size over the period 2000-2005 
 
 
Figure 3-2 The mean percentage of board independence over the period 2000- 
2005 
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Chapter 4: Distance to Default, Subordinated Debt and Market Discipline  
4.1 Introduction 
This empirical chapter investigates whether bank holding companies that issue 
subordinated debt show an increase in the extent to which bank fundamentals 
predict the likelihood of their default (relative to their counterparts without 
subordinated debts). Besides, it examines whether the banks’ charter values or 
capitalisation transmit further information to market participants which increase the 
reliability of bank fundamentals to predict default risk. Campbell et al. (2008) define 
distance to default as “the difference between the asset value of the firm and the 
face value of its debt, scaled by standard deviation of the firm’s asset value”. 
Overall, at a minimum, the evidence presented in this empirical chapter provides 
support to the market discipline hypothesis. This hypothesis states that the 
movement in prices of bank sub-debt securities – i.e. distance to default-reflects 
timely and reliable information and consequently mirrors the changes in bank 
accounting information risk. Under this hypothesis, sub-debt bank investors face 
increased costs as bank select risky asset portfolios owing to conjectural protection 
schemes. Indeed, these uninsured counterparty investors tend to price bank sub-
debt securities higher for additional perceived risk. Accordingly, if a bank fails to 
compensate them proportionally, they can discipline it through demanding higher 
rewards, withdrawing uninsured deposits, or shifting to credible and low risk-profile 
banks elsewhere (Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001). Specifically and along with 
(H1), the investigation indicates some ability of distance to default to predict 
financial distress in sub-debt banks.  
Hence, distance to default is associated with bank risk fundamentals. With this, 
there are three possible explanations to this relationship: First, sub-debt securities 
increase the amount of informational efficiency of distance to default leading to 
increased predictive power of the models for banks which issued these securities. 
Bank sub-debt private monitors – i.e. institutional investors - are not mainly covered 
by deposit insurance policy the same as the dispersed and unsophisticated 
depositors. Consequently, bank sub-debt investors have more monitoring 
incentives to protect their large invested capital. Second, the tension between 
distance to default and bank risk fundamentals confirms the existence and 
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importance of market discipline tool in monitoring excessive risk-taking incentives. 
Along this, it is proposed by Flannery (1998) that banking firms require an 
additional specific corporate governance system – i.e. a market discipline through 
private sub-debt investors - to discipline managers against excessive risk-taking 
behaviour. Finally, such findings can cast doubts on policy issues of  the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley’s legislation pre-requisite which stipulates that large bank holding 
companies should maintain at least one issue of subordinated notes and 
debentures at all times (Krishnan et al., 2005; Goyal, 2005).   
Furthermore, this study finds that in higher charter value banks and low-
capitalised banks distance to default is significantly predicted by bank risk-
fundamentals. For higher charter value banks, it can be explained that their asset 
values are informationally more efficient to reflect accounting risk-data. For low-
capitalised banks, it can be argued that the informational efficiency of book-based 
risk measures will be higher as investors face an increased risk of default in these 
sub-debt banks. In fact, market-related indicators have turned to be important in 
complementing accounting risk data when regulatory bodies are assessing bank 
fragility (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Flannery, 1998; Evanoff and Wall, 2001; 
Hancock and Kwast, 2001; Sironi, 2003; Gropp et al., 2004, 2006). Additionally, 
bank regulators have long stressed the importance of these signals as a measure 
of banks’ financial distress and a purveyor of market discipline. Amid pervasiveness 
of bank failures, the 2007-09 financial crisis and the inability of accounting-based 
information to reliably predict bank bankruptcy - have also highlighted the need of 
market indicators.  
The operation of deposit insurance schemes and any explicit or implicit bail-out 
policy by the monetary authorities shield bank creditors from potential losses and 
give rise to moral hazard. Bank subordinated notes and debentures (“sub-debt”) 
issuers are uninsured, in addition to being at a higher risk due to the inherent junior 
debt subordination feature in the creditors’ hierarchy and the long holding maturity 
period (Gorton and Santomero; 1990). Based on this factual information, there is a 
high likelihood for sub-debt investors to lose their invested money in case a bank is 
liquidated. Otherwise they will be serviced after more senior debt claimants42.  
                                            
42 Typical, loss rates in the event of default for senior secured, subordinated and zero coupon 
bonds are 49, 68 and 81 per cent, respectively (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003). 
- 96 - 
 
In an information efficient market, sub-debt spread (e.g. over Treasury Bills of 
similar maturity), form an accurate reflection of asset quality, managerial skills and 
ultimately, the likelihood of distress. To minimize losses on their investment, sub-
debt holders have interests in the running and monitoring of the bank management. 
By the same token, the prospect of higher funding costs for banks that issue 
subordinated notes and debentures provides an ex-ante incentive to banking firms 
to refrain from undue risk-taking (see Nier and Baumann, 2006). As such, bank 
sub-debt holders are different from bank equity investors. The difference emerges 
from the conflicting risk-preferences perspective. In a moral hazard environment, 
bank equityholders have greater incentives to pursue excessive risk strategies that 
increase their equity call-put options (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Merton, 1977). 
While bank sub-debt investors have more incentives to monitor managerial risk-
shifting behaviour that assure them of the promised repayments on their 
investments (i.e., when firm’s asset market value is greater than the present value 
of promised cash flows), bank equity holders are less risk-averse. In this 
perspective, bank sub-debt investors and regulators have universal interests as 
they share similar risk exposures (Flannery, 1998).  
While previous work on the information in sub-debt spreads is massive and has 
produced mixed results, there has been little research on market discipline about 
information in the sub-debt distance to default. Three papers employ distance to 
default methodology to link bank risk fundamentals. Gropp et al. (2004, 2006) 
report that negative distance to default or spread on sub-debts decreases in the 
market value of the bank’s assets and increases in leverage and asset volatility. 
Gropp et al. (2006) show a positive association between composite score and 
negative distance to default. Akhigbe et al. (2007) find a connection between 
default likelihood indicator and specific risk factors in commercial banks. This 
literature offers an insight that bank securities’ prices incorporate all available 
information associated with the banks’ financial condition. 
This empirical chapter makes three major contributions to the existing literature. 
One, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to contrast the ability of 
distance to default to predict bank risk fundamentals of distress for banks that issue 
subordinated notes and debentures with banks that do not issue sub-debts. 
Previous work on subordinated notes and debentures and market discipline limited 
itself to examining subordinated debt yields (i.e., Avery et al., 1988; Gorton and 
Santomero, 1990; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; and many successors). In effect, 
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this evaluation reinforces the extant research by indicating that sub-debt distance to 
default is relevant for market discipline in sub-debt banks. Two, it contributes to 
analysing distance to default on low- through high-chartered banks and low versus 
high-capitalised banks. For sub-debt banks, some quintiles of banks (i.e., sorted on 
charter value-basis) and low- against high-capitalised banks, the connection 
between distance to default and bank risk fundamentals is new. 
Three, it adds to the literature on leading indicators of bank financial distress 
literature by analysing the connection between default likelihood and bank risk 
fundamentals. Currently, distance to default is considered as one of the important 
market-indicators in predicting bank financial problems (Gropp et al. 2004; 2006; 
Akhigbe et al. 2007). However, this literature is scarce. Bank supervisors and 
policymakers are interested in and have seen distance to default to have higher 
predicting ability than yield spreads. Thus, as argued by previous researchers, it 
may complement the accounting risk-based data to signal the possibility of 
bankruptcy. Such analysis allows for some inferences under which market 
indicators may substitute or complement regulatory intervention (see Adams and 
Mehran, 2003; Elyasiani and Jia, 2008). From this analysis, supervisory authorities 
may supplement their traditional monitoring mechanisms by market-based 
indicators – to reinforce oversight or early scrutiny in complex banks. Finally, the 
investigation is policy motivated due to the fact that its findings are consistent with 
the ongoing market discipline discussion around Basel II Framework and Gramm-
Leach-Bliley requirements. These mandatory legislations favour larger bank holding 
companies to issue subordinated notes and debentures for bank capital to enhance 
market discipline – i.e. transparency and disclosure.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the theoretical 
literature. Section 4.3 develops the hypotheses and discusses the empirical model. 
Section 4.4 introduces the sample. Section 4.5 presents empirical results, and 
Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 Theoretical Motivation 
Theoretically, in an efficient market, security prices should reflect all available 
information including investors’ expectations about the firm’s future prospects. In a 
banking context, whether the market prices of subordinated bank debt securities 
provide signals for the increased bank risk-taking behaviour is a debatable issue – 
i.e. that is, whether market discipline exists in bank holding companies. Fluctuation 
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in subordinated notes and debentures prices is useful information to assess how 
the bank balance sheet accounting risk data changed (Flannery and Sorescu, 
1996; Sironi, 2003; Krishnan et al., 2005; Akhigbe et al. 2007). In fact, this volatility 
pattern indicates bank excessive risk-taking and motivates uninsured sub-debt 
investors to demand higher returns on their securities. In the Merton (1977) model, 
bank shareholders prefer more risks that maximise the value of their equity put 
options by increasing the asset portfolio risk.  
Similarly, in this environment, if uninsured subordinated debt holders are not 
adequately compensated by banks, where additional risk taking is being perceived, 
they punish banks for their bad behaviour (Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001). 
Here, one would expect that bank risk fundamentals would have a higher predictive 
ability in explaining distance to default for banks with subordinated debt – 
suggesting the existence of market discipline. In contrast, if contemporaneous price 
signals of subordinated debt instruments are not properly processed, then such 
market discipline may not occur - i.e. no detectable link between distance to 
default/yield spreads and bank accounting risk measures. The role of the bank’s 
charter value is also important in this setting. Keeley’s (1990) model indicates that 
the bank’s charter value is vital with regards to risk-taking.  A high charter value is a 
monitoring device that mitigates managerial risk-taking in banks. From this theory, 
the relationship between distance to default and bank risk fundamentals, is 
expected. 
4.3 Hypotheses development and empirical model 
4.3.1 Hypotheses 
It is hypothesised that if market discipline exists, one would predict accounting risk 
information to be associated with distance to default in subordinated debt banks. 
The argument is that the contemporaneous information content in banks that issue 
sub-debts is greater and readily available to the respective investors to identify 
banks’ risk exposures (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Flannery 1998; Sironi, 2003; 
among others). The information summarised in the prices of these debt securities 
is likely to result in bank risk-fundamentals, explaining a larger fraction of the cross-
sectional variation in distance to default for sub-debt banks. Alternatively, if the 
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information content in sub-debt securities is of low frequency, no relationship is 
expected between distance to default and bank risk-fundamentals.  
Comparing the performance of predicting power between distance to default and 
yield spread indicators in sub-debt banks, Gropp et al. (2004) documented higher 
predictive ability in the former over the latter market indicators. For example, they 
report that, while “distance to default prediction worsens between 6 and 18 months 
in advance, yield spread predictive power diminishes beyond 12 month prior to 
downgrade”. In this context the study tests whether banks that issue sub-debts 
increase the information content available to bank sub-debt investors so that 
distance to default measures can be predicted by a larger variation of accounting 
risk measures.  The central testable hypothesis is:  
 
H1: The predicting power of distance to default is larger for banks which issue 
subordinated notes and debentures than for banks without outstanding 
subordinated notes and debentures. 
Generally, a bank’s charter value refers to the present value of its future 
expected earnings in a regulated environment. It is hypothesised that the bank’s 
charter value may act as a self-imposed disciplinary factor to mitigate moral hazard 
problems (Keeley, 1990). Higher charter values increase the cost of bank distress, 
because managers cannot sell valuable charters in the event of insolvency.  
Similarly, one would expect that debt contracts issued by banks with low charter 
value would offer higher yield spreads and/or more restrictive covenants (Goyal, 
2005). It further lowers the managers’ ex-ante incentives for risk-taking (Demsetz et 
al., 1996; Galloway et al., 1997; Saunders and Wilson, 2001; Goyal, 2005). 
Accordingly, for banks that issue subordinated notes and debentures, higher 
charter values diminish incentives in these banks to take greater risks. This is due 
to the fact that sub-debt investors are motivated to monitor the banking institutions. 
Thus, the degree to which the book-based accounting measures explain distance to 
default should be larger for banks with high charter value, where private monitoring 
by sub-debt investors is relatively more important and interesting. However, higher 
distance to default in this group of banks reflects lower default risk likelihood and 
less regulatory interferences. 
From the above assertion, low chartered value banks have incentives to engage 
in greater risk-taking strategies that could be constrained by regulatory discipline 
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tools. During the period of policies related to deregulation and reform (i.e., Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999), managers of high charter value banks are likely to 
pursue risky activities as managers of low charter value banks that maximise the 
equity call-option of their shareholders. Based on these arguments, this 
investigation complements previous studies by exploring whether sub-debt banks 
with high charter value would enhance the level of risk-taking that increases 
distance to default sensitivity to accounting information. This leads to the second 
hypothesis associated with distance to default and bank risk fundamentals for 
banks with high charter value: 
 
H2: The degree to which distance to default is explained by bank risk 
 fundamentals is higher in banks with high charter value. 
Capital reserves are perhaps the most important indicator of the overall stability 
of a banking firm. Banks with higher capital should display lower default risk than 
banks with thinner capital cushions. Given the lower risk of default for highly-
capitalised banks (with larger distance to default), Elyasiani and Jia (2008) and 
Flannery and Rangan (2008) argued that well-capitalised banks are less likely to 
face intervention from either market investors in subordinated bank debts or 
regulators. This is because sound capital adequacy regulations are intended to limit 
excessive risk-taking and default risk on uninsured deposits. In this sense, it is may 
be logical that a sufficient capital policy requirement represents formal bank 
governance in well-capitalised banks.  
For undercapitalised banks in which their capital adequacy regime may be 
ineffective, private monitoring could be more important to reduce the extent of 
financial distress and default risk on deposits. Consistent with the market discipline 
hypothesis, therefore, institutional investors holding huge amounts of uninsured 
deposits have higher incentives to monitor and discipline undercapitalised banks 
once there are financial distress signals. With these arguments market discipline 
can provide additional corporate governance in bank holding companies (Flannerly, 
1998) and complement weak capital adequacy regimes.   
Therefore, in line with the views above, it is argued that the information efficiency 
of book-based risk measures will be higher if investors face an increased risk of 
default in the low-capitalised sub-debt banks. This leads to the third hypothesis 
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associated with distance to default and bank risk fundamentals in undercapitalised 
banks:  
 
H3: The degree to which distance to default is explained by bank fundamentals is 
 higher in banks with low capitalisation.  
4.3.2 Methodology  
This section describes and justifies the dependent, independent, and control 
variables from the perspective of previous empirical and theoretical studies. It 
begins by explaining the dependent variable. Next, the section discusses the 
explanatory variables in sequence and finishes with control variables. 
A. Distance to Default 
Distance to default is used as the dependent variable. Black and Scholes (1973) 
and Merton’s (1974) employ the distance to default model as a market-based 
measure of banking distress. As distance to default estimate is based on the 
theoretical foundation of contingent claims valuation model (Black and Scholes, 
1973; Merton, 1974) it contains more information on volatility of the firm and market 
value of debt (Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Gropp et al., 2004). The model has been 
widely-used in industrial empirical research (Hillegeist et al., 2004; Vassalou and 
Xing, 2004; Gropp et al., 2004; Gropp et al., 2006; Akhigbe et al.,  2007;  Chan-Lau 
and Sy, 2007; Duffie et al., 2007; Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Campbell, et al., 
2008).  
Distance to default measures default risk as the number of standard deviations 
by which the market value of a bank’s assets is above the default point – i.e. the 
default point is the point when the bank market value of assets is just equal to its 
book value of total liabilities (Gropp et al., 2006). The value and volatility of assets 
(VA and σA, respectively) which are both unobservable using a system of 
simultaneous equations is inferred. The first step is the estimation of VA, and σA, 
based on an iterative method as in Hillegeist et al. (2004), Vassalou and Xing, 
(2004) and Akhigbe et al. (2007). The market value of equity is expressed by the 
call option equation (4.1) on the value of the firm’s assets. 
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where VE represents the total market value of equity at year end, and N (d1) and N 
(d2) are the cumulative standard normal probability distributions of d1 and d2, 
respectively. D is the face value of debt liabilities, and r represents expected asset 
growth rate. 
     (4.2) 
      (4.3) 
Asset and equity volatilities are linked in the following optimal hedge equation as:  
 
      (4.4) 
VA and σA in equation (4.1) and the hedge equation (4.4) are estimated by 
employing Newton search algorithm.  
Equity volatility, σE, is estimated using daily stock returns collected from 
Datastream. Following Bharath and Shumway (2008), the standard deviation of 
daily stock returns multiplied by the square root of the average number of trading 
days in the year is set at 252 trading days. To solve the simultaneous system of 
equations (4.1) and (4.4), therefore, estimates of  the starting values for σA and VA 
are as follows; σA= σEVE/(VE+D), and VA=D+VE. Employing Newton’s search 
algorithm in the iteration procedure, the whole simultaneous system converged in 
the fifth-iteration at tolerance level of 0.01. At this stage, the two unknown variables 
(VA and σA) are estimated and substituted for in equation (4.5). Following that, the 
instantaneous risk free rate (one-year US Treasury Bill rate) is used to represent 
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the expected returns. Finally, distance to default (-DD) is calculated following 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Gropp et al., (2006)43: 
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B. Explanatory Variables  
This section discusses the ex-ante signs of every regressor and their importance in 
the model specifications. Book-accounting information employed in this 
investigation has been used in previous empirical studies to measure bank risk 
(see Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Evanoff and Wall, 2002; Sironi, 2003; Demirgüc 
Kunt and Huzinga, 2004; Elyasiani and Jia, 2008). Non-performing loans ratio is 
defined as non-performing loans divided by total loans denoted as NPLTL. This 
variable should positively affect distance to default as it indicates the quality of the 
bank loan portfolio, with higher values suggesting lower asset quality (Flannery and 
Sorescu, 1996; Akhigbe et al., 2007).  
Reserve loan losses to total assets ratio, RLLA, should have a similar impact as 
the non-performing loans ratio on default likelihood (Sironi, 2003). Non-interest 
income divided by revenues is labelled as NIIR. This variable captures earnings 
diversification. Diversification reduces the return variance of a financial assets 
portfolio and should, hence, be negatively associated with default likelihood 
(Demsetz and Strahan, 1997). Cash and marketable securities over total assets 
ratio is denoted as CSD and it captures a banks’ liquidity position (Martinez-Peria 
and Schmukler, 2001). This ratio should be negatively related to distance to default 
as higher liquidity levels signal a lower likelihood of financial distress (Sironi, 2003). 
Essentially, it reflects soundness and health of a bank. 
Capital is defined as the ratio of the book value of equity to total assets, denoted 
by CAP. Well-capitalised banks are less vulnerable to economic shocks – and thus, 
                                            
43 Increasing –DD (i.e. moving to the right on the -DD line) narrows the distance to default and, 
thus, makes default risk more likely. For banks A and B, if -DDA > -DDB, Bank B has a higher 
distance to default relative to Bank A. 
- 104 - 
 
CAP should be negatively associated with distance to default. The negative sign on 
book value equity to total asset ratio captures both low leverage banks (i.e., very 
strong banks - with high capital ratios) and small banks. Moreover, one would 
expect this direction to suggest a lower investment opportunity set in banks that are 
not well capitalised. In contrast, a positive association between bank capital and 
risk proxies suggests that equity investments are more risky (very weak banks – 
i.e., with low capital ratios) than assets (Sironi, 2003). These banks could be forced 
to enhance their capital positions as they might be unable to sustain huge losses in 
economic downturn periods. 
To proxy leverage, the market value of common equity and the book value of 
preferred stock (MKTLEV) are used. Leverage should be positively related to 
distance to default as increasing costs to service liabilities will make default more 
likely. That is, a higher financial leverage suggests greater likelihood to default risk. 
Return on assets, ROA) is defined as income before tax divided by total assets. A 
positive relationship between profitability and default likelihood is expected as 
higher profitability may be achieved on the basis of higher risk-taking (Flannery and 
Sorescu, 1996). On the other hand, the negative linkage between risk and 
profitability measures could suggest greater efficiency by the management in 
downsizing incentives to risk-taking behaviour. 
C. Control Variables  
This study also controls for the effects of bank size and year dummies on distance 
to default. Natural log of a bank’s total assets controls for the size of the firm is 
denoted as LNSIZE. The negative sign on bank size refers to more diversification 
of risk asset portfolios, greater disclosure, lower information asymmetry and 
bailouts benefits or too-big-to-fail in larger banks (Saunders et al., 1990; Flannery 
and Sorescu, 1996). In addition, firm size, past stock returns, and idiosyncratic 
returns variability have previously been identified as a relevant bankruptcy predictor 
(Shumway, 2001). Time effects which control intertemporal variations in market 
(macroeconomic) conditions, tax effects and bank sector differences are captured 
by the year dummy variable, dt.  
Following Flannery and Sorescu’s (1996) and Martinez-Peria and Schmukler’s 
(2001) approach of fixed effects panel regressions (unbalanced panel), bank risk 
fundamental coefficients are estimated. The fixed-effects estimator captures an 
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unobservable heterogeneity. It is preferred over other estimators. This is because it 
yields unbiased coefficients in contrast to random-effects modelling. In this 
specification, the estimator indicates the variation of distance to default over time – 
i.e., deviation from the mean of each bank. Each bank has also its own intercept. 
Hence, the dependent variable - negative distance to default is estimated in the 
following equation, 4.6. Bank risk fundamentals are lagged by one year to mitigate 
endogeneity issues.  
 
titititiit ClsFundamentaRiskBankduDD ,,1,'      (4.6) 
 
where -DD is the distance to default representing the dependent variable. The 
primary interest focuses in the coefficient estimates of bank risk fundamental (β’) 
variables (lagged) and defined in Appendix I. Cit, dt and µ represent control 
variables, year dummies and bank–specific fixed effects affecting distance to 
default, respectively. Finally, i indexes number of banks and t indexes number of 
years per bank. εi,t  is the error term with assumed Gaussian properties.  
It is argued that equation 4.6 is theoretically sub-optimal since it ignores 
nonlinear, interactive effects between asset risk and leverage on distance to default 
(Gorton and Santomero, 1990; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996). Accordingly, as in 
Sironi (2003), two interactive variables are included to represent this nonlinear risk 
relationship. These interactive variables are ROAMKLEV (the product of ROA and 
MKTLEV), and RLLAMKLEV (the product of RLLA and MKTLEV). 
4.4 Sample Selection 
To construct the sample of banks, I identify US bank holding companies and any 
outstanding subordinated notes and debentures from FR Y-9C filings with the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago at the end of the fourth quarter. I then match 
sample banks with financial information available on the Datastream database over 
the period 1998-2007. 
The number of bank holding companies in the sample that have issued 
subordinated notes and debentures and bank holding companies without 
subordinated notes and debentures is 98 and 128, respectively. The sample size is 
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closely comparable to that of other studies (e.g., Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; 
Evanoff and Wall, 2001; Bliss and Flannery, 2002; Goyal, 2005; Flannery and 
Rangan, 2008; Elyasiani and Jia, 2008). In Table 4-1, Panel A presents the key 
descriptive statistics for the pooled sample of bank holding companies which have 
issued subordinated notes and debentures. The sample mean (median) -DD value 
is 3.913 (3.618). Elyasiani and Jia (2008), using a sample of 110 bank holding 
companies report a mean (median) -DD of 3.376 (1.245) over the period 1992-
2004. The explanation for these values being on the low side could be due to 
methodological differences. Elyasiani and Jia (ibid) defined DD as equity 
capitalisation to asset volatility ratio.  
As expected, equity volatility is higher than asset volatility. This indicates 
decreases in the idiosyncratic volatility relative to the market volatility of individual 
banks over the period under investigation. Campbell et al. (2001) show that during 
the period 1962-1997, there was a remarkable increase in firm level volatility 
relative to market volatility. The authors argue that idiosyncratic volatility is 
influenced by institutional ownership or the opacity of firm fundamentals. The mean 
(median) values of equity volatility (σE) are 0.385 (0.298). These figures are on the 
high side compared to Elyasiani and Jia (2008) and Akhigbe et al. (2007) for the 
reason given above.  Mean (median) values of annualized bank level volatility (σA) 
are 0.095 (0.045).  
Regarding the accounting measures of risk, the mean (median) value of NPLTL 
is 0.671% (0.559%) and the mean (median) value of RLLA is 0.946% (0.899%). 
These proxies capture asset quality. Mean (median) values of CSD are 40.442% 
(35.156%). CSD measures bank liquidity. Mean (median) CAP and CART are 
8.956% (8.494%) and 12.26% (11.96%), respectively. LEV and MKTLEV have 
mean (median) values of 11.310 (10.753) and 6.684 (5.466) which are on the high 
side, implying higher leverage and higher likelihood of default risk. In the sample, 
the mean (median) values for ROA are 1.460 (1.464) respectively. These 
measures show overall firm performance (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996). 
To offer an initial empirical examination of the hypotheses, the study uses the 
univariate analysis-Welch test to compare bank risk fundamentals of SND banks 
and non-SND bank sub-samples. A SND bank is a firm that issued mandatory sub-
debt security in any single year over the sample period 1998-2007 and a non-SND 
bank never issued this security over this period. The results are summarised in 
Table 4-1. Panel B reports this comparison results. Contrary to expectation, the 
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findings indicate no quantitative significant difference in non-performing loans ratio 
of the two groups. A possible explanation for this is that both sets of banks attempt 
to keep credit risk assets portfolio on the low side through complying with the 
prudential requirements. That means managers are enthusiastic about the 
migration risk of deteriorating credit portfolios to minimise loan losses and ensure 
good banks’ credit/asset quality. However, reserve loan losses ratio indicates that 
SND banks set aside significant amount of cash (i.e., 0.946%) to conserve problem 
loans and unprecedented losses, as compared to 0.893% of non-SND banks.  
In addition, non-interest income is larger in SND banks relative to non-SND 
banks. Their average values are 21.32% and 15.14%, respectively (with estimated 
difference significant at 1% level). Such pattern is consistent with the hypothesis 
that larger BHCs tend to better diversify their portfolio risk in the capital market 
(Saunders et al., 1990). Therefore, BHCs can generate more income from 
securities and insurance underwritings, merchant banking, and other expanding 
product lines. In support of this, Stiroh (2006) has shown that the US banking firms 
are moving from conventional sources of interest income lending activities towards 
lucrative business that brings in more non-interest income. Capital-to-asset ratio 
(CAP) and total risk asset ratio (CART) are lower for SND banks compared to non-
SND banks. In both cases, the decrease in difference is statistically significant at 
1% level. 
 On the other hand, leverage ratio is higher in SND banks than in non-sub debt 
banks. The increase in difference is statistically significant at 1%. This pattern of 
findings is consistent with the view that more highly-leveraged firms and low capital 
ratio are associated with higher default risk (Lev, 1976). As such, distance to 
default exhibits higher predicting power in SND banks as compared to non-SND 
banks, consistent with H1. Higher liquidity assets ratio in non-SND banks may 
reflect their inability to access capital markets. Contrary to expectation, non-sub 
debt banks hold larger assets (significant at 1% level) than SND banks, suggesting 
that many large banks are yet to comply with the mandatory SND issuance clause. 
4.5 Empirical Results 
Panel A of Table 4-2 presents a correlation matrix of the variables employed to 
estimate -DD.  The correlation between -DD and equity volatility (σE) and asset 
volatility (σA) are 0.342 and 0.613, respectively. Equity volatility and asset volatility 
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are almost perfectly correlated (0.902) (significant at 5%-level). This is because 
both variables capture the same firm risk characteristics.  
Panel B of Table 4-2 reports pair-wise correlations between the independent 
variables, and shows that correlations among the variables are generally low. Large 
correlation above 0.3 is between LNSIZE and NIIR - of 0.560 and significant at 5% 
level. It is argued that the strong correlated variables suggest the presence of 
multicollinearity in the regression analysis. This investigation addresses this 
problem by orthogonalising these parameters. CART (total capital adequacy ratios) 
is negatively correlated with leverage, LEV at -0.111. This correlation could confirm 
that highly-leveraged banks exhibit lower capital buffers to absorb loan losses and 
other unforeseeable events. 
4.5.1 Comparison of distance to default on bank holding companies with and 
without SND 
This section contrasts the importance of book-based measures of risk in explaining 
distance to default for banks that issue subordinated notes and debentures 
compared with banks that do not issue sub-debt. In fact, the study measures 
whether the information content in bank fundamentals is contingent on banks 
issuing sub-debt. H1 predicts that book-based risk measures are comparatively 
more important in predicting default risk for banks that issue sub-debt. This is 
because investors in bank sub-debt are exposed to greater levels of market 
discipline than other bank creditors. Thus, they have higher incentives to monitor 
bank risk-taking. This is likely to result in higher bank risk-fundamentals explaining 
a larger fraction of the cross-sectional variation in distance to default in predicting 
default risk. To explore this, the sample is divided into two parts: (i) bank holding 
companies with outstanding subordinated notes and debentures (98), and (ii) bank 
holding companies without subordinated notes and debentures (128). Next, the 
regressions of bank risk fundamentals and control variables are run on distance to 
default for each subgroup.  
The results in Table 4-3 for subordinated notes and debenture banks reveal that 
non-performing loans ratio, NPLTL enters models (1) and (3) with positive signs 
and is significant at 5% and 10% levels, respectively, as expected. The possible 
interpretation for this is that banks with poor loan portfolios (poor assets quality) are 
more vulnerable to financial distress. The positive sign on coefficient estimate of 
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leverage LEV implies increasing funding costs on deposit interest-bearing accounts 
that may lead to higher credit default likelihood. Return on asset ratio, ROA in all 
specifications is never significant. However, this finding does not imply that more 
profitable banks are not associated with higher risk-taking. Other accounting risk 
measures show no association with distance to default in this sample. 
 To overcome multicollinearity between regressors, highly correlated variables 
are orthogonalised. For example, in model (2), non-interest income divided by 
revenues, NIIR and natural log of total assets, LNSIZE (i.e., 0.560) are 
orthogonalised. Subsequently, these orthogonalised parameters (NIIR_res and 
LNSIZE) are used in regression analysis instead of unorthogonalised ones. 
Consistently, their coefficient estimates are robust with the earlier predictions as 
reported in model (1), suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern.  
In Models (4) through (6) of Table 4-3, the same regressions for banks that have 
not issued subordinated notes and debentures are run. With the exception of 
orthogonalised liquidity risk – CSD_re, profitability – ROA, and leverage - LEV_res 
coefficient estimates, other risk fundamentals do not show any impact on -DD44. 
This differs from banks with sub-debt where only NPLTL and LEV enter the 
regression with a statistically significant coefficient. However, the leverage risk 
proxy appears to be the dominant determinant of financial distress for both types of 
banks. But, it is statistically significant (at 1% level in models (1) and (2)) in banks 
that issued sub-debts. 
In addition, across all specifications (models 4 to 6), the estimated coefficient on 
CSD is positive and statistically significant at 1% levels in models (4) and (5), and 
at 5% level in model (6). The positive coefficient implies liquidity problems in non-
subordinated notes and debentures banks which may increase the likelihood of 
default. That means that non-sub-debt banks are more vulnerable to liquidity risk. 
Turning to the profitability indicator, ROA is negatively associated with -DD 
(significant at 1% level) in models (4) and (5). This result contradicts the theory 
which states that higher return is linked with greater risk-taking and is inconsistent 
with those in by Akhigbe et al. (2007). The finding further explains that non sub-
debt banks are more profitable, and are unlikely to be susceptible to default risk. 
                                            
44 For non-sub debt banks in model (5), the pair correlation between CART and CSD is 0.379. 
As such, these parameters are also orthogonalised to account for the multicollinearity problem. 
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However, the banks’ assets size (LNSIZE) variable is insignificant in all regression 
models. By contrast, Akhigbe et al. (2007) indicate strong connection between bank 
size (i.e., measured by the natural log of the market value of equity) and default 
likelihood.    
Generally, banks that issue sub-debt revealed slightly lower predictive power of -
DD versus banks that do not issue sub-debt instruments. This explanatory power 
gets better after controlling for more risk fundamentals (provisions for loan losses to 
net loan losses, LLCR, the ratio of reserve loan losses to total assets, RLLA, the 
interaction of RLLALEV) – i.e. from adjusted R2  equals 49% to 50% in models (1) 
and (3), respectively. The adjusted pseudo-R
2
, shows that the model specification 
explains a larger proportion of the cross-section variation in distance to default.
 
More important and consistent with the theoretical predictions (Gujarati, 2003), for 
banks that issued sub-debts, coefficient estimates are statistical significant. While, 
the reported higher adjusted R
2 
in models (4) and (6) are 62% and 63%, 
respectively, for banks without outstanding sub-debts - this does not indicate bad 
model specifications in sub-debt banks. Arguably, larger asset size in non-SND 
banks as compared with SND banks may have resulted in higher R
2 
in the former 
banks. 
To further analyse the differences in the predictive power of bank fundamentals 
for subordinated notes and debentures banks and non-subordinated notes and 
debentures banks, a Chow test (partial F-test) is used to determine whether there 
are differences in the parameter estimates for the different sub-samples are 
conducted. The calculated F with d.f. =17, 1921 of 509.55 (p<0.000) is greater than 
the critical value of 1.63 at 5 % level of significance. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
that the parameter estimates are identical can be rejected. This intuition suggests 
that hypothesis (H1) is somehow supported - more analysis on this and robustness 
tests follow in the next section. 
4.5.2 Further robustness checks 
To further analyse the likelihood that the findings are not partly driven by model 
specification, a differences-in-differences methodology (see Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2003) is employed. Using a combined sample of 226 banks, this 
approach compares the change in the DD sensitivity  for banks with subordinated 
debts and banks without these securities. The basic regression is OLS in equation 
4.7. The results are presented in Table 4-4. dSND2 is the main coefficient of 
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interest, representing banks with sub-debts. dSND indicates 1 if the bank issued 
sub-debt, otherwise 0 – i.e. predicted to be positive45. Banks deemed less risky 
have their customers’ deposits covered by the deposit insurance schemes. On the 
other hand, to reduce risk-shifting incentives to bondholders from shareholders, 
uninsured banks are mandated to issue subordinated debt that would boost private 
market discipline and mitigate risk-taking. Z represents similar risk bank 
fundamentals, already defined above. Therefore the estimated coefficient reflects 
the differences in distance to default sensitivity to banks with and without sub-
debts. The finding indicates a significant positive coefficient on dSND, explaining 
that banks with sub-debt have a narrow distance to default. Across all regressions 
(models 2-6), after controlling for bank risk fundamentals, dSND also remains 
statistically significant at all conventional levels of significance. 
 
)7.4.........(............................................................iiiii ZdSNDDD    
 
Based on these analyses, the results reported in Table 4-3 do not suggest that 
banks without sub-debts have higher explanatory power over those that do not 
have. In summarising, these findings lend some support to hypothesis (H1). 
Accordingly, H1 is justified. Moreover, across all regression models, distance to 
default varies inversely with residual of LNSIZERE at the 1% level. This finding may 
be interpreted as less likelihood of default risk in larger bank holding companies.  
Finally, to mitigate the multicollinearity problem reported in Table 4-2, the highly 
correlated variables are orthogonalised – that means, each of these regressors is 
set to be uncorrelated to each other. The highest reported correlation of 0.560 is 
between LNSIZE and NIIR. Each of these correlated variables is represented by 
the residual from a regression of one factor on its respective correlated variable. 
Then, these residuals are used as regressors. To further multicollinearity checks, 
variance inflation factor (VIF) test - column 10 is carried out. In the OLS regression, 
the reported VIF tests for the dependent variable distance to default is significantly 
less than 10 for each used regressor. Therefore, VIF test suggests the absence of 
                                            
45 In this combined sample, it is relatively noted highly pairwise correlations between dSND2 
and CSD (0.835), dSND2and LNSIZE (0.406), NIIR and LNSIZE (0.512), CSD and LNSIZE 
(0.329), and ROALEV and ROA (0.782). To account for multicollinearity, these pair variables, 
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both multicollinearity among independent variables and noise on the dependent 
variable. Over model specifications associated with multicollinearity – see table 4-3, 
model (2) and (5) and the discussion above. 
4.5.3 Distance to default and charter value 
This section considers whether the charter value of banks affects the degree to 
which fundamentals help predict bank distress. Valuable bank charters act as an 
incentive for bank managers to constrain their risk-taking behaviour. Hence, H2 
proposes that higher charter values, due to an increased need for investors to 
monitor management, should increase the informational efficiency of bank 
fundamentals.  
To test predictions, regressions of bank risk fundamentals on -DD for groups of 
banks located in different charter value quintiles are run. Charter value is proxied by 
Tobin’s Q and assigns banks to quintile portfolios based on Q. Tobin’s Q is 
employed instead of demand deposits to total deposits ratio, as it captures market 
power in terms of bank growth opportunities, relative to market power from deposit 
markets in the latter (Keeley, 1990). Tobin’s Q has also been employed as a proxy 
for charter value by Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996) and Goyal (2005). Table 4-5 
presents results of regression models for the lowest value quintile (Q1), middle 
(Q2-Q4), and the highest quintile (Q5) in the pooled sample of bank holding 
companies. dSND is a multiplicative dummy defined as 1 if the bank issued sub-
debt, otherwise 0, and interacted with each of hypothesised bank risk 
fundamentals. 
Across all regressions, the results show that the interaction variables 
NPLTL*dSND, CART*dSND, ROA*dSND and LNSIZE*dSND are not statistically 
significant. However this does not change the theoretical fact that -DD is sensitive 
to bank risk fundamentals in sub-debt banks. Models (1) and (4) of Table 4-5 report 
regressions on -DD for the lowest charter value quintile. This group is deemed to 
have higher incentives to engage particularly in risky investment activity. In these 
regressions, none of the bank risk fundamentals enter the specification with a 
statistically significant coefficient, except the interaction of MKTLEV*dSND and 
RLLAMKLEV*dSND. Surprisingly, MKTLEV*dSND carries a negative sign 
                                                                                                                                
thus, are orthogonalised. Next, as a further confirmation for multicollinearity, in each regression 
model, VIF is estimated. It is found that the estimated VIF values are less than 4. 
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(significant at 10% level) in model (4), exhibiting lower leverage in medium banks 
with distance to default. Controlling for non-linearity, RLLAMKLEV*dSND enters 
model (4) positively (significant at 5% level) as predicted. In general, the hypothesis 
that bank risk fundamentals are equal to zero can be accepted, suggesting that 
they cannot explain the variation in -DD for sub-debt banks with low charter value.  
In model (6), the interaction effect between asset risk and leverage on distance 
to default (RLLAMKLEV*dSND), which captures non-linear relationships, has a 
positive sign (significant at 1% level). This result is consistent with other empirical 
research. Sironi (2003) indicated that this interaction term positively impacts credit 
default spreads since credit risk becomes more relevant for higher-leveraged 
banks.  
The results in Model (3) and (6), which relate to bank holding companies located 
in the highest charter value quintile, ROAMKLEV*dSND and MKTLEV*dSND, are 
negative and significant at 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The negative 
coefficient estimate on ROAMKLEV*dSND is consistent with the hypothesis on the 
management’s efficiency in reducing the extent of credit defaults (Flannery and 
Sorescu, 1996). Consistent with the theory, in model (6), liquidity assets ratio, 
CSD*dSND, is positive explaining that liquidity risk is not a concern in large banks. 
In other words, large holding banks have in place sufficient liquidity levels and 
funding contingency mechanisms that mitigate bank liquidity risks. Hence, for 
banks with higher charter value - i.e. located in Q5, the bank risk accounting-based 
measures explain a higher share of the variation in distance to default. For 
instance, banks located in Q5 have higher adjusted R
2 
in
 
both regression models 
(i.e. 65.4% and 67.2 %). Collectively these findings are consistent with H2. 
Subsequently, the results could be explained by the theoretical support that banks 
with higher charter values - more valuable banks - are more frequently traded and 
their asset values are thus, informationally  efficient and are more likely to reflect 
fundamentals. In this context, the reported adjusted R
2 
=65.4% or 67.2 % might 
make the argument that it strengthens H1. 
4.5.4 Distance to default and capital adequacy 
This section analyses the extent to which accounting measures predict the distance 
to default of banks that are well-capitalised in relation with undercapitalised ones. 
This analysis disentangles banks that exhibit capitalisation levels above and below 
the sample median. It is hypothesised that investors and regulators will give 
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increased attention to banking firms with low capital reserves. Banks with low 
capital reserves will make private monitoring governance for market in 
subordinated debt banks relatively more important. Therefore, banks with low 
capital reserves display a higher degree of informational efficiency with regard to 
the extent to which the accounting data reflects default risk.  
Table 4-6 runs regressions on -DD for banks that are capitalised below and 
above the sample median (i.e., 12.260% of total risk-based capital). For banks with 
low capital ratios in models (1-2) the coefficient on NIIR_res – i.e. capturing 
diversified fee-based activities, has the expected negative sign and is significant (at 
least at the 1%-level). Similarly, LNSIZE is negative and significant (at < 5% level). 
This suggests that the management efficiency through portfolio diversification 
decreases -DD as portrayed by NIIR_res and LNSIZE. As expected, -DD increases 
with leverage, LEV at 5% level of significance. This is consistent with the view that 
low-capitalised banks have incentives to achieve a higher risk-return profile through 
risk-shifting incentives (John, 1987).  
The coefficient estimates for well-capitalised banks are reported in models (3) 
and (4). As in low-capitalised, NIIR_res carries the negative sign. The two 
regression models show that ROA and LNSIZE are not statistically significant at 
customary levels. Consistent with Akhigbe et al. (2007), LEV is marginally 
significant (at 10% level) in model (3) and statistically significant (at 1% level) in 
model (4) with the expected signs. Consequently, there is little evidence which 
points to bank fundamentals explaining default risk in hi-capitalised banks. Finally, 
adjusted R
2
 is higher (i.e., about 63.7%) in low total risk-based capital ratios than in 
well capitalised ones (i.e., about 54%). Therefore, one may argue that bank-risk 
fundamentals are more effective in explaining -DD in undercapitalised banks 
compared to highly-capitalised banks. Consequently, H3 is accepted. 
4.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This empirical chapter examines the extent to which bank fundamentals help 
predict market-based measures of default risk. Generally, by employing the 
distance to default approach, the analysis which generates some findings that 
support distance to default has higher predictive power for financial distress in sub-
debt banks (H1). The explanation for that is the importance of private monitoring 
governance for uninsured bank creditors that issue subordinated debts. Sub-debt 
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increases the informational efficiency of bank risk fundamentals. It also finds that 
both higher charter value and lower bank capitalisation further increase the power 
of bank fundamentals to predict bank default risk. Another interesting finding is the 
methodological approach - an option pricing model employed to construct distance 
to default to measure for default risk is more useful than others in capturing 
information in sub-debt. Distance to default adds important information to the 
accounting data in assessing unhealthy banks by regulatory authorities.  
The results have a number of important implications. First, the study is policy 
motivated - due to the fact that findings are consistent with the Basel II Framework 
and Gramm-Leach-Bliley’s requirements. They support the infusion of greater 
levels of market discipline governance that enhances transparency and disclosures. 
As such, the issuance of bank sub-debt securities, improves the informational 
efficiency of bank risk fundamentals. Second, from the agent-principal perspective, 
subordinated debt holder monitoring governance is important in managerial 
incentives for greater risk-taking in banks. As a possible avenue for further 
research, the relationship between accounting risk information and distance to 
default uncovered in this study, can be tested in the context of other markets.  
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Table 4-1 Summary Statistics for SND Banks 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics. The variable -DD is the distance to default. Equity volatility 
(σE) is calculated as the standard deviation of daily equity returns multiplied by the square root of 
the number of trading days in a year. Asset volatility (σA) is the volatility of asset returns based 
on the contingent claims model. Non-performing loans divided by total loans ratio denoted is 
denoted by NPLTL. RLLA is the ratio of reserve loan losses to total assets. Non-interest income 
divided by revenues is labelled as NIIR. Cash and marketable securities to total assets ratio 
denoted as CSD. Capital is denoted by CAP and defined as book value of equity to total asset. 
Total risk capital ratio is denoted by CART and defined as the sum of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 
capital divided by weighted risk assets. The ratio of total (book) liabilities to the book value of 
equity denoted as LEV. Return on assets is income before tax divided by total assets and 
labelled as ROA. Tobin’s Q is denoted as Q and defined as market capitalisation plus total asset 
minus total equity divided total assets. Total liabilities to the sum of market value of common and 
book value of preferred stock ratio denoted as MKTLEV. ROALEV is the product of ROA and 
LEV. RLLALEV is the product of RLLA and LEV. Control variable: Total asset is denoted by TA. 
Natural log of total Assets (LNSIZE). Panel B presents means (medians) of bank risk 
fundamentals for comparisons of SND banks against non-SND banks for a sample of 226 US 
bank holding companies for the period 1998-2000. SND banks are defined as those BHCs that 
have issued mandatory sub-debt security in any single year over the sample period 1998-2007 
and a non-SND bank had never issued this security. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 N Mean Median  Std Dev  Min Max 
-DD 906 -3.913 -3.618 2.096 -16.995 3.767 
σE 906 0.385 0.298 0.438 0.066 6.848 
σA 906 0.095 0.045 0.375 0.004 6.837 
NPLTL (%) 874 0.671 0.559 0.582 0.000 5.623 
RLLA(%) 874 0.946 0.899 0.370 .013 4.601 
NIIR (%) 878 21.319 18.162 13.333 0.426 69.930 
CSD (%) 905 1.455 0.461 2.185 0.000 1.953 
CAP (%) 906 8.956 8.494 5.620 1.241 92.200 
CART (%) 906 12.262 12.260 1.241 5.920 23.700 
LEV (Times) 906 11.310 10.753 3.914 0.085 79.611 
ROA (%) 877 1.460 1.464 0.968 -4.648 14.665 
Q  906 1.096 1.080 0.090 0.933 1.878 
MKTLEV (Times) 906 6.684 5.466 5.584 0.050 88.295 
ROAMKLEV (%) 877 15.725 15.910 8.462 -63.434 45.193 
RLLAMKLEV (%) 874 10.657 9.581 7.860 0.147 198.323 
LNSIZE 906 24.879 22.286 26.085 17.717 28.415 
TA ($ billion) 906 63.800 4.770 213.000 0.050 2,190.000 
Panel B: Comparison of SND banks and non-SND banks  risk fundamentals  
Item   SND banks Non-SND  
banks  
t-statistics (p-value for  
Welch test) for 
difference  
in mean (median)  
Number of firms                                       98 128  
NPLTL (%)  0.671 (0.559) 0.678 (0.502) -0.594     (0.2724) 
RLLA (%)  0.946 (0.899) 0.893 (0.876) 3.267*** (0.000) 
NIIR (%)  21.319 (18.162) 15.142 (14.437) 11.915*** (0.000) 
CSD (%)  1.455 (0.461) 28.366 (27.056) -76.220*** (0.000) 
CAP (%)  8.956 (8.494) 9.636 (8.746) -2.619*** (0.000) 
CART (%)  12.262 (0.12.260) 12.790 (12.798) -8.389*** (0.000) 
LEV (Times)  11.310 (10.753) 10.584 (10.415) 4.634*** (0.000) 
ROA (%)  1.460 (1.464) 1.474 (1.353) -0.280     (0.610) 
TA ($ billion)  63.800(4.770) 1,980 (1270) -30.630*** (0.000) 
   ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
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Table 4-2 Correlation matrix  
The variable -DD labels the distance to default. Equity volatility denoted by σE and is calculated as the standard deviation of daily equity returns multiplied 
by the square root of the number of trading days in a year. Asset volatility labelled as σA and is the volatility of asset return based on a contingent claims 
model. The value of total assets, VA ($ billion), is estimated based on option pricing methods. X is the book value of total liabilities at the end of each year 
($ billion). Non-performing loans are divided by total loans and labelled NPLTL. RLLA is the ratio of reserve loan losses to total assets. Non-interest 
income divided by revenues ratio and labelled as NIIR. Cash and marketable securities to total assets ratio denoted as CSD. Total risk capital ratio is 
denoted by CART and defined as the sum of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital divided by risky assets. The ratio of total (book) liabilities to the book value 
of equity denoted by LEV. Return on assets is defined as income before tax divided by total assets and labelled as ROA. Tobin’s Q is defined as market 
capitalisation plus total asset minus total equity divided total assets. Control variable: Natural log of total Assets (LNSIZE). 
Panel A: Correlation between distance to default and equity volatility, asset volatility, and total liabilities 
Variable  -DD σA σE VA      
σA  0.342*         
σE  0.613* 0.902*        
VA  -0.161* -0.034 -0.067*       
X  -0.151* -0.03 -0.06 0.998*      
Panel B: Correlation for bank risk measures and control variable used in regression models and variance inflation factor (VIF) tests between dependent 
variable (DD). 
 
DD NPLTL RLLA NIIR CSD CART LEV ROA VIF 
DD 
         NPLTL 0.156* 
       
1.15 
RLLA 0.202* 0.270* 
      
1.15 
NIIR -0.233* -0.016 -0.193* 
     
1.51 
CSD 0.075* -0.099* 0.083* -0.104* 
    
1.07 
CART -0.031 -0.013 -0.001 0.097* -0.053 
   
1.03 
LEV 0.155* 0.046 -0.055 -0.062 -0.023 -0.111* 
  
1.09 
ROA -0.141* -0.163* 0.150* 0.28* -0.084* 0.037 -0.215* 
 
1.27 
LNSIZE -0.332* 0.034 -0.054 0.560* -0.149* 0.014 -0.080* 0.254* 1.59 
Asterisk * indicates that the test statistic is significant at the level of 5% 
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Table 4-3 Distance to default and subordinated debt 
The underlying model is: -DD=β1+β2NPLTLt-1+β3NIIRt-1+β4CSDt-1+β5CARTt-1+β6ROAt-1+β7LEVt-
1+β8ROALEVt-1+β9LLCRt-1+β10RLLAt-1+β11RLLALEVt-1 +β12LNSIZE+εit. 
This table reports fixed effects panel regressions on the variable –DD. Independent variables: 
Non-performing loans divided by total loans ratio is denoted by NPLTL. Non-interest income 
divided by revenues is labelled as NIIR. Cash and marketable securities to total assets ratio 
denoted as CSD. Total risk capital ratio is denoted by CART and defined as the sum of Tier 1 
capital and Tier 2 capital divided by weighted risk assets. Return on assets ratio is the income 
before tax divided by total assets and labelled as ROA. The ratio of total liabilities to the book 
value of equity denoted by LEV. ROALEV is the product of ROA and LEV. Loan-loss coverage 
ratio defined as pre-tax income plus provisions for loan losses to net loan losses, LLCR. RLLA is 
the ratio of reserve loan losses to total assets. RLLALEV is the product of RLLA and LEV. 
Control variable: Natural log of total Assets (LNSIZE). Year dummies are included in the fixed 
effect regressions. Estimated standard errors are computed using White’s method. 
Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics reported in parentheses below each coefficient 
estimate. SND banks are defined as those BHCs that issued mandatory sub-debt, and non-SND 
banks are those that had not issued this security. 
 SND banks Non-SND  
banks 
 
Variables/Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Lag(NPLTL) 0.231** 0.248** 0.251* 0.092 0.054 0.274  
 (2.088) (2.239) (1.948) (0.460) (0.270) (1.211)  
Lag(NIIR) -0.006  -0.012 -0.016 -0.016 -0.019  
 (-0.519)  (-0.906) (-1.364) (-1.352) (-1.548)  
NIIR_res.  -0.006      
  (-0.606)      
Lag(CSD) 0.062 0.072 0.159 0.062***  0.046**  
 (0.992) (1.144) (1.582) (3.857)  (2.360)  
CSD_re     0.071***   
     (4.085)   
Lag(CART) 0.020 0.016 0.004 -0.033 0.127* 0.021  
 (0.464) (0.375) (0.075) (-0.539) (1.897) (0.293)  
Lag(ROA) 0.174 -0.070 0.391 -1.115*** -0.713*** -1.207  
 (0.874) (-0.684) (1.303) (-2.663) (-3.101) (-1.058)  
Lag(LEV) 0.086*** 0.071*** 0.030 0.011 0.092* 0.107  
 (3.477) (3.178) (1.602) (0.132) (1.781) (0.625)  
Lag(ROALEV) -0.021  -0.030 0.055  0.069  
 (-1.436)  (-1.602) (1.115)  (0.695)  
Lag(LNSIZE) -0.019 -0.033 -0.341 -0.236 -0.196 0.333  
 (-0.101) (-0.169) (-1.459) (-0.662) (-0.547) (0.728)  
Lag(LLCR)   -0.000   -0.000  
   (-0.995)   (-1.013)  
Lag (RLLA)   0.966   0.345  
   (1.011)   (0.312)  
Lag(RLLALEV)   -0.028*   -0.108  
   (-0.323)   (-0.832)  
Constant -4.453 -4.073 1.942 -3.922 -5.547 -17.008  
 (-0.996) (-0.916) (0.346) (-0.508) (-0.721) (-1.644)  
R
2 
0.565 0.563 0.587 0.675 0.675 0.687  
Adjusted R
2 
0.487 0.486 0.500 0.620 0.621 0.628  
#Obs. 749 749 640 968 968 860  
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Welch test 
is used to check differences in coefficients of variables between SND banks and non-SND 
banks, and results are reported in Table 4-1. 
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Table 4-4 Robustness: differences-in-differences methodology   
The table reports the sensitivity of distance to default to dSND. dSND takes the value of 1 if the 
bank issued mandatory sub-debt in any single year over the sample period 1998-2007, 
otherwise 0. Non-performing loans divided by total loans ratio is denoted by NPLTL. Residual of 
non-interest income divided by revenues is labelled as NIIR. Residual of cash and marketable 
securities to total assets ratio denoted as CSD. Total risk capital ratio is denoted by CART and 
defined as the sum of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital divided by weighted risk assets. Return on 
assets ratio is the income before tax divided by total assets and labelled as ROA. The ratio of 
total liabilities to the book value of equity is denoted by LEV. Residual of ROALEV is the product 
of ROA and LEV. Residual of natural log of total assets (LNSIZERE). Year dummies are 
included in the fixed effect regressions. Estimated standard errors are computed using White’s 
method. Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics reported in parentheses below each coefficient 
estimate. 
 Dependent variable: Distance to default 
Variables/Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
dSND 4.242*** 4.109*** 4.135*** 4.138*** 4.125*** 4.126*** 4.073*** 4.076*** 
 (35.274) (34.621) (34.415) (34.408) (33.158) (34.442) (34.228) (34.267) 
PLTLN  0.346*** 0.335*** 0.349*** 0.354*** 0.267** 0.251** 0.290*** 
  (3.308) (3.211) (3.378) (3.395) (2.474) (2.313) (2.626) 
NIIR   -
0.018*** 
-
0.019*** 
-
0.019*** 
-0.014** -0.015** -0.014** 
   (-2.751) (-2.802) (-2.784) (-2.294) (-2.354) (-2.226) 
CSD    0.011 0.013* 0.009 0.006 0.006 
    (1.644) (1.693) (1.260) (0.830) (0.855) 
CART     -0.025 -0.047 -0.014 -0.007 
     (-0.579) (-1.107) (-0.332) (-0.173) 
ROA      -
0.559*** 
-
0.456*** 
-
0.834*** 
      (-5.815) (-4.661) (-6.410) 
LEV       0.094*** 0.050*** 
       (4.913) (3.459) 
ROALEV        0.052*** 
        (3.974) 
LNSIZERE -0.319*** -0.315*** -0.317*** -0.321*** -0.321*** -0.270*** -0.262*** -0.272*** 
 (-8.547) (-8.496) (-8.538) (-8.648) (-8.639) (-6.881) (-6.800) (-7.012) 
Year dummy Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
R
2
 0.519 0.530 0.532 0.532 0.532 0.551 0.557 0.559 
Adjusted R
2
 0.517 0.527 0.529 0.529 0.528 0.547 0.553 0.555 
#Obs. 2,063 1,998 1,998 1,996 1,996 1,938 1,938 1,938 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
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Table 4-5 Distance to default and bank risk fundamentals sorted by Tobin’s Q 
The underlying model is: -DD=β1+β2NPLTLt-1+β3CSDt-1+β4CAPt-1+β5ROAt-1+β6MKTLEVt-
1+β7ROAMLEVt-1β8LNSIZE+εit. 
BHCs firms issuing SND over 1998-2007 are ranked on their Tobin’s Q (Q, defined as market 
capitalisation plus total asset minus total equity divided total assets). The variable -DD labels the 
distance to default. Independent variables: Non-performing loans divided by total loans ratio 
denoted by NPLTL. Cash and marketable securities to total assets ratio denoted as CSD. Non-
interest income divided by revenues ratio and labelled by NIIR. Total risk capital ratio is denoted 
by CART and defined as the sum of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital divided by weighted risk 
assets. Return on assets ratio is the income before tax divided by total assets and labelled ROA. 
Total liabilities to the sum of market value of common and book value of preferred stock is 
denoted by MKTLEV. The ratio of total liabilities to the book value of equity denoted is by LEV. 
ROALEV is the product of ROA and LEV. ROAMKLEV is the product of ROA and MKTLEV. 
RLLAMKLEV is the product of RLLA and MKTLEV. dSND is the dummy variable takes the value 
of 1 if the bank issued mandatory sub-debt in any single year over the sample period 1998-2007, 
otherwise 0. Control variable: Natural log of total Assets (LNSIZE). Year dummies are included 
in the fixed effect regressions. Estimated standard errors are computed using White’s method. 
Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics reported in parentheses below each coefficient 
estimate. 
Variables LOW:Q
1 
MEDIUM: 
Q2-Q4 
HIGH:Q5 LOW:Q
1 
MEDIUM: 
Q2-Q4 
HIGH:Q5 
Variables/Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lag(PLTLN*dSND) 0.201 0.164 0.498 0.054 0.038 0.177 
 (1.015) (0.562) (1.541) (0.267) (0.127) (0.614) 
Lag(CSD*dSND) 0.038 -0.046 0.506* 0.017 -0.080 0.558** 
 (0.648) (-0.378) (1.958) (0.315) (-0.701) (2.176) 
Lag(CART*dSND) -0.088 0.107 -0.065 -0.065 0.105 -0.085 
 (-1.001) (1.472) (-0.726) (-0.735) (1.463) (-0.911) 
Lag(ROA*dSND) 0.064 -0.254 0.506 0.042 -0.235 -0.108 
 (0.432) (-0.725) (1.206) (0.376) (-0.945) (-0.465) 
Lag(MKTLEV*dSND) -0.000 0.009 0.309 -0.063* -0.098 -0.365** 
 (-0.003) (0.130) (1.671) (-1.892) (-1.486) (-2.381) 
Lag(ROAMKLEV*dSND) -0.004 -0.009 -0.200*    
 (-0.752) (-0.266) (-1.730)    
Lag(LNSIZE*dSND) -0.142 0.255 -0.205 -0.060 0.196 -0.111 
 (-0.581) (0.745) (-0.338) (-0.252) (0.575) (-0.213) 
Lag(RLLAMKLEV*dSND)    0.066** 0.124* 0.424*** 
    (2.351) (1.803) (3.183) 
Constant -0.498 -9.838 -0.384 -2.406 -8.478 -1.201 
 (-0.100) (-1.304) (-0.027) (-0.491) (-1.125) (-0.095) 
R-squared 0.462 0.550 0.682 0.473 0.550 0.699 
Adj. R-squared
 
0.393 0.534 0.654 0.406 0.533 0.672 
#Obs. 134 427 188 134 424 187 
 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
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Table 4-6 Distance to default sensitivity and capital adequacy for SND Banks  
The underlying model is: -DD=β1+β2NIIRt-1+β3CAPt-1+β4ROAt-1+β5RLLAt-1+β6LEVt-
1+β7RLLALEVt-1+β8LLCRt-1+β9LNSIZE+εit. 
The table presents the influence of bank risk fundamentals risk and distance to default in 
subsamples split in low- and high-cap banks on the basis of total capital risk ratio. The low-cap 
subsample banks are defined as banks below the median of total risk capital ratio (i.e. 12.260%) 
and high-cap subsample are banks equal or above this ratio. Dependent variable: Distance to 
default regression are estimated over 2003-2007 for above and below-median portfolios of 
capitalisation. Independent variables: Residual of non-interest income divided by revenues is 
denoted by NIIR. Return on assets (ROA) is income before tax divided by total assets.  RLLA is 
the ratio of reserve loan losses to total assets. LEV is total liabilities to the book value of equity.  
RLLALEV is the product of RLLA and LEV. Loan-loss coverage ratio is defined as pre-tax 
income plus provision for loan losses to net loan losses (LLCR). Control variable: Natural log of 
total assets (LNSIZE). Year dummies are included in the fixed effect regressions. Estimated 
standard errors are computed using White’s method. Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics 
reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. 
 Low capital ratio  
effect < median 
High capital ratio 
effect >= median  
 
Variables/Models (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Lag (NIIR_res) -0.103*** -0.107*** -0.006 -0.016*  
 (-2.709) (-2.959) (-0.526) (-1.674)  
Lag (ROA) 0.541 0.322 -0.079 -0.112  
 (1.470) (1.132) (-0.688) (-1.003)  
Lag (RLLA) 0.855  1.545   
 (0.242)  (1.432)   
Lag (LEV) 0.130 0.113** 0.152* 0.078***  
 (0.467) (2.156) (1.746) (2.818)  
Lag (RLLALEV) 0.017  -0.070   
 (0.061)  (-0.849)   
Lag (LLCR) -0.001 -0.001* -0.0003 -0.0004  
 (-1.530) (-1.806) (-0.817) (-1.047)  
Lag (LNSIZE) -2.092** -2.158** -0.499 -0.491  
 (-2.344) (-2.442) (-1.454) (-1.400)  
Constant 42.457** 45.702** 5.426 6.756  
 (2.098) (2.348) (0.695) (0.846)  
R-squared 0.665 0.662 0.555 0.552  
Adj. R-squared 0.636 0.637 0.540 0.539  
#Obs. 176 177 467 470  
         ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
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Appendix I. Bank Risk Fundamentals 
Variable  Definition  
NPLTL (%) Non-Performing loans to total loans  
RLLA (%) The ratio of reserve loan losses to total assets 
ROA (%) Profit before interest and tax divided by book value of assets 
NIIR (%) Non-interest income divided by revenues 
CSD (%) Cash and marketable securities to total assets ratio  
CAP (%) Book value of equity to total asset 
CART (%) Sum of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital divided by weighted risk assets. 
LEV (times) Total (book) liabilities to the book value of equity  
Tobin’s Q Market capitalisation plus total asset minus total equity divided total assets 
MKTLEV (%) Total liabilities to the sum of market value of common and book value of 
preferred stock ratio  
ROALEV (%) The product of ROA and LEV 
RLLALEV (%) The product of RLLA and LEV 
RLLALEV (%) The interaction of RLLA and MKTLEV 
ROAMKLEV (%) The interaction of ROA and MKTLEV 
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Chapter 5:  Corporate Governance and Bank Risk-Taking 
Behaviour 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to extend Chapter 4 and investigate the 
effectiveness of corporate governance on the bank risk-taking. It questions whether 
board and ownership structure governance jointly drives risk-taking that could affect 
bank stakeholders’ value. Little work has been carried out on this topic, in spite of 
its importance for the banking industry (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009). 
Motivated by excessive risk-taking and bank failures and aware of the features 
specific to banking firms, regulators, researchers and practitioners have given 
increased attention to the link between corporate governance and bank risk. 
Bearing these considerations in mind, this empirical study attempts to offer better 
understanding of how corporate control mechanisms influence risk-taking activity in 
banks. 
Therefore, the main thrust of this investigation, assumes bank governance is in 
place. It examines the tension between board and ownership structure and bank 
risk-taking. In other words, does board and ownership governance lead to risk-
taking behaviour in banking firms? The key empirical findings can be summed up 
as follows: First, the empirical evidence indicates that board and ownership 
governance influence bank risk-taking. In particular, managerial ownership 
negatively influences capital to assets and non-performing loans ratios. After 
controlling for non-linear form, non-performing loans ratio increases in managerial 
ownership. There are three plausible explanations for these findings. One, 
ownership structure governance is designed to maximise the value of equity 
options (Galai and Masulis, 1976; Merton, 1977). Yet, achieving this goal through 
increasing risk-taking can be affected by both managers’ preferences and by 
restrictions imposed by regulators.  
Two, when managers are entrenched and their substantial stock holdings are 
exposed to greater risk, they will engage in less risky strategies – i.e. adopt lending 
behaviours that enable them to maintain their positions and enjoy their firms’ 
perquisites. In this scenario, managers may maintain good quality loan portfolios 
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while ensuring their banks are well capitalised. On the other hand, if managerial 
interests are tied more closely to those of shareholders, managers will take on 
more risky lending activities; potentially deteriorating the quality of credit portfolio 
and bank capital status. A final explanation could be board of directors’ non-
compliance with prudential regulations due to lack of supervision, collusion between 
bank insiders and regulators, or corruption. As such, non-conformity should be 
attributed to imprudent lending decisions. For instance, Horiuchi and Shimizu 
(2001) contended that collusion in the banking sector led to the Japanese safety 
net becoming unstable. 
Second, capital to assets and non-performing loan ratios are negatively 
associated with board size. Therefore, these findings clearly suggest that smaller 
boards impair bank capital position. An alternative view is that insiders are reluctant 
to enhance their shareholdings. In this model, larger boards might be the 
appropriate agency conflict monitoring device to preserve banks’ capital 
requirement. However, smaller boards pay attention to ensure that banks maintain 
good asset quality status, along with the decline in non-performing loans. Again, for 
capital to assets, non-performing loans, and liquid assets ratios, the percentage of 
independent directors is as would be expected. This parameter registers positively 
in capital to assets and liquid assets ratios, and negatively in non-performing loans 
ratio. From these results, it seems logical that independent directors played their 
monitoring role to shape excessive bank risk-taking. In fact, this prediction is 
consistent with the risk-averse and corporate control hypotheses. Indeed, 
independent directors may be aware of the bank risk profile, are experienced 
members, pay attention to regulatory compliance issues, or hold insignificant 
wealth in the bank. Collectively, this suggests that the prudential tools and 
institutional settings are structured to mitigate risk-taking behaviour46.  
Third, contrary to expectations, managerial ownership impacts on liquidity ratio 
specifications positively. With this prediction, the following speculations emerge. 
One, for safeguarding the stability of the banking system, managers have in place 
short and long term liquidity risk strategies that help to curb bank liquidity 
disruptions. For example, banks may be holding sufficient liquid assets to avoid 
runs. Two, banks’ liquidity is not a focus for regulatory agencies and legislators. In 
this sense, it was not given much attention by bank regulatory agencies.  
- 126 - 
 
Fourth, the percentage of institutional ownership has a positive relationship with  
the capital to assets ratio. This explains the importance of institutional investors in 
ensuring minimum capital requirements are in place. Again, there is some evidence 
that the percentage of institutional investors impacts positively in non-performing 
ratio regression. Consistent with finding by Laeven and Levine (2009), this 
relationship highlights that, in part, institutional investors tend to risk lending 
activities. Fifth, board size is negatively associated with bank risk-taking ex-ante 
Sarbanes and ex-post Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Regulation A. This finding 
indicates that decisions of larger boards could be effective and less extreme in 
liquidity risk management – or overall bank asset-liability management frameworks 
ex these regulatory reforms. Generally, the results presented in this empirical 
chapter indicate that board and ownership influence bank risk. 
The theoretical literature is normally focused on the premises that corporate 
governance is designed to align shareholders’ interests – i.e. maximise the value of 
shareholders’ equity, with those of the management. Empirical evidence that 
considers the impact of control mechanisms for corporate governance on banking 
firms’ risk behaviour produces mixed result. There is supporting evidence that risk 
and managerial risk sensitivity (through ownership) are associated – see Saunders 
et al. (1990), Anderson and Fraser (2000), and other successors including a recent 
paper by Laeven and Levine (2009). Indeed, the main finding in this research is a 
strong link between ownership structure and risk. The relation between institutional 
ownership, board structure and bank risk-taking has received far less attention 
(Staikouras et al., 2007; Elyasiani and Jia, 2008; Akhigbe and Martin, 2008; 
Pathan, 2009)47. Table 2-2 reports the findings of a selection of bank risk and 
board structure empirical evidence. 
This investigation departs from prior work in a different way. It proxied bank risk 
by using bank balance information – i.e. capital to assets, non-performing and liquid 
assets ratios. They capture capital adequacy, credit risk and bank quality of assets 
portfolio, and liquidity risk, respectively. These regulatory indicators are not only 
important to managerial decisions and business policy issues, but also, they are not 
yet fully tested along with agency problem control mechanisms. Bank regulatory 
agencies and legislators closely focus on capital adequacy and mandatory asset 
                                                                                                                                
46 Examples of prudential regulations include capital adequacy, asset quality, management 
capability, earnings ability, and liquidity management. 
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choice restrictions to monitor excessive risk-taking (John et al., 1995)48. 
Furthermore, the findings for board and ownership structure on bank risk are 
statistically significant and are robust after controlling for multicollinearity, 
endogeneity, survivorship bias, and heteroskedasticity.  
This chapter makes five major contributions to the existing study. First, while 
there is a substantial empirical study examining managerial ownership on risk-
taking for financial firms, the understanding of board and ownership structure on 
bank balance sheet risk measures is yet to be examined. To my knowledge this is 
the first investigation not only assessing the influence of board and ownership 
structure governance on bank risk, but also its reflection on  capital adequacy, 
asset quality and liquidity position. A thorough review of the bank board literature 
found only three papers which connected board structure and risk (Staikouras et 
al., 2007; Akhigbe and Martin, 2008; Pathan, 2009). In fact, various control forces 
work well together in influencing firm governance and resolving agency related-
risks. In effect, the interaction of external and internal governance mechanisms 
may work together to downsize agency costs in corporate firms (Cremers and Nair, 
2005). Nevertheless, many researchers considered at least one element of 
corporate governance from a bank risk-taking perspective (see Tables 2-1 and 2-
2). This empirical analysis found that the multiple usage of board and ownership 
structure governance impacts on risk-taking behaviour in banks. 
Second, since there is limited academic research into the association between 
board structure and bank risk, this investigation adds to the literature by 
documenting that board structure governance is a significant aspect in bank risk-
taking. More specifically, strong board (small board size) and bank risk proxies are 
negatively related. Third, the sensitivity of board and ownership structure in 
different classes of banks based on risk-taking incentive is analysed - i.e. large 
banks against small banks. Consistent with the preceding results, board size and 
                                                                                                                                
47 Consistent with the theoretical prediction, Cheng (2008) shows those smaller boards drive 
risk-taking for corporate firms. 
48 Recently, bank liquidity risk has also been placed on the global agenda subsequent to 
September 11, the global financial crisis and the ongoing Euro debt crisis. In response to these 
episodes, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008) has published a Liquidity Risk 
Management and Supervisory Challenge to ensure that banks continue to meet their 
outstanding commitment at reasonable costs. As liquidity risk is a major threat to the banking 
sector, sufficient liquidity (i.e., liquid assets in the form of cash and marketable securities) cannot 
be emphasised enough for safety and soundness of the financial system in this empirical 
experiment. For example, see http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/en/summit-aims/communique-
explanation/ for the real action agreed on and other steps to be taken. 
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managerial ownership remain as valuable monitoring mechanisms in complex 
banks with regard to risk-taking. Analysing complex and large firms, Coles et al. 
(2008) argue that complex firms - that are large, diversified and highly leveraged, 
have greater advising and monitoring needs – consistent with the efficient 
monitoring hypothesis set forth by Dalton et al. (1999). 
 Fourth, comparison of bank risk-taking behaviour and board structure ex-ante 
and ex-post Sarbanes enactment and Regulation A in the 2003 amendment is 
somehow overlooked. The theory advanced by Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 
(2003) is that with mandatory risk disclosures, firms are expected to exhibit high 
risk. Analysing board characteristics and risk-taking patterns over the two regimes, 
board size is an indispensable characteristic as per Sarbanes enactment. Finally, 
the chapter sheds some light on the debate over policy issues related to bank 
governance - i.e. the necessity of a majority of independent directors in boards. 
Given the findings in this empirical chapter, a rethink and possible new direction in 
governance monitoring devices is imperative in banking institutions. By adopting 
sound corporate governance, excessive bank risk-taking might be brought to an 
acceptable level. Consistent with contributions in this study, two evident empirical 
questions remain open: Whether board and ownership governance drives bank 
risk-taking. And the policy-oriented question - as to whether this investigation casts 
some light about corporate governance in banking firms.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the theoretical 
literature. Section 5.3 develops the hypotheses. Section 5.4 introduces the sample 
and discusses the methodology. Section 5.5 presents empirical results. Section 5.6 
carries out and show further diagnosis tests and Section 5.7 concludes the 
empirical chapter. 
5.2 Theoretical Motivation  
Economic theories tested in this empirical chapter are generally based on the 
principal-agent framework (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers and 
shareholders have different preferences in regard to risk. With banks, the agency 
framework assumes that shareholders can enhance the value of call-option (Galai 
and Masulis, 1976) and put-option (Merton, 1977) by increasing the risk of the 
underlying assets of the bank. Indeed, risk-averse managers might be induced to 
undertake risky corporate investment policies preferred by shareholders. The 
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agency-model based literature of board and ownership governance are structured 
to represent shareholders’ interests that maximise their wealth - the convergence of 
interests hypothesis. When good corporate governance is in place, agency theory 
predicts a definite tension between mechanisms to control agency conflict and risk-
taking.  
In this context, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and John et al. (2008) have 
proposed that in agency theory, risk-taking increases as a function of ownership 
structure. Another competing hypothesis is managerial entrenchment set forth by 
Stulz (1988). In an entrenched environment of weak corporate governance, agency 
theory predicts that insider ownership levels and firm performance are negatively 
correlated. With this managerial self-serving, manager may engage in risk-reducing 
investing and financing decisions (Smith and Stulz, 1985). In turn, the 
entrenchment hypothesis supports the value-destroying effect and exacerbates the 
agency risk.  
The theoretical corporate governance literature also looks at board structure – 
i.e. the primary internal control mechanism. Jensen’s (1993) work offers a 
conceptual foundation on the board of directors’ responsibilities - i.e. monitoring, 
advising, hiring, firing and managing executive compensation schemes. He 
recommended a smaller board over a larger one as an efficient monitoring 
mechanism. To date, theoretical work identifies monitoring and advising as the key 
functions for boards (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Raheja, 2005; Adams and 
Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008). It documents that a smaller board (strong 
board) effectively monitors managers’ behaviour that aligns their interests with 
shareholders, but this can increase risk-taking (Cheng, 2008). Together, the 
theoretical research proposes three board characteristics that could lead to 
maximisation of shareholders’ value - i.e. board size, independence and leadership.  
In this conceptual framework, the popular views suggest that smaller and a 
majority of independent directors on boards are better (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 
1996). Accordingly, board size and firm performance should be negatively related, 
suggesting that communication or coordination problems and agency conflicts are 
exacerbated by larger boards. The percentage of independent directors and firm 
performance should be positively associated - consistent with the view that the 
addition of even one independent director improves firm performance. In this 
perspective, smaller boards and more independent directors are expected to 
monitor managers, which, in turn, downsize the level of bank risk. However, the 
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opposite direction can be predicted in a moral hazard environment where bank 
shareholders have higher incentives for greater risk-taking.  
Finally, in agency theory, external ownership structure - institutional investors 
with larger shareholdings, on average, have greater managerial monitoring 
incentives. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) predict that large shareholders with 
substantial equity-holdings – i.e. blockholders and institutional investors, will lead to 
better firm performance – and thus, positively influence corporate value. Primarily, 
the motive for well-diversified portfolio institutional investors is to monitor managers 
rather than entrenchment or information traders.  
In banks, the prediction of corporate control and information asymmetry 
hypotheses for the relationship between institutional ownership and risk is not clear 
(Cebenoyan et al. 1995). With the efficient monitoring hypothesis (Dalton et al. 
1999), therefore, the association between institutional shareholdings and bank risk 
is expected to be negative. With this prudent-man theory, institutional investors 
offer managerial monitoring a second layer. Yet, under the moral hazard 
environment of deposit insurance large shareholders, institutional investors, have 
more incentives to engage in bank risk-taking strategies (Saunders et al., 1990; 
Demsetz et al., 1997; Laeven and Levine, 2009). As such, these are two competing 
theories with regard to the connection between the percentage of institutional 
ownership and bank risk.  
5.3 Hypotheses Development  
5.3.1 Testable Hypotheses 
Following theoretical arguments explored in this study, this section develops a set 
of testable hypotheses as formulated on the basis of bank risk-taking. Then, risk 
measures are related to the corporate governance framework to explore the effect 
of ownership and board characteristics on bank risk-taking behaviour. 
5.3.2 Does managerial share ownership influence bank risk-taking? 
Based on the principal-agent model, agency conflicts exist between managers and 
shareholders. Where there is broad dispersion of shareholders, owners are unable 
to oversee managerial self-serving behaviours. The ownership structure is one of 
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the governance aspects that reduces the effect of this agency problem (Demsetz, 
1983). Thus, risk-taking may be sensitive to ownership structure (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; John et al. 2008; Laeven and Levine, 2009). From this theoretical 
foundation, one may, therefore, expect that as the managerial ownership grows, 
agency conflicts decrease, and managerial risk-taking incentives more closely align 
to those of shareholders - leading to firm performance improvement.  
Prior empirical studies listed in Table 2-1 report a summary of research into the 
ownership structure. Findings relating to the association between equity ownership 
composition and bank risk-taking are consistent with this theory of ownership 
structure49. These empirical papers have identified a strong positive link between 
insider ownership and risk, consistent with the managerial risk-taking hypothesis. In 
this vein, it is argued that an increase in managerial ownership translates into 
value-maximisation of shareholders via greater risk-taking as proposed in the 
corporate control hypotheses (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Gorton and Rosen (1995) investigate the effects of entrenchment and economic 
condition shifts on the relationship between ownership structure and risk. They 
report that the non-performing loans ratio is strongly positively and negatively 
connected to insider ownership and insider ownership squared, respectively. In 
addition, they show that insider ownership and insider ownership squared impact 
negatively and positively, and they are significant in the equity-to-assets ratio. 
Moreover, they indicate that the non-performing loans ratio and return on asset are 
positively related to outside blockholders, respectively.  
In contrast to earlier studies, Laeven and Levine (2009) report a strong negative 
association between cash flows and z-score, as shown by Cebenoyan et al. (1995) 
and Sullivan and Spong (1998). Gorton and Rosen (1995), Knopf and Teall (1996) 
and Sullivan and Spong (1998) indicate that equity to total assets ratio is negatively 
related to insider shareholding, suggesting that greater risk-taking resulted in a 
weaker capital position. One may argue that, increasingly, non-performing loan 
portfolios, reserve loan losses, or huge losses realisation may adversely have an 
impact not only on the quality of asset portfolios and profitability of banks, but also, 
the capital status. If this pattern persists, it may threaten bank insolvency - i.e. 
                                            
49 Among others include research by Saunders et al., (1990) Knopf and Teall (1996), Demsetz 
et al. (1997), Sullivan and Spong (1998), Anderson and Fraser (2000), Horiuchi and Shimizu 
(2001), Lee (2002), Staikouras et al. (2007), and  Laeven and Levine (2009). 
- 132 - 
 
increased liquidity risk. On the other hand, Sullivan and Spong (1998) show that 
insider ownership and net loans losses to total loans are negatively related. 
Based on these highlighted arguments, the following are predicted: First, the 
measure of capital adequacy was equity-to-total asset ratio, CAP - and, it will 
decrease in managerial ownership and trend up in managerial ownership squared. 
Second, asset quality and asset portfolio risk indicators were measured by the non-
performing loans ratio, NPLTL. The increase pattern is expected for the non-
performing loans ratio function. Finally, liquidity risk was measured by liquid asset 
ratio, CSD. This variable is predicted to decrease in managerial ownership. If 
managers act in the best interests of the shareholders for value-maximising when 
their shareholdings increase gradually, it is expected that shareholders will gain 
through greater risk-taking. This leads to the first hypothesis related to managerial 
ownership and risk-taking divided into three parts: 
 
H1a: A negative association will exist between managerial ownership and capital-
 assets ratio.  
H1b: A positive association will exist between managerial ownership and non-
 performing loans ratio 
H1c: A negative association will exist between managerial ownership and liquidity 
 asset ratio. 
5.3.3 Does institutional investor ownership influence risk-taking? 
The literature listed in Table 2-1 presents the connection between institutional 
ownership and risk. In financial firms, the prediction between institutional ownership 
and risk measures is conflicting. Cebenoyan et al. (1995) show a positive and 
significant relation between institutional ownership and the capital-to-assets ratio. 
Knopf and Teall (1996) indicate that institutional shareholdings and thrift industry 
risk (measured by equity return variability and real estate to total asset ratio) are 
negatively related. Together, these papers indicate that institutional investors are a 
disincentive to risk-taking activities in depository institutions. However, Demsetz et 
al. (1997) report a negative association between capital to assets ratio and large 
blockholdings. By contrast, in Japanese banks, Konishi and Yasada (2004) 
highlight a U-shaped association between risk-taking and institutional ownership 
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stability – that is, a non-linear relationship.  Finally, Laeven and Levine (2009) show 
that z-score is negatively related to the activity restrictions index when large 
shareholders are present in boards. On the other hand, Gorton and Rosen (1995) 
report that non-performing loans increase with external blockholders. 
Elyasiani and Jia (2008) indicate a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership stability and BHC performance. A possible explanation for this significant 
association is increasingly evident in shareholdings by institutional investors in BHC 
firms. Prior to GLBA, institutional investors had less equity in banking firms relative 
to manufacturing firms. Taken as a whole, the above research evidence supports 
the efficient monitoring contention. Others document no relation between 
institutional ownership and bank performance (Pi and Timme, 1993). Yet, in these 
prior findings, the strength between institutional ownership and bank risk is not only 
limited and mixed, but also, remains an empirical question. 
From the above discussion, it is argued that as institutional investors hold well 
diversified portfolios, they have greater incentives to monitor managerial bad 
behaviour. In effect, with this sufficient diligent second layer monitoring tool, 
institutional investors can shape managerial actions that impair the maximisation of 
the call-put option values of bank shareholders’ equities. Consequently, an inverse 
relationship is predicted between institutional ownership and bank risk (i.e., non-
performing loans, the capital to assets, and the liquidity asset ratios). By contrast, 
under the government protection coupled with stockholder controlled banks, the 
prediction may be the opposite - as these incentives decrease risk-aversion in 
institutional investors. Assuming the monitoring effect dominated, the second 
hypothesis related to institutional investor shareholding and balance sheet risk 
measures is divided into three parts:  
 
H2a: A positive association will exist between institutional ownership and capital-
 assets ratio.  
H2b: A negative association will exist between institutional ownership and non-
 performing loans ratio.  
H2c: A positive association will exist between institutional ownership and liquidity 
 asset ratio. 
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5.3.4 Does board structure influence bank risk-taking preferences?  
A. Board size and risk-taking 
The literature listed in Table 2-2 reports a summary of research into board 
structure. The board of directors is essentially responsible for monitoring and 
advising top executive officers in a bid to ensure the best interests of shareholders 
are safeguarded. According to Jensen (1993), the smaller board is a better agency 
control mechanism, despite the fact of its inherent greater extreme decision-
making. Little is known about the connection between board size and bank risk. 
Staikouras et al. (2007) indicate that loans to total assets and equity to total assets 
ratios are significant and negatively related to board size. Pathan (2009) shows a 
strong negative tension between the governance of board structure (board size) 
and risk. In contrast, Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001) reveal a negative relation 
between amakudari and bank risk in Japanese banks. The negative coefficient 
estimate on board size supports the better smaller boards foundation supposition 
elucidated in Yermack (1996) for monitoring managers and representing the 
interests of shareholders. Consistent with the view at complex firms – i.e. highly 
leveraged firms have greater advisory needs - bank performance increases in 
relation to board size (see Adams and Mehran, 2003; Andres and Vallelado, 2008). 
This association is atypical in the board structure literature. 
The contentions above suggest that the relevance of board size on bank 
behaviour is unclear - but smaller boards are better. If a smaller board of directors 
effectively monitors bank managers’ behaviour to align it with shareholders’ 
interest, then owners will benefit from that smaller board, but it can increase risk 
(Cheng, 2008; Pathan, 2009). Subsequently, bank managers may engage in 
excessively risky corporate decisions that do not enhance the firm's convex payoff 
– or not maximising shareholders’ wealth. In effect, if smaller boards accentuate 
bank risk taking, capital to assets and liquidity asset ratios are predicted to 
decrease in relation to board size. Non-performing loans ratio is expected to 
increase with board size. These arguments lead to the third proposed hypothesis 
related to board size and bank risk-taking divided into three parts: 
 
H3a: A negative association will exist between board size and capital to assets 
 ratio. 
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H3b: A negative association will exist between board size and non-performing 
 loans ratio. 
H3c: A negative association will exist between board size and liquidity asset 
 ratio. 
B. Board independence and risk-taking 
From Table 2-2, both empirical research and the theoretical view, propose that the 
dominance of independent directors on boards boosts effective monitoring and 
corporate performance. On the other hand, studies show that there is no link 
between board independence and bank performance (Pi and Timme, 1993; Adams 
and Mehran, 2005; Akhigbe and Martin, 2006; Staikouras et al., 2007). This 
research evidence does not generalise to indicate that independent directors are 
irrelevant in monitoring banking firm behaviour. Pathan et al. (2007) report a strong 
and positive link between bank performance and board independence. Two papers 
indicate that board independence and market risk are negatively connected 
(Akhigbe and Martin, 2008; Pathan, 2009). In contrast, Staikouras et al. (2007) 
indicates a positive association between the extent of board independence and risk 
(measured by loans to total assets ratio). One could, therefore, argue that, if 
independent directors are better monitors of bank managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour to conserve their reputation, bank risk-taking will decrease. 
Based on heightened concerns, a dominance of outside directors on boards is 
preferred for independent efficient monitoring. However, their effectiveness on 
banking behaviour is ambiguous. Given this discussion, in more independent 
boards, managers may take on and exhibit moderate risk behaviour, even in an 
environment of moral hazard. Thus, building on Akhigbe and Martin (2008) and 
Pathan (2009) research evidence, there should be the following relationships: 
Board independence will increase in the capital to asset and the liquidity asset 
ratios and will decrease in the non-performing loans ratio. Accordingly, the above 
arguments lead to the fourth hypothesis related to board independence and risk-
taking also divided into three parts: 
 
H4a: A positive association will exist between board independence and capital to 
 assets ratio.  
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H4b: A negative association will exist between board independence and non-
 performing loans ratio. 
H4c: A positive relationship will exist between board independence and liquidity 
 asset ratio. 
5.3.5 Effect of board structure on bank balance sheet risk: Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 and Regulation A in 2003 
Literature on Sarbanes fuelled by the high profile scandals at Enron and other high 
profile corporate firms put the emphasis on a board structure largely composed of 
independent directors. Prior to these regulatory mandates, boards had been 
inefficiently monitoring managers, and are thus blamed for corporate business 
failures (Adams, 2009). While the Sarbanes legislation was intended to promote 
firms’ governance and to enhance transparency, Regulation A counteracts 
excessive risk-taking incentives. Akhigbe and Martin (2008) demonstrate a 
significant negative effect on risk and corporate governance for US financial 
services firms, following Sarbanes enactment. 
From the above views, if the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is adopted and implemented 
accordingly by banks, opacity of financial statements will decrease and boards will 
have more incentive to constrain risk-taking behaviour. The same effect will be true 
for Regulation A of 2003 in mitigating bank risk. However, in theory, mandatory risk 
disclosure could lead to greater market risk (Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2003). 
Consequently, ex-post under these mandatory regimes the total loan losses ratio 
and z-score (bank risk measures) are expected to decrease in board governance. 
Hence, these legal and regulatory reforms combine to make the fifth testable 
hypothesis related to board structure and risk-taking in a stringent environment: 
 
H5a: There is a negative association between board size and bank risk, ex-post 
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Regulation A of 2003.  
H5b: There is an inverse association between the percentage of board 
 independence, ex-post Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Regulation A of 2003.  
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5.4 Data and Methodology 
5.4.1 Sample selection and methodology 
Data and the sample selection were discussed in Chapter 3. The construction of 
the variables, and more definitions used in this analysis, can be found in Appendix 
II. Therefore, this section starts by discussing the primary risk dependent variables. 
The section also discusses explanatory variables and control variables. 
A. Risk measures 
The main dependent variables include capital to assets, non-performing loans and 
liquid assets ratios. These balance sheet risk indicators have been used in prior 
empirical studies to proxy risk-taking in financial firms (Gorton and Rosen, 1995; 
Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Staikouras et al., 2007, among others). While 
the capital to assets-ratio captures fluctuation in bank capital adequacy, the non-
performing ratio captures credit risk and ascertains bank quality of assets. Liquid 
assets ratio is important in measuring and controlling for bank liquidity risk.  
A. Empirical specification 
Following Saunders et al. (1990), Gorton and Rosen (1995) and Horiuchi and 
Shimizu (2001), to investigate the link between bank risk and board and ownership 
structure, the empirical model specification is as follows: 
 
 
 
where Risk is represented by capital to assets, non-performing loans and liquid 
assets ratios measures defined in Appendix II. The primary interest centres on the 
coefficient estimates of managerial ownership (β1), managerial ownership squared 
(β2), institutional ownership (β3), board size (β4) and board independence (β5). A 
negative estimate of managerial ownership (β1) on the capital to assets ratio is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the increase in managerial ownership leads to 
risk-taking and thus reduces capital level. A positive estimate of managerial 
   
 
    Riskit =α+β1INSOWN+ β2INSOWNQ+ β3INSTOWN+ β4BDSIZE 
              + β5FINBD+ β6LNSIZE+ β7Time.Dummy+ε ................................. (5.1)
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ownership squared (β2) on the same risk indicator supports the hypothesis that 
capital regulations reduce bank risk-taking incentives as owners are forced to 
increase their stockholdings (Laeven and Levine, 2009). Along with the efficient 
monitoring hypothesis, an inverse relationship is predicted between institutional 
ownership (β3) and risk. 
 Negative estimates of board size (β4) on capital to assets, non-performing and 
liquid assets ratios refer to the relevance of smaller boards in highlighting bank-risk 
taking. Positive coefficient estimates of independent directors (β5) on the capital to 
assets and the liquid assets ratios indicate independent directors’ incentives to 
shape bank risk-taking behaviour. This is true for a negative coefficient estimate of 
independence board (β5) on non-performing ratio. Finally, the regression models 
include two control variables to measure other sources of ex-ante heterogeneity. 
Bank size, LNSIZE (β6) and year dummy variables are included to control for 
possible risk asset diversification, information asymmetry, bailouts in larger banks 
and time effect, respectively. As the sample is composed of small and large BHCs, 
the predicted effect on risk measures can be either negative or positive. Return on 
assets is included to control for profitability on banks risk where, i and t represent 
the bank and time, respectively. 
5.4.2  Summary statistics 
Table 5-1 shows some of the key descriptive statistics incorporated in this analysis. 
The average mean and median values of book value of capital to total asset ratio 
are 16.23% and 13.01%, respectively. They are substantially higher than the 
regulatory benchmark for well-capitalised banks. Well-capitalised banks are 
required to maintain 5%, 6% and 10% of tier 1 leverage, tier 1 risk-assets based 
and total risk-based capital minimal ratios, respectively. On average, the sample 
used in this empirical chapter consists of well-capitalised BHCs. The mean and 
median values for the non-performing to total loan ratio is 0.78% and 0.55%, 
respectively. These ratios are higher than those of 0.59% and 0.46% reported by 
Akhigbe et al., (2007). This may be attributed to differences in the sample sources - 
Akhigbe et al., (2007) examined commercial banks. This investigation focuses on 
bank holding companies. The mean and median values for the liquid assets ratio 
are 5.66% and 4.14%, respectively. 
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 The average mean value for percentage managerial ownership is 16%. This 
value is considerably higher than that found in US studies, with Booth et al., (2002) 
eliciting an average mean value of 5.77%, and Elyasiani and Jia (2008) producing 
one of 13.857%. The average mean value for percentage institutional ownership is 
15%. This is substantially lower than that reported by Elyasiani and Jia (2008). 
These differences may be due to sample period differences, as well as variations in 
managerial ownership definitions. Average mean and median values of board size 
are quite close, with 12 and 11 members respectively.  
The mean value of board size is similar to that reported by Pathan (2009) of 
12.92 members. In contrast to other studies in the banking sector, Booth et al. 
(2002) documented a higher mean value of 16.3 board members in the 100 banks 
with the largest total assets. Adams and Mehran (2005) indicated a mean value of 
18 board members. Andres and Vallelado (2008) found mean values of 15.203 and 
15.780 for board size in the US and pooled commercial banks in six countries, 
respectively. Larger boards reported in the above studies can be explained by the 
massive merger and acquisitions wave in the banking sector during the late 
nineties. Another plausible explanation for larger boards in bank holding companies 
relative to industrial firms is the structure of the boards for the BHCs. Some of the 
subsidiary banks’ board members are also members of a lead BHC. For example, 
in non-financial firms, the following mean values of board size have been provided: 
Yermack (1996) - 12.25; Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) – 11; Vafeas (1999) - 11.77; 
Andres et al. (2005) - 11.67; Coles et al. (2008) – 10.4, and Linck et al.,  (2008) -
7.5.  
The percentage of independent directors displays a mean value of 76%. This 
value is considerably higher than that reported by Booth et al. (2002) of 58%, and 
Pathan (2009) of 64.52% in the US banking sector. One may argue that higher 
board independence reported in this chapter is due to the provisions of Sarbanes 
and self- regulatory organisations (SROs) that require publicly traded firms to have 
larger numbers of board members in the aftermath of well publicised corporate 
scandals. Prior to these mandatory regulations, more independent directors had not 
been seen as a priority.  
Table 5-2 presents pair correlations between explanatory variables at a 5% level 
of significance. The percentage of managerial ownership is statistically significant 
with respect to its negative correlation with board size and proportion of 
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independent directors. The same is true for institutional ownership and board 
characteristics. The largest correlation is 0.661, between institutional ownership 
and blockholder ownership, and there is a correlation of 0.516 between the 
percentage of managerial ownership and blockholder ownership. The percentage of 
managerial ownership and board size are also highly correlated with firm size - 
0.376 and 0.433, respectively. Institutional ownership is negatively correlated with 
the proportion of independent directors (0.081). Blockholder ownership is 
significantly negatively correlated, with both board size and proportion of 
independent directors. From this pair of negative correlations, one may, therefore, 
contend that characteristics of board and ownership are substitutes for controlling 
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Because of this, there is a 
sense that corporate governance control mechanisms are endogenously 
determined (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006). However, board size 
is significantly positively related to the proportion of independent directors.  
To control for the multicollinearity problem in the regression analysis, several 
tests are conducted. First, in each regression model, variance inflation factors (VIF) 
are estimated. Across all model specifications, the reported VIFs of firm size or 
board size are below 2. Essentially, in this empirical chapter analysis, VIFs are at 
acceptable levels, suggesting that the multicollinearity among independent 
variables is not problematic. According to Gujarati (2003), the acceptable 
conventional VIF is 10. Second, orthogonal variables represented by the residual 
values from regressions of the natural log of firm size or board size factors on each 
other are generated. These values are used as regressors. Moreover, managerial 
ownership and the natural log of bank size variables correlated at 0.376 are 
orthogonalised. Third, according to Anderson et al. (2004), board size is redefined 
as the number of board size divided by the natural log of firm size. This new 
variable is used in regression analysis instead of board size. 
5.5 Empirical Results 
5.5.1 Capital adequacy, asset quality, liquidity and corporate governance 
This empirical chapter tests the relationship between bank risk measures and 
corporate governance. It models risk on board and ownership characteristics, and 
control variables. The risk surrogates are provided as capital to total asset, CAP, 
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for capital adequacy; non-performing loans ratio, NPLTL, for asset quality; and 
cash and marketable securities to total assets, CSD, for liquidity risk. 
A. Ownership characteristics and bank risk fundamentals 
Table 5-3 presents the results of primary specification using equation (5.1) for 
testing hypotheses H1 to H4. Along with models (1)-(3) and H1a, residual 
managerial ownership, INSOWNRE is significant in explaining capital adequacy (as 
measured by capital-to-asset ratio) at 1% or better level of significance – i.e. they 
are negatively associated. This finding is consistent with those in Gorton and Rosen 
(1995), Knopf and Teall (1996), and Sullivan and Spong (1998), and the view 
advocated by Saunders et al. (1990) that substantial managerial shareholdings lead 
to greater bank risk-taking. Hence, the result suggests that an increase in 
managerial ownership to a certain level will reduce the capital level and jeopardise 
its status. One may interpret this association as suggesting that increases in 
managerial ownership act as a countermeasure to the effectiveness of those 
prudent capital regulations intended to discourage greater risk-taking behaviour. 
Accordingly, with risk-taking incentives, managers behave in the best interests of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), as the effect of a convergence of 
interests overwhelms the private consumption/perks dominated behaviour.  
Controlling for the coefficient of squared value of managerial ownership, 
INSOWNQ is never significant in models (2) and (3). Yet, residual managerial 
ownership remains with earlier prediction sign. Negative and significant estimate of 
INSOWNRE on capital to asset ratio does not support the hypothesis that capital 
regulations reduce bank risk-taking incentives as owners are possibly hesitant to 
enhance their stockholdings. The increase in bank ownership puts shareholders’ 
wealth at greater risk, which in turn reduces the incentives for them to pursue risky 
policies. This result suggests that bank entrenched managers who may be 
otherwise averse to greater risk-taking are more likely to select risky strategies 
once their shareholdings increase. Consequently, this excessive risk-taking 
behaviour by insiders might put bank capital adequacy at more risk, thus leading to 
insolvency. Factoring in the risk-taking behaviour function in capital-to-asset ratio, 
the result is compatible with the view that linear managerial ownership increases 
bank risk through capital adequacy decline. Hence, these results are consistent 
with H1a and it is supported.  
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For models (4)-(6) and along with hypothesis H1b, asset quality is predicted by 
the percentage of non-performing loans ratio, NPLTL. In linear regression model 
(4), the relationship between the residual managerial ownership and non-
performing loans is negative and significant (at 5% level). For models (5) and (6), 
the coefficient estimates on INSOWN and INSOWNQ are negative and positive, 
respectively, and are significant at a level of 10% or better. The risk-taking 
behaviour function in non-performing loans ratio models is U-shaped. First, risk in 
the loan portfolio declines in managerial ownership as the entrenchment effect 
dominates the positive convergence effect. Thereafter, it increases significantly (at 
5% level) in managerial ownership level as convergence and asset substitution 
become significant motivating factors. These findings are inconsistent with those 
reported by Gorton and Rosen (1995) and Sullivan and Spong (1998). However, a 
positive sign on INSOWNQ explains managerial convergence and risk-taking 
effects at the higher managerial ownership level. From this pattern and, consistent 
with the risk-taking hypothesis, bank managers whose interests are closely aligned 
with those of shareholders will seek risky lending activities that increase the 
magnitude of risk in the credit portfolios.  
The lesson of these results is that, managers with insignificant share levels have 
no incentive to select risky lending strategies, as reflected by the coefficient 
estimate on INSOWN in model (4).  However, they can engage in these risky 
activities once their shareholdings increase to maximise shareholders’ and their 
own wealth.  
Solving quadratic equations for the level of managerial ownership values that 
maximise the percentage of non-performing loans ratio are 50% and 22.5% in 
models (5) and (6), respectively. These turning point values are greater than the 
mean value for managerial ownership (15.85%). However, values are comparable 
to the value of 24.5% found in US thrifts by Cebenoyan et al. (1995). There are two 
possible explanations for this. One, the latter study does not control for board 
characteristics. Including these variables might have driven the findings. Two, the 
differences in regulatory financial sector environment may also have a role in this 
variation. In this sense, banks with managerial ownership over the 22.5-50% mark 
are more likely to pursue excessive risk-taking. Saunders et al. (1990) and Lee 
(2002) classified such banks as ‘stockholder-controlled’ banks. These results 
indicate that an increase in managerial ownership exacerbated the quality of asset 
portfolios of banks. It would seem that one lesson to be drawn from these results is 
- 143 - 
 
that as managerial ownership increases; bank managers have incentives to select 
risky asset portfolio investments. These findings are consistent with the existing 
empirical results and positions provided in Saunders et al. (1990), Anderson and 
Fraser (2000), and Laeven and Levine (2009), among others. Therefore, 
hypothesis H1b holds. 
Models (7)-(9) depict the impact of managerial ownership on liquidity risk 
(measured by liquid asset ratio, CSD). In the linear regression model (7), the 
relationship between residual managerial ownership and liquid assets ratio, 
INSOWNRE is positive and significant (at 1% level). After allowing for a possible 
nonlinear association, the tension between the residual managerial ownership 
squared, INSOWNQRE and liquid asset risk ratio is negative and statistically 
significant, at better than 1% with an inverted U-shape in models (8) and (9). That 
is, liquidity asset ratio emerges as nonlinear as a function of managerial ownership. 
Initially, liquidity assets ratio increases at a low level of managerial ownership, 
before trending downwards at a higher level when managers are entrenched. The 
positive signs, on managerial ownership, indicate a high bank liquidity position. 
 One reason is that, to keep banking operations on going, managers maintain 
sufficient liquidity to guarantee immediate withdrawals and any outstanding loans in 
the short-term. Moreover, managers are responsible for the bank liquidity situation 
so as to ensure the safety and soundness of the banking system. A high liquidity 
rating for a bank is also important as it confirms the bank’s avoidance of market 
discipline (Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). 
Examples of market discipline (presented in Chapter 4) include higher interest rates 
on core deposits, capital withdrawal, or unwinding positions prior to a bank run. 
Healthier cash positions may lead managers to smooth out banking operations and 
minimise the probability of a bank run or a systematic failure. In addition, this 
finding casts doubts on the recent debate over liquidity risk in banks. In general, 
hypothesis H1c is not supported.  
For model (10), overall bank risk (measured by z-score) is linked to board and 
ownership structure. The residual managerial ownership, INSOWNRE and 
managerial ownership squared, INSOWNQ positively and exponentially influence z-
score. This evidence is supportive of a risk-decreasing effect of insider 
shareholdings. It implies that as insiders’ personal wealth becomes concentrated, 
the likelihood of bank survival increases, that is, default risk is rendered more 
remote. Alongside this, it may be argued that bank managers are sceptical about 
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excessive risk-taking once their substantial wealth is being exposed to higher risk. 
This finding is consistent with those in Cebenoyan et al. (1995), Sullivan and Spong 
(1998), and Pathan (2009)50. Residual board size and z-score are negatively 
associated, at 5% level of significance in model (10). Such results though, stand in 
direct contrast to the theoretical prediction and prior empirical evidence (Pathan, 
2009).  
As noted for non-performing loans ratio, models (5) and (6) and for liquid assets 
ratio, models (7)-(9), the connectivity between natural log of firm size and z-score is 
positive and significant at 10% level. This finding is consistent with that indicated by 
the three above papers. In this sense, banks with larger assets have higher 
distance to default. In addition, the positive association between return on asset, 
ROA and z-score indicates that stable banks are more profitable. The results of the 
survival likelihood index are robust and add support to the impact of board 
governance (board size) on the bank risk-taking.  
In line with hypothesis H2a-c and across all models (1-9), institutional investors 
have had an impact on the bank’s capital adequacy and asset quality. Consistent 
with Cebenoyan et al. (1995), capital to assets ratio is positively related to the 
percentage of institutional ownership in models (1)-(3). However, these findings are 
inconsistent with those reported by Demsetz et al. (1997) who shows an inverse 
relationship between large blockholdings and capital to assets ratio. The evidence 
presented can be explained as follows. For capital adequacy: institutional investors 
devote efforts to ensure that banks’ capital regulations are complied with and banks 
are not threatened with insolvency. In contrast, it may be argued that if institutional 
investors play their monitoring role, they will ensure banks hold sufficient capital for 
unforeseen risks.  
Consistent with Gorton and Rosen (1995), the percentage of institutional 
ownership impacts positively on the non-performing loans ratio, model (4). With this 
marginal negative effect of institutional investors on credit portfolio (at 10% level of 
significance), it cannot be directly construed that institutional investors may have 
failed to play their dual role of monitoring and activism. Yet, the multiple institutional 
investors’ incentives seen in their investing in banks should be recognised. With 
these varied stimuli, they might prefer to take risks. As such, these diverse 
                                            
50 Pathan (2009) reports a positive relationship between the percentage of shares owned by the 
CEO and z-score. 
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motivations could drive the tension between institutional ownership and bank risk 
fundamentals in either direction. A point worth noting is that, given this evidence 
and the recent increase in institutional shareholdings, it is evident that institutional 
investors’ presence affects bank risk. Studies by Demsetz et al. (1997), Konishi and 
Yasada (2004), and Laeven and Levine (2009) have highlighted that institutional 
investors incentivise risk-taking activity in banking firms. With regard to liquidity risk, 
the coefficient of the percentage of institutional ownership, INSOTWN is never 
significant on liquid asset ratio, models (7)-(9).  Hence, while H2a is accepted, H2b 
and H2c are rejected. Accordingly, this connection is further analysed. 
B. Board characteristics and bank risk 
A significant negative link of residual board size, BDSIZERE, with all measures of 
bank risk measures at better than 10% level across all models can be observed. 
More specifically, small boards increased the extent of risk in the credit portfolios 
(i.e., worsen non-performing loans). The small board also reduced the capital 
position and increased fluctuations in the liquidity position of banking firms. As a 
whole, these findings go with the supposition that small boards not only worsen 
banks’ asset quality, but also aggravated their capital adequacy and liquidity status. 
Collectively, the findings are consistent with those in Staikouras et al. (2007) and 
Pathan (2009) for banks and in Cheng (2008) for corporate firms. Consequently, 
this empirical evidence is unable to reject hypothesis H3a-c – that board size and 
bank risk fundamentals are negatively related. 
Therefore, negative coefficient estimates of board size on capital to assets, non-
performing and liquid assets ratios refer to the relevance of a smaller board in 
escalating bank-risk. Based on these findings, it may be contended that as the 
board size in the bank declines, the capital to assets ratio decreases, non-
performing ratio increases, and liquidity risk decreases, therefore indicating a rise in 
risk. In general, strong boards of a small size can make more extreme decisions 
that possibly may exacerbate agency conflicts in banking firms. 
The percentage of independent directors is positively associated with the capital 
to assets ratio in model (3), at better than 5% level. This result is supportive of the 
board monitoring role in banks in maintaining sufficient capital. Therefore, it may be 
considered logical that independent directors in banks not only align the interest of 
shareholders, but also paying attention to banks’ compliance risk management 
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guidelines prerequisite may be a priority. In this perspective, they ensure that banks 
are not violating any law, legal and regulation related to banking business.  From 
these results, it can be seen that independent directors are an important 
component of board structure governance and have been responsible for 
addressing issues of capital adequacy of banks rather than provoking risk-taking 
behaviour. Therefore, hypothesis H4a is supported.  
For the non-performing loans ratio, the percentage of independent directors 
carries a negative sign with a significant coefficient in model (6) at better than 1%. It 
can be argued, as above, that independent directors may have a twin-role in 
respect to risk-taking in banks, by striking a balance between the interests of 
shareholders and other multi-constituency stakeholders. From these results, the 
idea appears to be that the board composition is largely composed of outsiders. 
These independent directors not only understand banking operations and complex 
financial services, but also the bank risk management framework. More important, 
the findings across independent directors and bank risk-taking (i.e., capital to 
assets and non-performing loans ratios) support the theoretical prediction of the 
principal-agent model. Hence, hypothesis H4b is supported. 
 Focusing on model (9), a positive and significant link is detected between the 
percentage of independent directors and liquid asset ratio (at 5% level). There are 
two plausible explanations for this. First, independent directors would not have 
underestimated the fragility of bank liquidity. As such, they manage and monitor 
managers to ensure sufficient liquidity is in place all the time. Second, independent 
directors are important in prioritising and ranking bank liquidity risk. All told, 
hypothesis H4c is accepted, thereby proposing that independent directors are 
essential for bank liquidity. Thus, independent directors may be a driving force in 
controlling bank liquidity risk.  
Collectively, the findings suggest that an increase in board independence 
monitoring and advisory responsibilities improves capital adequacy, liquidity 
position and reduces the chances of credit risks. And, these results are consistent 
with those reported by Akhigbe and Martin (2008) and Pathan (2009), and Cheng 
(2008) for industrial firms. However, they are inconsistent with those of Horiuchi 
and Shimizu (2001), who highlighted that Amakudari reduced capital adequacy 
levels and led to the deterioration in credit portfolio quality in Japanese banks. 
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In terms of control variables, the coefficient estimate for the natural logarithm of 
total assets is marginally negative on capital-to-asset, in model (1). This is contrary 
to expectations. It may be argued that well-capitalised banks have a larger asset 
size. In models (5) and (6), bank size impacts positively on the performing loans 
ratio. This pattern indicates that large and complex banks have made more risky 
loans which may have resulted in poor asset quality. Other risk measures - liquidity 
assets ratio and asset size are positive and significant at the 1% level in models 
(7)-(9). This positive relationship suggests that large banks maintain sufficient liquid 
assets (i.e., cash and marketable securities). There are two possible explanations 
for this. One, this result is consistent with the conjecture that liquidity is important 
during capital market problems. Two, they reflect the results in Dahlquist and 
Robertson (2001) which show that foreign investors prefer large firms with high 
cash deposits on their balance sheets. As expected, return on asset is positive in 
capital-to-asset ratio. This suggests that realised profit is reinvested to enhance tier 
1 capital. In liquid asset ratio, return on asset is negative. 
 Finally, a number of post estimation tests were performed. Wald test (II) for the 
joint significance of year dummies control variable is statistically significant at better 
than 1% level (p=0.000)51. These results show that macroeconomic conditions and 
banking sector differences in the institutional framework also play a significant role 
in bank risk-taking behaviour. Therefore, these tests validate their inclusion in the 
model specification. The adjusted -squares are between 0.052 and 0.16.  These 
are on the low side, but close to those found in comparable empirical work in the 
US (see Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Knopf and Teall, 1996). To correct for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, the chapter employs White’s (1980) 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard error in regression analysis (models (1)-(9)). 
The t-value and standard error are corrected by clustering observations within each 
bank. Finally, at the end of each regression analysis, VIF test is performed. The 
highest reported VIF is less than 2, which falls within the benchmark of 10. With 
this evidence, it can be stated that multicollinearity is not an issue in this empirical 
analysis. 
Generally, results indicate two emerging and important issues. Board makeup 
and ownership structure governance are important factors in bank risk-taking 
                                            
51 In the presence of multicollinearity that would have threatened regressions analysis, Stata 
automatically drops one of the highly correlated variables – i.e. one of the year dummy variables 
is dropped in each regression model.  
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behaviour. Based on this, board and ownership governance provides solution to 
agency conflicts in banking firms.   
 
5.5.2 Additional multicollinearity checks 
Board size and bank size are highly correlated (i.e., at 0.433). On this basis, the 
chapter uses various techniques to mitigate the multicollinearity concern and further 
explore the above hypotheses. Using three approaches, the above analysis in 
Table 5-3 is revisited. If the connection between board and ownership 
characteristics continues to exhibit itself in the same way with regard to balance 
sheet risk - this offers additional support for the belief that board and ownership 
structure governance are significant in bank risk-taking. Results are reported   in 
Table 5-4. First, board size and bank size are orthogonalised. Accordingly, after 
controlling for orthogonalised board size (BDSIZERE) and bank size (LNSIZE) in 
models (1-3), coefficient estimates of managerial ownership, managerial ownership 
squared, board size and the percentage of independent directors carry similar prior 
signs and levels of significance.  
Second, along with Anderson et al. (2004), board size is redefined as the number 
of board directors divided by natural log of total asset ratio, BDLNSIZE. Again, in 
models (4) and (5), BDLNSIZE estimate is negative and supports the hypothesis 
that smaller boards enhance bank risk-taking as noted in Table 5-3. Coefficient 
estimates on residual managerial ownership, managerial ownership squared and 
percentage of independent directors also remain robust. Moreover, the test for VIF 
indicates that their means are less than 2 in models (4-6). In general, using these 
additional multicollinearity tests, the interpretation of the findings is still similar to 
those presented in Table 5-3. 
Finally, to provide further robustness in the assessment of multicollinearity 
concerns, 146 large banks sorted by Tobin’s Q and located in the top quintiles, Q4-
Q5, are analysed. The results of this subsample are reported in Table 5-5. 
Consistent with the prior findings, board size remains negatively associated with 
non-performing loans in model (5) and is significant at 5% levels. The interpretation 
of board size coefficient remains qualitatively the same as in Table 5-4. For liquid 
assets ratio, the coefficient estimates on board size is positive and significant at the 
10% level, in model (6). This result is consistent with the advisory role played by 
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larger boards in complex firms. In this context, larger boards can make important 
decisions that improve bank liquidity. In complex industrial firms, Coles et al. (2008) 
show that the relation between corporate value and board size is positive - 
attributed to larger boards.  
In comparison with prior findings, the percentage of independent directors 
retained the same levels and is significant in the non-performing loans and liquidity 
ratios. This prediction adds support to hypothesis, H4c. In this subsample, it may 
be logical to assume that the above association attempts to answer the 
survivorship bias. This is because the 146 bank subsample used in this analysis is 
available for the entire investigation period.  
5.5.3 Impact of board structure on risk: mandatory legislations  
To examine the effect of board structure on bank risk before the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 and Regulation A of 2003, two subsamples 2000-2002 and 2003-2005 
are created. The main focus is on the coefficient estimates of board size and board 
independence, ex-post mandatory legislations. The findings are reported in Table 
5-6. This table outlines the comparison of regressions for the total loan losses ratio 
and z-score on board structure governance. It is immediately evident that board 
size is a bank risk motivating characteristic in both regimes. The coefficient 
estimates on board size in models (1)-(4) were negative, and significant at 5% level 
or better. This finding is comparable to that in Table 5-3 with regard to greater risk-
taking that endangers banks’ asset quality as well as capital status. In addition, it 
provides support for the idea that smaller boards are not only an important factor of 
board governance ex-ante-Sarbanes, but also ex-post Sarbanes and Regulation A. 
Hence, H5a is accepted that subsequent to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
passage and Regulation A reform, small board size increased bank risk. 
Throughout the regression models, the coefficient of independent directors is 
insignificant. Therefore H5b is not supported.  
5.6 Robustness Checks 
This section carries out a string of further tests to deal with numerous economic 
and econometric issues – i.e. endogeneity biases, Glejser’s (1969) 
heteroskedasticity and other tests. It uses alternative risk measures to investigate 
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the possibility that other risk proxies are influenced by the board and ownership 
structure. Findings remain robust throughout this battery of checks. 
5.6.1 Endogeneity bias 
Since board and ownership characteristics are available simultaneously, they are 
likely to be jointly determined with bank risk measures, hence, paving the way to 
complexity analysis. The effect of this mechanism to control agency conflict on firm 
performance varies. This is because every characteristic has different benefits and 
cost in its usage, and their interaction could also impact firm risk differently. 
Therefore, to rectify the possibility that these variables are endogenously 
determined, a simultaneous equations model, using three-stage-least-squares 
(3SLS) methods, is estimated (Beiner et al., 2006). In the 3SLS estimations, the 
board and ownership structure governance equation consists of INSOWN, BDSIZE, 
or FINBD as endogenous variables, and capital-to-assets ratio or non-performing 
loans ratio are simultaneously determined variable. This approach considers each 
risk proxy as endogenous together with three governance control mechanisms. 
Empirically, this leads to two different systems of simultaneous equations.  
The system of equations consists of four endogenous and seven exogenous 
variables. In each system board and ownership structure, and risk measures are 
dependent on each other. In theory, to meet order conditions for identification in 
this system, each equation must exclude at least three of the exogenous variables 
as each equation consist of three endogenosus variables. Thus, in constructing a 
four-equation framework, these identification settings are observed. To estimate 
the 3SLS system, the following set of previously used instrumental variables was 
selected (as in Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Mak and Li, 2001; Davies et al., 2005; 
Beiner et al., 2006) as AGE, TENURE, ROA, VOLATILITY, LNSIZE TAGR, and 
NYSE. 
To validate the usage of the above procedure, the endogeneity bias of the board 
and ownership control mechanisms and risk were checked by employing an 
instrumental variables estimator. This estimator was proposed by Wooldridge 
(2004) and it involves two stages. One, dependent variable risk measure (i.e., 
capital to assets ratio or non-performing loans ratio), where board and ownership 
characteristics are each regressed on all exogeneous variables. Next, the 
respective residual values of the balance sheet risk and board and ownership 
control mechanisms are estimated. Two, these values are added to the original 
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equations and ordinary least square equations are estimated. A significant positive 
(negative) coefficient estimate on predicted value suggests the presence of the 
board and ownership structure being endogenous. For contrasting purposes, 
instrumental variables regressions were run in Stata, Version 11.2. Indeed, 
endogeneity checks for risk proxies for every board and ownership characteristic by 
applying the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test were performed. Subsequent to the 
implementation of the Hausman command, a t-test that the null hypothesis of no 
endoegeneity is rejected – as the governance control mechanisms were jointly 
significant at 1%.  
In Table 5-7, findings for potential endogeneity biases of bank risk measures and 
corporate governance are presented using 3SLS method estimation. Despite the 
fact that the results revealed are very robust and remain statistically significant with 
the predicted signs - an endogeneity problem is addressed. Put differently, this 
investigation documents a causal association between board and ownership control 
mechanisms and bank risk measures. But more importantly, managerial ownership, 
INSOWN is significantly negative and positive with capital to asset, CAP and non-
performing loans ratios, NPLTL (at 1% level), respectively. Board size impacts on 
model (1) negatively and significantly (at 1% level), consistent with the popular 
notion of smaller boards.  The proportion of independent directors influences 
positively in this regression model. For comparability, as noted in Table 5-3, 
coefficient estimates on managerial ownership and board size are the same. 
However, board characteristics are insignificant in the non-performing loans ratio 
regressions. 
For models (2) and (6) associated with managerial ownership, the negative and 
positive signs on board size support substitution and complementary hypotheses, 
respectively (see Mak and Li, 2001). The substitution hypothesis advocates that 
firms substitute between control mechanisms to mitigate agency problems between 
managers and owners. The percentage of independent directors enters model (2) 
positively and significantly (at 1% level), signifying a complementary hypothesis. 
However, in this interdependence of monitoring systems, independent directors are 
vulnerable to high information asymmetry in carrying out their responsibilities.   
Model (4) related to the percentage of independent directors, managerial 
ownership and board size enter positively - suggesting the complementarity effect 
(as in Beiner et al., 2006, for board size). Comparing estimators 3SLS (depicted in 
models 1-8) and OLS (presented in models 9-10), the former estimator indicates 
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higher coefficient estimates of board and ownership characteristics over the latter. 
Roughly a 10-20 times increase is noted. As argued by the literature, this not only 
confirms the causality, but also suggests the presence of the endogeneity bias52. 
However, for non-performing loans ratio regressions, board and ownership 
characteristics are insignificant. Generally, these results show that the relation 
between bank board and ownership structure governance is either a substitution or 
complementarity with regard to bank risk-taking.  
5.6.2 Glejser’s (1969) heteroskedasticity and more tests 
Building on Cheng (2008) and Pathan (2009) work, Glejser’s (1969) 
heteroskedasticity test is performed. Two stages are involved. One, residuals from 
the pooled-linear estimation of regressions are derived. The dependent variable are 
return on asset, ROA and reserves loan losses ratio, RLLA that capture bank 
profitability and uncertainty, respectively. Two, absolute values for return on asset 
and the reserves loan loss to total loans ratio residuals are obtained above. The 
generated absolute values residual values, û, are regressed for each of the two risk 
proxies in models (1) and (2) of Table 5-8 on board and ownership characteristics. 
The latter are hypothesised to be related to the bank risk measures modelled in 
equation (5.2). 
 
ûit =α+β1INSOWN+ β2INSOWNQ+ β3INSTOWN+ β4BDSIZE 
                     + β5FINBD+ β6LNSIZE.................................................................. (5.2)
 
 
Panel A of Table 5-8 presents the second stage results of Glejser's (1969) 
heteroskedasticity test for return on assets, and reserves loan loss to total loans 
ratio.  An F-test of the hypothesis – that all slopes equal zero – is a test of the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity, against the alternative that bank risk is a function 
of board and ownership characteristics and control variables. To test whether a 
particular measure of power, i, affects bank risk, the t-test for the null βi=0 is used. 
A high t-statistic indicates that a particular measure of i is related to bank risk, after 
controlling other variables. 
                                            
52 See Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Mak and Li (2001), Durnev and Kim (2005), and Beiner et 
al. (2006) for this comparison. 
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The R
2
 values are 3.7% and 11.4%, and The Wald test statistics are 1.94 and 
5.73 for the absolute value of return on asset, and the reserves loan loss to total 
loans ratio, respectively. To test for multicollinearity among the independent 
variables, the mean variance inflation factors (MVIFs) are 1.4 and 1.39, 
respectively - they are on the low side. These results substantiate the thesis that 
inclusion of board and ownership structure is fundamental in explaining bank risk 
models. Coefficient estimates on managerial ownership and board size carry the 
expected signs. In model (2), residual managerial ownership affects positively 
absolute values of reserves loan losses ratios (at better than 1% level of 
significance), consistent with that reported by Sullivan and Spong (1998). This is 
also true for absolute values of return on assets. Thus, the interpretation remains 
the same. Overall, the results were validated by Glejser's (1969) heteroskedasticity 
test.  
To provide a further robustness check, the analysis introduced many control 
variables in the structural model. These variables included leverage, profitability 
and a dummy LNSIZEDU. A dummy variable LNSIZEDU is created to replace bank 
size. It takes 1 if LNSIZE is greater than the median for all firms, otherwise 0. The 
results are reported in models (3) through (4) in Table 5-8 panel B. The findings in 
this panel also confirm the main result that board and ownership characteristics 
influence bank-risk-taking.  
5.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This study has investigated whether corporate governance systematically 
influences bank risk-taking behaviour, through a sample of 301 BHCs between 
2000 and 2005. The evidence presented in this chapter is consistent with the risk-
taking hypothesis. Using bank balance sheet risk measures, the analysis indicates 
that board and ownership structure governance affect bank risk-taking - i.e.  capital 
to assets, non-performing loans and liquid assets ratios. Results showing overall 
bank risk and board structure governance provide additional support on bank risk-
taking (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009, among others). These results 
remain robust throughout a number of tests. The percentage of independent 
directors and risk measures are negatively related. This prediction can be explained 
by arguing that the independent director not only represents the interests of bank 
shareholders, but this also extends to other constituents, and is consistent with 
principal-agent model.  
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Moreover, confirmation was also sought regarding whether banks’ risk-taking and 
board structure was not pronounced ex-ante the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) of 
2002 and ex-post the Sarbanes and Regulation A of 2003. The empirical chapter 
reports that smaller board is an essential element of board governance ex-ante 
Sarbanes and ex-post Sarbanes and Regulation A legislations. Generally, 
consistent with the contracting environment, the findings reveal that the risk-taking 
behaviour of banks is a conduit in which a form of governance is effective on bank 
risk-taking behaviour. Most importantly, findings for H1-H4 re the association 
between smaller boards and bank balance sheet risk characteristics are stronger. 
Finally, this empirical chapter offers an extension of the agenda to cover policy 
implications related to corporate governance and bank risk-taking. 
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Appendix II. Bank risk measures and board and ownership characteristics 
Variables    Definition  
Dependent variables: Bank risk measures  
Capital adequacy 
Capital to assets ratio, CAP (%) Book value of capital to total asset (financial leverage) ratio 
Asset quality 
Non-performing loans ratio,  
NPLTL (%)                                   Non-performing loans to total loans  
Liquidity risk  
Liquid assets ratio, CSD (%) Liquid assets divided to total assets  
 
Independent variables 
Corporate governance  
INSOWN (%) Managerial ownership variable is defined as percentage of 
ordinary shares held by top executive officers including the 
CEO and directors  
BDSIZE (numbers)  The total number of board of directors on board  
FINBD (%) Fraction of independent directors refers to the fraction of board 
seats held by non-officers without relationship to the founding 
family divided by the board size. 
INSTOWN (%) Percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional investors 
based on common equity shares under voting control 
BLOCK (%) Percentage of shares held by blockholders with greater than 
5% ownership of banks’ outstanding shares 
Control variables 
LNSIZE  (%)   Natural logarithm of total assets of the bank, a proxy for bank 
size 
Year dummy D2000-D2005 captures intertemporal variations in market 
conditions, tax effect and institutional framework effect 
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Table 5-1 Sample Summary Statistics 
This table presents dependent variables for bank risk exposure, Riskit proxies: Capital adequacy 
is defined as book value of capital to total asset ratio, CAP. Asset quality refers to non-
performing loans ratio defined as non-performing loans to total loans, and denoted as NPLTL. 
Liquid assets ratio is defined as cash and marketable securities to total assets CSD. 
Independent variables:  Managerial ownership variable is defined as percentage of ordinary 
shares held by top executive officers including the CEO and directors and is denoted as 
INSOWN. Institutional ownership variable is defined as percentage of ordinary shares held by 
institutional investors based on common equity shares under voting control and is denoted as 
INSTOWN. Blockholders ownership is a percentage of shares held by institutions or individuals 
with greater than or equal to 5% ownership of the shares outstanding, and is labelled as BLOCK. 
Board size is total number of board of directors on board denoted as BDSIZE. Fraction of 
independent directors refers to the fraction of board seats held by non-officers without 
relationship to the founding family divided by the board size and labelled as FINBD. Control 
variable: Return on assets is calculated as profit before interest and tax divided by book value of 
assets, ROA. Natural logarithm of total assets labelled as LNSIZE.  
  
N Mean Median  Std Dev Min Max 
Panel A: Risk proxies 
       CAP (%) 
 
   1,765 16.232 15.013 6.548 3.760 97.025
NPLTL (%) 
 
   1,779 0.778 0.552 1.027 0.000 19.525 
CSD (%) 
 
   1,590 5.662 4.141 5.097 0.374 64.500 
Panel B: Corporate governance 
       INSOWN (%)    1,766  15.867 11.259 13.911 0.055 86.966
INSTOW (%) 
 
      905 14.910 10.683 13.732 0.063 95.797 
BLOCK (%) 
 
   1,347  22.618 16.200 18.109 5.012 95.797 
BDSIZE (number) 
 
   1,766  11.996 11.000 4.179 4.000 33.000 
FINBD (%) 
 
   1,766  75.825 78.571 13.734 20.000 96.000 
Panel C: Control variable 
       ROA (%) 
 
1,727 1.384 1.404 0.718 -10.549 6.479
LNSIZE 
 
   1,807  21.185 20.787 1.699 16.338 28.033 
TA ($ billion) 
 
1,807 18.844 1.055 107.127 0.012 1,494.037 
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Table 5-2 Correlation matrix  
This table presents the pair correlation between variables. Managerial ownership variable is 
defined as percentage of ordinary shares held by top executive officers including the CEO and 
directors and is denoted as INSOWN. Institutional ownership variable is defined as percentage 
of ordinary shares held by institutional investors based on common equity shares under voting 
control and is denoted as INSTOWN. Blockholders ownership is a percentage of shares held by 
institutions or individuals with greater than or equal to 5% ownership of the shares outstanding, 
and is labelled as BLOCK. Board size is total number of board of directors on board denoted as 
BDSIZE. Fraction of independent directors refers to the fraction of board seats held by non-
officers without relationship to the founding family divided by the board size and labelled as 
FINBD. Control variables: Return on assets is calculated as profit before interest and tax divided 
by book value of assets, ROA. Natural logarithm of total assets labelled as LNSIZE.  
 
INSOWN INSTOW BLOCK BDSIZE FINBD TENURE LNSIZE_ 
INSTOWN -0.048 
      BLOCKOW 0.516* 0.661* 
     BDSIZE -0.123* -0.033 -0.090* 
    FINBD -0.184* -0.081* -0.212* 0.146* 
   TENURE 0.034 -0.036 0.053 0.013 -0.054* 
  LNSIZE -0.376* 0.044 -0.021 0.433* 0.026 -0.007 
 ROA -0.170* -0.021 -0.038 -0.001 0.003 0.090* 0.309* 
Asterisk * indicates statistical significance at the level of 5%. 
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Table 5-3 Bank risk measures, board and ownership structure 
Dependent variables: Capital adequacy is defined as book value of capital to total asset ratio, CAP. Asset quality refers to non-performing loans ratio 
defined as non-performing loans to total loans, and denoted as NPLTL. Liquid assets ratio is defined as cash and marketable securities to total assets 
CSD. Return on assets plus capital asset ratio divided by variability of asset returns, and is labelled as z-score. Independent variables:  Residual 
managerial ownership variable is defined as percentage of ordinary shares held by top executive officers including the CEO and directors and is denoted 
as INSOWNRE. INSOWNQ is the squared value of managerial ownership. INSOWNQRE is the squared value of residual managerial ownership. 
Institutional ownership variable is defined as percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional investors based on common equity shares under voting 
control and is denoted as INSTOWN. Residual board size is total number of board of directors on board denoted as BDSIZERE. Fraction of independent 
directors refers to the fraction of board seats held by non-officers without relationship to the founding family divided by the board size and labelled as 
FINBD. Control variables measures: Return on assets is calculated as profit before interest and tax divided by book value of assets, ROA. Natural 
logarithm of total assets labelled as LNSIZE. Year dummies are time dummies. Wald test indicates the significance of all coefficients excluding constant. 
II is the Wald test F-statistics represents for the joint significance of the year fixed-effects. The heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics, derived from 
White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses below each parameter estimate. 
 Balance sheet risk  
measures 
Overall risk  
measure 
 CAP NPLTL CSD z-score  
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
INSOWNRE -0.163*** -0.164*** -0.166*** -0.012** -0.010* -0.009* 0.028*** 0.025** 0.030*** 0.022*** 
 (-2.856) (-2.902) (-2.947) (-2.139) (-1.855) (-1.775) (2.666) (2.552) (2.927) (3.497) 
INSOWNQ  -0.0001 0.0001  0.001** 0.0002**    0.0002*** 
  (-0.168) (0.125)  (2.133) (2.082)    (4.265) 
INSOWNQRE        -0.002*** -0.002***  
        (-2.996) (-3.092)  
INSTOWN 0.047** 0.045** 0.047** 0.004* 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.006 -0.001 
 (2.149) (2.059) (2.160) (1.679) (0.604) (0.349) (0.060) (0.370) (0.497) (-0.481) 
BDSIZERE  -0.100** -0.119***  -0.034*** -0.026***  -0.054* -0.064** -0.023*** 
  (-2.332) (-2.807)  (-3.051) (-2.879)  (-1.726) (-1.968) (-4.532) 
FINBD   0.036**   -0.013***   0.019** 0.002 
   (2.120)   (-3.008)   (1.974) (0.908) 
ROA 2.811*** 2.693*** 2.668*** -0.098 -0.090 -0.088 -0.675** -0.730** -0.742** 0.458*** 
 (4.557) (4.343) (4.319) (-1.188) (-1.073) (-1.050) (-2.205) (-2.391) (-2.441) (8.643) 
LNSIZE -0.250* -0.241 -0.232 0.014 0.065*** 0.062*** 0.617*** 0.767*** 0.767*** 0.023* 
 (-1.760) (-1.633) (-1.583) (0.736) (2.673) (2.654) (3.828) (4.362) (4.378) (1.723) 
Constant 14.714*** 14.828*** 11.839*** 0.626 -0.623 0.460 -6.274* -9.414*** -10.831*** -5.573*** 
 (4.660) (4.449) (3.475) (1.461) (-1.069) (0.934) (-1.960) (-2.677) (-2.900) (-15.391) 
Year dummy Included  Included  Included Included  Included  Included  Included  Included Included  Included  
R-squared 0.116 0.120 0.125 0.026 0.114 0.134 0.063 0.073 0.076 0.174 
Adj. R-squared 0.106 0.108 0.112 0.015 0.102 0.121 0.052 0.060 0.062 0.161 
Wald test 8.45*** 7.30*** 7.14*** 1.19 2.80*** 2.82*** 6.42*** 4.97*** 4.38*** 19.80*** 
II: F-test 4.57*** 4.21*** 4.18*** 6.51*** 6.58*** 6.44*** 3.21*** 3.59*** 3.72*** 0.51 
#Obs. 800 800 800 796 796 796 805 805 805 769 
 Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 5-4 Risk measures, orthogonalisation, and board size to natural log of total assets 
ratio 
Dependent variables: Capital adequacy is defined as book value of capital to total asset ratio, 
CAP. Asset quality refers to non-performing loans ratio defined as non-performing loans to total 
loans, and denoted as NPLTL. Liquid assets ratio is defined as cash and marketable securities 
to total assets CSD. Independent variables:  Residual managerial ownership variable is defined 
as percentage of ordinary shares held by top executive officers including the CEO and directors 
and is denoted as INSOWNRE. INSOWNQ is the squared value of managerial ownership. 
Institutional ownership variable is defined as percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional 
investors based on common equity shares under voting control and is denoted as INSTOWN. 
Board size is total number of board of directors on board denoted as BDSIZE. Fraction of 
independent directors refers to the fraction of board seats held by non-officers without 
relationship to the founding family divided by the board size and labelled as FINBD. Control 
variables measures: Return on assets is calculated as profit before interest and tax divided by 
book value of assets, ROA. Residual natural logarithm of total assets labelled as LNSIZERE. 
Year dummies are time dummies. Wald test indicates the significance of all coefficients 
excluding constant. II is the Wald test F-statistics represents for the joint significance of the year 
fixed-effects. Since board size and bank size are highly correlated at 0.433 (motivating this test), 
they are orthogonalised in regression models 1-3. In models (4-6), board size is redefined as 
number of board divided by natural log of total asset, BDLNSIZE (Anderson et al., (2004). The 
heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics, derived from White (1980) standard errors, are in 
parentheses below each parameter estimate. 
       Incremental impacts 
 CAP NPLTL CSD    CAP NPLTL CSD 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3      Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
INSOWNRE -0.166*** -0.009* 0.030***    -0.168*** -0.008* 0.034*** 
 (-2.947) (-1.775) (2.927)    (-3.044) (-1.672) (2.961) 
INSOWNQ 0.0001 0.0005**     0.0001 0.0005**  
 (0.125) (2.082)     (0.282) (2.005)  
INSOWNQRE   -0.002***      0.0001 
   (-3.092)      (0.189) 
INSTOWN 0.047** 0.001 0.006    0.045** 0.002 0.007 
 (2.160) (0.349) (0.497)    (2.064) (0.614) (0.630) 
BDSIZE -0.137*** -0.011 0.083**       
 (-3.174) (-1.512) (2.550)       
BDLNSIZE (ratio)       -2.891*** -0.416** 0.002 
       (-3.144) (-2.443) (0.003) 
FINBD 0.036** -0.013*** 0.019**    0.037** -0.013*** 0.017* 
 (2.120) (-3.008) (1.974)    (2.160) (-3.039) (1.776) 
ROA 2.668*** -0.088 -0.742**    2.549*** -0.043 -0.278 
 (4.319) (-1.050) (-2.441)    (4.126) (-0.504) 0.002 
LNSIZERE -0.106 0.090*** 0.836***       
 (-0.691) (3.154) (4.379)       
Constant 8.563*** 1.894*** 4.445***    8.613*** 1.991*** 5.032*** 
 (4.809) (4.994) (4.838)    (4.790) (5.044) (5.560) 
Year dummy Included  Included  Included     Included  Included  Included  
R-squared 0.125 0.134 0.076    0.124 0.127 0.025 
Adj. R-squared 0.112 0.121 0.062    0.111 0.114 0.011 
Wald test 7.14*** 2.82*** 4.38***    8.30*** 2.96*** 2.12** 
II: F-test 4.18*** 6.44*** 3.72***    4.13*** 5.98*** 2.42** 
#Obs. 800 796 805    800 796 805 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 5-5 Risk measures of top quintile banks on board and ownership structure 
Dependent variables: Capital adequacy is defined as book value of capital to total asset ratio, 
CAP. Asset quality refers to non-performing loans ratio defined as non-performing loans to total 
loans, and denoted as NPLTL. Liquid assets ratio is defined as cash and marketable securities 
to total assets, CSD. Independent variables:  Residual managerial ownership variable is defined 
as percentage of ordinary shares held by top executive officers including the CEO and directors 
and is denoted as INSOWNRE. INSOWNQ is the squared value of managerial ownership. 
INSOWNQRE is the squared value of residual managerial ownership. Institutional ownership 
variable is defined as percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional investors based on 
common equity shares under voting control and is denoted as INSTOWN. Board size is total 
number of board of directors on board denoted as BDSIZE. Fraction of independent directors 
refers to the fraction of board seats held by non-officers without relationship to the founding 
family divided by the board size and labelled as FINBD. Control variable measures: Year 
dummies are time dummies. Wald test indicates the significance of all coefficients excluding 
constant. II is the Wald test F-statistics represents for the joint significance of the year fixed-
effects. Given high multicollinearity between board size and bank size, I also take another 
approach and analyse only 146 large banks located in Q4-Q5 and sorted by Tobin’s Q. The 
heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics, derived from White (1980) standard errors, are in 
parentheses below each parameter estimate. 
Q1-Q3 small banks Q4-Q5 large banks 
 CAP NPLTL CSD CAP NPLTL CSD 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
INSOWNRE -0.232** 0.004 0.003 -0.125** -0.013** 0.063*** 
 (-2.247) (0.401) (0.217) (-2.125) (-2.461) (3.380) 
INSOWNQ -0.001 0.0004  0.0004 0.001*  
 (-0.610) (1.073)  (0.747) (1.660)  
INSOWNQRE   -0.0004   -0.002 
   (-0.395)   (-1.576) 
INSTOWN 0.216*** -0.002 -0.006 -0.015 0.003 0.017 
 (5.646) (-0.440) (-0.234) (-1.055) (0.953) (1.304) 
BDSIZE -0.182** -0.005 -0.089*** -0.056 -0.031** 0.077* 
 (-2.470) (-0.567) (-2.632) (-1.162) (-2.270) (1.749) 
FINBD 0.070** -0.007 -0.003 0.019 -0.016*** 0.041*** 
 (2.121) (-0.869) (-0.209) (0.942) (-3.304) (3.078) 
ROA 1.411 0.004 -0.412* 4.124*** -0.179 -0.440 
 (1.434) (0.031) (-1.796) (8.663) (-1.489) (-0.913) 
Constant 8.916*** 1.403** 6.075*** 9.738*** 2.518*** 2.656** 
 (3.485) (2.317) (4.626) (5.055) (4.635) (2.142) 
Year dummies Included  Included  Included  Included Included  Included  
R-squared 0.161 0.064 0.040 0.231 0.203 0.051 
Adj. R-squared 0.136 0.036 0.011 0.210 0.181 0.026 
Wald test  8.89*** 0.53 2.11* 15.03*** 4.34*** 5.06*** 
II: F-statistics  0.12 2.09* 2.73** 5.44*** 4.57*** 0.71 
#Obs. 381 377 381 419 419 424 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 5-6 Board structure over pre- and post-Sabarnes periods and post Regulation A 
Regression analysis of total loan losses ratio and z-Score on board governance over the two 
different periods: 2000-2002 and 2003-2005. Dependent variables: Total loan losses ratio is 
defined as total loan losses to total loans denoted as PLLTL. Return on assets plus capital asset 
ratio divided by variability of asset returns, and is labelled as z-Score. Independent variables: 
Residual board size is total number of board of directors on board denoted as BDSIZERE. 
Fraction of independent directors refers to the fraction of board seats held by non-officers 
without relationship to the founding family divided by the board size and labelled as FINBD. 
Blockholders ownership is a percentage of shares held by institutions or individuals with greater 
than or equal to 5% ownership of the shares outstanding, and is labelled as BLOCK. CEO 
ownership is as the percentage of shareholdings by the CEO based on shares outstanding, 
denoted as CEOWN. Age of the CEO is denoted as AGE. Control variables: Natural logarithm of 
total assets labelled as LNSIZE. The heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics, derived from 
White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses below each parameter estimate. Wald test 
indicates the significance of all coefficients excluding constant. II is the Wald test F-statistics 
represents for the joint significance of the year fixed-effects. The heteroskedasticity consistent t-
statistics, derived from White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses below each parameter 
estimate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2000-2002 2003-2005 2000-2002 2003-2005 
VARIABLES PLLTL z-score  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
BDSIZERE -0.030*** -0.016** -0.001** -0.002*** 
 (-3.861) (-2.317) (-2.507) (-3.281) 
FINBD 0.002 -0.001 -0.0001 0.0002 
 (1.276) (-0.448) (-0.926) (1.436) 
BLOCK 0.004** 0.003** 0.0002* 0.0001 
 (2.070) (2.043) (1.725) (0.781) 
CEOWN -0.003 -0.005* 0.0002 0.001** 
 (-0.862) (-1.946) (0.859) (2.029) 
AGE -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.000 -0.0001 
 (-3.567) (-3.423) (-0.110) (-0.362) 
LNSIZE 0.117*** 0.045** 0.005** 0.003*** 
 (5.926) (2.491) (2.426) (2.728) 
Constant -1.019** 0.566 -0.077* -0.056*** 
 (-2.383) (1.338) (-1.653) (-2.794) 
R-squared 0.12 0.04 0.044 0.017 
Adj. R-squared 0.11 0.03 0.034 0.008 
Wald test 6.51*** 3.66*** 3.86*** 601*** 
#Obs. 591 635 578 609 
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Table 5-7 Simultaneous equations system (3SLS): Effect of board and ownership structure on the capital to assets and the non-performing 
loans 
Managerial ownership variable is defined as percentage of ordinary shares held by top executive officers including the CEO and directors and is denoted as 
INSOWN. Board size is total number of board of directors on board denoted as BDSIZE. Fraction of independent directors refers to the fraction of board seats 
held by non-officers without relationship to the founding family divided by the board size and labelled as FINBD. Capital to assets ratio is defined as book value 
of capital to total asset ratio, CAP. Asset quality refers to non-performing loans ratio defined as non-performing loans to total loans, and denoted as NPLTL. 
Instrumental variables: Tenure captures number of years served by current CEO, labelled as TENURE. The age of the firm since its establishment is labelled as 
AGE. Return on assets is calculated as profit before interest and tax divided by book value of assets, ROA. Equity return volatility denoted as σi and calculated 
as standard deviation of daily equity returns, and total debt to total assets ratio. Residual of natural logarithm of total assets labelled as LNSIZE. NYSE is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is listed on the new York Sock exchange, otherwise 0. 
 Three stage least square (3SLS)   Ordinary Least square 
VARIABLES CAP INSOWN BDSIZE FINBD NPLTL INSOWN BDSIZE FINBD   CAP NPLTL 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 Model 8   Model 9 Model 10 
INSOWN -0.110**  0.048 0.410*** 0.038***  0.076 0.098   -0.018 0.007*** 
 (-2.136)  (1.350) (3.858) (7.010)  (1.166) (0.792)   (-1.549) (3.320) 
BDSIZE -0.988*** -5.266***  3.758*** 0.093 -5.644***  5.992***   -0.081** -0.004 
 (-2.598) (-5.773)  (9.558) (1.382) (-2.646)  (26.684)   (-2.245) (-0.675) 
FINBD 0.383*** 1.548*** 0.221***  -0.013 0.836** 0.158***    0.018 -0.006*** 
 (5.273) (10.684) (16.376)  (-1.124) (2.431) (12.557)    (1.573) (-3.423) 
CAP  -2.993*** -0.365*** 0.969***         
  (-11.158) (-6.176) (2.890)         
NPLTL      26.390*** -1.196* -1.009     
      (4.382) (-1.694) (-0.342)     
TENURE  0.132***    -0.042       
  (3.627)    (-0.578)       
AGE   0.010***    0.003      
   (4.031)    (0.792)      
ROA    5.093***    0.839     
    (4.216)    (1.106)     
σi  46.076***    5.931       
  (5.606)    (0.293)       
LNSIZERE 0.128 -1.865*** 0.252***  0.125*** -3.157*** 0.251    0.366*** 0.038** 
 (0.697) (-5.221) (2.720)  (4.469) (-4.458) (1.443)    (3.486) (2.137) 
TAGR    0.051***    -0.017     
    (5.737)    (-0.697)     
NYSE 0.886    0.036      2.589* 0.290 
 (0.413)    (0.376)      (1.666) (1.185) 
Constant           13.522*** 0.922*** 
           (7.506) (3.209) 
R-squared 0.752 -2.230 0.839 0.923 0.240 -2.613 0.870 0.876   0.018 0.019 
#Obs. 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,222 1,222 1,222 1,222   1,717 1,732 
t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 5-8 Robustness test 
Panel A shows the results of the Glejser's (1969) heteroskedasticity tests for banks risks. 
Dependent variables: Absolute value ROA_abs residuals, return on equity is defined as return 
on net income divided by equity, and denoted as ROA. Absolute value RLLA_abs residuals, 
RLLA are the reserve loan losses ratio is defined as reserves loan loss to total loans. 
Independent variables: Residuals of Managerial ownership variable are defined as percentage of 
ordinary shares held by top executive officers including the CEO and directors and is denoted as 
INSOWNRE. INSOWNQ is the squared value of managerial ownership. Institutional ownership 
variable is defined as percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional investors based on 
common equity shares under voting control and is denoted as INSTOWN. Board size is total 
number of board of directors on board denoted as BDSIZE. Fraction of independent directors 
refers to the fraction of board seats held by non-officers without relationship to the founding 
family divided by the board size and labelled as FINBD. Control variable measures: Book value 
of capital to total asset ratio, CAP. Natural logarithm of total assets labelled as LNSIZE. Panel B: 
Dependent variables: Capital adequacy is defined as book value of capital to total asset ratio, 
CAP. Asset quality refers to non-performing loans ratio defined as non-performing loans to total 
loans, and denoted as NPLTL. Additional control variables: Return on equity denoted as ROA. 
Return on equity denoted as ROE. Total debt to total assets ratio, measures of financial 
leverage, denoted as LEV. LNSIZEDU takes 1 if LNSIZE is greater than the median for all firms, 
otherwise 0 LNSIZEDU takes 1 if LNSIZE is greater than the median for all firms, otherwise 0. 
Year dummies are time dummies. Wald test indicates the significance of all coefficients 
excluding constant. II is the Wad test F-statistics represents for the joint significance of the year 
fixed-effects. The heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics, derived from White (1980) standard 
errors, are in parentheses below each parameter estimate. 
 Panel A: Glejser's (1969) 
  heteroskedasticity test 
Panel B: Additional  
control variables 
 Absolute value  
ROA_abs  
 residual 
Absolute value 
 RLLA_abs   
residual 
CAP NPLTL CSD 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
INSOWNRE 0.010** 0.000*** -0.176*** 0.004 0.032*** 
 (2.073) (4.062) (-3.135) (0.558) (2.949) 
INSOWNQ 0.000 0.000 -0.00001 0.0004**  
 (0.771) (0.319) (-0.023) (2.064)  
INSTOWN 0.000 0.000 0.047** -0.001 0.012 
 (0.000) (1.312) (2.217) (-0.213) (1.018) 
BDSIZE -0.007* -0.000*** -0.104** -0.024*** 0.043 
 (-1.665) (-4.388) (-2.513) (-2.744) (1.419) 
FINBD 0.001 0.000 0.029* -0.012*** 0.019* 
 (0.681) (0.425) (1.648) (-2.976) (1.948) 
CAP 0.010*** 0.000***    
 (2.624) (3.421)    
LNSIZE 0.006 0.000**    
 (0.318) (2.119)    
LNSIZEDU   -1.043** 0.088 0.374 
   (-1.966) (0.811) (1.117) 
ROA   2.762***  -0.087 
   (4.376)  (-0.292) 
ROE    -0.024**  
    (-2.132)  
LEV    -0.032*** 0.052** 
    (-3.217) (2.464) 
Constant 0.143 -0.003 9.235*** 4.621*** -0.224 
 (0.362) (-1.055) (5.116) (4.124) (-0.114) 
R-squared 0.037 0.114 0.129 0.179 0.036 
Adj. R-squared 0.023 0.101 0.116 0.166 0.021 
Wad test  5.73*** 1.94* 7.19*** 2.76** 4.15*** 
MVIF 1.39 1.40 1.38 1.37 1.41 
#Obs. 800 816 800 807 800 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Chapter 6:  Managerial Incentives and Risk-Taking in Banking 
6.1 Introduction 
This empirical chapter builds on the preceding two empirical chapters. It looks at 
one dimension of investigation – executive compensation and bank governance. It 
enquires whether managerial incentive compensation via board structure is 
important in bank risk-taking – an area which is not widely researched. The main 
objective of this chapter is to advance the understanding of the impact of 
managerial incentive compensation on risk in banking institutions. Executive 
compensation and board structure have been cited in corporate scandals, for their 
role in excessive risk-taking and the global financial crisis (Chen et al., 2006; 
Adams, 2009; Pathan, 2009; Walker, 2009). Today, managerial compensation and 
incentives in the financial sector have sparked strong opinions among the public, 
policymakers, congressional/parliament leaders, politicians, and taxpayers over 
promoting excessive risk-taking in banks53. Accordingly, motivated by scaling 
down bankers’ excessive pay policy, investigation in this area is both timely and 
significant. 
This investigation finds a strong link between bank risk and equity-based 
compensation. First, equity return volatility is positive and statistically significant in 
relation to stock ownership and stock options. Total debt to total assets ratio 
(leverage) increases in stock option and not in stock ownership. The insight of 
these results is that managerial incentive compensation tends to lead to higher 
bank risk and financial leverage. Accordingly, the logic may be that equity-based 
packages encourage risk-taking (Chen et al., 2006) and aggressive debt policies in 
banking institutions.  
 
                                            
 53 For example such public outcries include those surrounding the jet ordered by Citigroup in 
2005, dining and wining at Wynn Las Vegas hotel by Wells Fargo staff following staff mortgage 
sales, and bonus payouts of billions of dollars, and $440,000 spent by AIG on a lavish corporate 
retreat just a week subsequent to accepting an $85bn emergency loan from the US government 
to avoid bankruptcy.  
 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/4511948/Bankers-excesses-
what-caused-the-public-outcry.html.  
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In addition, this evidence confirms the risk-aversion hypothesis (Smith and Stulz, 
1985). That means managers may take on excessive risks once they are 
proportionately rewarded to represent the shareholders’ preferences for increased 
risk maximisation of firm value, consistent with agency theories. For comparability, 
in the competing view of moral hazard context, one can argue that if banks possess 
higher charter value, they are self-disciplined in engaging in risky investment 
choices (Keeley, 1990). Indeed, these two competing theories would produce 
opposing results. Second, with cash-based compensation, the parameter impacts 
positively and negatively in equity return volatility and leverage, respectively. The 
positive coefficient estimate is consistent with those indicated by Harjoto and 
Mullineau (2003) in the opposite direction. And it may be supportive of the view 
(and outcry) that bankers’ excessive pay packages - ‘bonuses’ - are presumed to 
have driven the recent global financial crisis in a more deregulated financial sector 
environment. The result is the US proposed capping of executive compensation at 
$500,000 (salary and bonus) for firms under the Troubled Asset Relief Program54.  
Third, across all regression models, it is found that the coefficient estimate of 
market to book ratio is negative. This pattern clarifies the idea that though principal-
agent models dominate the results, the moral hazard models are important in this 
empirical investigation. Fourth, board size is negative and statistically significantly 
related to bank risk and risky debt in all model specifications. Consistent with the 
neutral shareholder preferences, this evidence explains that managers of larger 
bank boards are very well compensated. In effect, they have more incentive to 
select riskier investment portfolios as well as implementing an aggressive debt 
policy. Finally, along with the bank policy implication, equity-based compensation, 
board structure, risk and leverage are endogenously determined. 
The classical agency theory predicts that managerial incentive compensation 
aligns the CEO with shareholders’ long term preferences of maximising the value of 
the firm. On theoretical fronts, Smith and Stulz (1985) and Jensen and Meckling  
(1976) have documented that equity-based compensation affects risk-taking 
behaviour to risk-averse managers and is important in reducing agency conflicts. 
As such, it provides managerial incentives to risk-taking - i.e. to pursue high-risk 
high-return investments. While research on managerial compensation and risk-
                                            
54 See http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/2009/02/04/2009-02-04_president_obama_ 
caps executive %20compensat.html. 
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taking in depository institutions has documented conflicting results, there have 
been a few studies that examine this relationship. Summarised in Table 2-3, they 
show there is some link between risk and managerial incentive compensation. 
 This empirical chapter makes four main contributions to the bank compensation 
literature. First, it analyses the association between executive compensation 
through board structure and bank risk and risky debt. Limited opposing evidence 
has been documented on the effect of managerial compensation incentives on 
bank risk-taking. (Houston and James, 1995; Angbazo and Narayanan, 1997; 
Brewer et al., 2003; Harjoto and Mullineaux, 2003; Chen et al. 2006). However, 
most research examines the impact of different sources on bank risk-taking through 
ownership structure (see Table 2-1). As such, consistent with evaluation, risk-taking 
and debt policy measures are linked to managerial incentive compensation. Given 
the different impact of managerial incentive compensation, Narayanan (1996) 
proposed that they should be disentangled. 
Second, it adds to the banking literature by examining corporate governance 
mechanisms along with bank risk in two areas, namely, managerial alignment and 
monitoring. Theoretically, managerial incentive compensation and corporate boards 
are substitutes that affect firm value through risk level, and they are important in 
mitigating agency conflicts between managers and owners. Third, it combines 
diversity of theories – agency, moral hazard, and deregulatory environment and 
their influence on managerial incentive compensation and bank risk. Though the 
main theory tested is principal-agent, given the fact that banks are unique (Morgan, 
2002), other highlighted theories are tested. Much existing evidence uses agency 
theory to examine the tension between managerial compensation and bank risk. 
With regard to moral hazard hypothesis, banks are assumed to enjoy the 
government protections and other bail outs. Houston and James (1995) reveal that 
their results are largely explained by the moral hazard hypothesis. They show that 
compensation does not promote bank risk-taking. While, Chen et al. (2006) show 
that stock options contribute to bank risk-taking, yet, they argue that the positive 
direction was driven by the information asymmetry hypothesis and not principal-
agent theory. Finally, under a deregulatory banking regime, though not necessarily, 
banks may be expected to pursue risky strategies. To sum up, this investigation 
has policy implications for the level and structure of managerial compensation and 
risk-taking in banking. Thus, it recommends that bank compensation contracts 
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should embed the concepts not only of maximising firm value, but also ought to 
consider the risk-taking factor. 
The next section discusses the theoretical considerations. Section 6.3 develops 
hypotheses. Section 6.4 describes data used and methodology. Section 6.5 
discusses empirical results. Section 6.6 ends with a conclusion. 
6.2 Theoretical Motivation 
In a survey of the executive compensation literature, Murphy (1999) concludes that 
the issue of executive pay appears to have its roots in agency-theoretical models. 
Agency theory advances the notion that because managers with undiversified 
wealth portfolios are risk-averse, equity-based rewards induce them to take on 
increasingly risky and value-enhancing projects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith 
and Stulz, 1985). This in turn increases the CEO’s wealth portfolio sensitivity to 
stock price through aligning managerial incentives with those of well-diversified 
shareholders. It is hypothesized, therefore, that in managerial risk aversion models, 
risk-neutral shareholders will employ managerial incentive compensation to closely 
tie managers’ interests to those of their own to maximise value of the firm. These 
stimuli may motivate managers to engage in positive net present value and risky 
investment projects by increasing stock return volatility. Accordingly, firm risk will 
vary directly with stock ownership and stock options compensations – i.e. risk 
rewarding equity-based.  
The second agency competing view is around derived firms’ private benefits 
protection by risk-averse managers. Under this scenario, the principal agent 
models predict a negative relationship between equity-based compensation and 
firm risk. Garen, (1994) reports that delta decreases in the interaction of firm size 
and residual standard deviation. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) show that pay-
performance sensitivity (delta) declines in stock return volatility. Theoretically, the 
value of equity is sensitive to both stock price and stock return volatility – this 
sensitivity is referred to as delta (slope) and vega (convexity), respectively. While 
incentives derived from delta encourage managers to pursue positive net present 
value projects, stimuli generated from vega may encourage managers to undertake 
risky projects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Guay, 1999). 
The theoretical literature has also shown that the delta of the CEO is predicted by 
the capital structure, firm size and firm risk (John and John, 1993). And, the pay-
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performance sensitivity of the CEO is a monotonically decreasing function of debt, 
firm size, and firm risk. 
 In theory, cash contracts outweigh managerial incentives to pursue risk-taking 
behaviour. In a theoretical model by Smith and Stulz (1985), managerial payoffs 
embedded in bonus payments are not rewarding – i.e. non convex. For industrials, 
Berger et al. (1997) and Coles et al. (2006) empirically show that excess 
compensation/salary and bonuses lead to managerial entrenchment behaviour by 
managers hesitating to pursue aggressive debt policy. Based on these theoretical 
and empirical supports, it may be logical that risk-averse entrenched managers will 
undertake passive debt policies and decline risky positive net present value 
projects. Indeed, these incentives are in line with managers conserving their 
undiversified accumulated human capital. In opposing theory, Noe et al. (1996) 
advocate that bonus incentive pay can drive risk-shifting in financially distressed 
banks in a deregulatory environment. 
Four complementary theories, namely contracting, moral hazard, information 
asymmetry, and deregulatory environment also have relevance to managerial 
compensation incentives and bank risk-taking tension. In fact, they motivate the 
analysis of this empirical chapter due to the mixed theorems under principal-agent 
model. The contracting hypothesis predicts higher levels of executive 
compensation for firms with more growth options and investment opportunity sets 
(Smith and Watts, 1992). Firms with better financial prospects tend to more closely 
tie managers’ wealth portfolios to firm performance and thus towards greater risk-
taking incentives. The moral hazard hypothesis postulates that compensation 
policies in banking (in particular, equity-based ones) are intended to motivate risk-
taking so as to maximise the put-option feature of fixed-rate deposit insurance 
(Merton, 1977; Saunders et al., 1990). Yet, higher managerial incentives to risk-
taking can be constrained by bank’s higher charter value (Keeley, 1990).   
The information asymmetry hypothesis predicts a positive association between 
bank risk and compensation. The deregulation hypothesis posits that a firm’s 
capability in adjusting to a vibrant environment is important to its continued 
existence (Kole and Lehn, 1999; Prendergast, 2002). This hypothesis predicts that 
pay-performance sensitivity becomes higher as bank management becomes less 
regulated. Taken together, theories tested in this investigation are anchored in the 
premise that managerial compensation contracts are designed to maximise the 
wealth of shareholders. 
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6.3 Hypotheses Development  
6.3.1 Testable Hypotheses 
Based on the above theoretical discussions, this section produces testable 
hypotheses. The academic debate suggests that in agency relationships when 
managers are compensated accordingly they will hesitate to pursue their own self-
serving behaviour. Instead, they will engage in corporate strategies - i.e. 
investment, financing, and aggressive debt policies that enhance the shareholders’ 
long term goals to firm value-maximisation. Specifically, equity-based 
compensation in the form of stock and stock options is more preferred to cash and 
bonus-based compensation to invoke managerial risk-taking behaviour. In effect, 
this structure of executive compensation can help to mitigate agency conflicts and 
induces managers to represent shareholders’ attitude to risk-taking behaviour.  
6.3.2 Equity-based compensation and bank risk 
In theory, the combination effect of equity-based compensation and other 
governance mechanisms is important in controlling agency risk-related incentive 
problems. Subsequently, this interdependence could reduce agency monitoring 
costs and agents’ risk-aversion opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
In the banking literature, there is evidence that risk and managerial risk-taking 
sensitivity (through equity-based compensation) are connected, see Table 2-3. This 
related work documents that managerial ownership and market risk measures are 
statistically positively associated. Consistent with risk-taking hypothesis, Laeven 
and Levine (2009) indicate that cash flows rights and bank z-score are strongly 
negatively related. The insight from this association is that greater cash flow rights 
motivate higher bank default risk. Angbazo and Narayanan (1997), Brewer et al. 
(2003) and Harjoto and Mullineaux (2003) report that CEO equity based 
compensation (stock and options grants) is positively related to stock return 
volatility (bank risk). This body of research implies that equity based compensation 
encourages risk-taking and implementation of aggressive debt policies in banks. 
Consistent with the risk-aversion hypothesis, Chen et al. (1998) indicate that risk 
and ownership structure are negatively associated, and Houston and James (1995) 
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show that equity-based incentives do not lead to increased risks, contrary to the 
risk-taking hypothesis (see Smith and Watts, 1992). 
Chen et al. (2006), Mehran and Rosenberg (2008), and Vallascas and 
Hagendorff (2010) indicated that option-based wealth induces risk-taking in banks. 
While the former study shows that market risk measures are positively related to 
option-based executive compensation, the latter highlights that distance to default 
and CEO stock options are negatively connected. The message derived from this 
research is that the recent widespread usage of stock options in financial firms – 
i.e. greater stock return volatility - leads to higher stock option value (Smith and 
Stulz, 1985).  
Consequently, the above arguments propose that increases in equity incentives 
can help to align managerial risk-taking behaviour with shareholders’ interests of 
increasing firm value. As such, bank managers will undertake riskier and positive 
net present value investments that maximise the interests of shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Stulz, 1985). Moreover, an increasingly deregulated 
banking environment in the 2000s could have intensified bank managerial risk-
taking incentives leading to expanded investment opportunity sets similar to 
industrial firms (Chen et al., 2006). Hence, if potential managerial risk-aversion 
behaviour is mitigated, managers will take actions which are beneficial to 
shareholders’ wealth, then, bank risk will increase in stock ownership and stock 
options. A similar prediction will be true for the total equity compensation (i.e. 
summation of stock ownership and stock option value). Accordingly, this discussion 
leads to the first hypothesis linked to managerial incentive compensation and risk 
divided into three parts: 
 
H1a: Bank risk is positively associated with CEO’s stock ownership-based  
  compensation. 
H1b: Bank risk is positively associated with CEO’s stock option-based  
 compensation. 
H1c: Bank risk is positively associated with total equity-based compensation.  
 
With debt policy, banks have lower pay-performance sensitivities (i.e. highly 
leveraged with significant debt ratio), thus, their managers’ incentives to increase 
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debt risk through risk shifting tend to decrease. With this theoretical perspective, 
debt risk is expected to decline in bank compensation (John and John, 1993). 
However, if owners are to increase bank risk through maximising the put-option 
feature of deposit insurance (Merton, 1977; Saunders et al., 1990) and if equity-
based compensation provides effective risk incentives then an increase in debt 
ratio will be detected.  
Angbazo and Narayanan (1997) and Harjoto and Mullineaux (2003) indicate that 
compensation (stock and options grants) and leverage are positively connected. 
John and Qian (2003) report a negative relationship between delta and debt ratio. 
Brewer et al. (2003) show no association between these parameters. This 
evidence, therefore, is contradictory. Capital regulations acting as substitutes for 
other disciplining mechanisms are intended to shape excessive risk-taking and the 
possibility of bank insolvency. Then, a decrease in risky debt is predicted. 
Accordingly, these arguments lead to the second hypothesis connected to 
managerial incentive compensation and risky debt: 
 
H2: Bank leverage is negatively associated with total equity-based  
 compensation.  
6.3.3 Short-term compensation (cash contracts) and bank risk 
According to John and John (1993) and Narayanan (1996), the disentangling of 
managerial incentive compensation is important. Both equity and cash-based 
compensation have different impacts on managerial corporate decisions – i.e. 
managerial incentives to risk-shifting incentives. Theoretically, managers 
compensated in cash contracts (i.e., concave function of firm value) are likely to 
decline variance-increasing positive net present value investments as they offer 
concave payoff (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Indeed, if manager’s expected utility is a 
concave function of firm value, managers will exhibit similar risk-aversion behaviour 
to overcome bankruptcy (John and John, 1993). In other words, cash contracts are 
utilised to reduce the likelihood of agency problems between debt holders and 
owners. More important they mitigate the risk-shifting to the latter from the former. 
However, the impact of this on risk-taking may be in the opposite direction given 
the prevailing regulatory environment (Noe et al., 1996) - i.e. distressed banks.  
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Three researches have reported a link between cash contracts and bank risk. 
While Harjoto and Mullineaux (2003) find that CEO salary increased in risk 
(measured by stock return volatility), Vallascas and Hagendorff (2010) indicate that 
distance to default (default risk) declined in CEO bonuses (i.e. positively). Benston 
and Evan (2006) indicate a negative relationship between bonus and market to 
book value ratio. Empirical evidence in this area of research is frankly contradictory.  
Such arguments opine that cash-based compensation can motivate managerial 
perverse behaviours (i.e. risk aversion hypothesis) that are detrimental to 
shareholders (Berger et al., 1997). As such, cash contracted managers are better 
diversified and will tend to make conservative investment decisions through 
undertaking safe riskless projects. Consistent with these competing arguments, if 
cash contracts dis-incentivise risk-taking behaviour, greater cash-based 
compensation will result in decreasing managerial incentives to take more risk. This 
leads to the final hypothesis related to cash contract and risk-aversion hypothesis 
divided into two parts. 
 
H3a: Bank risk is negatively associated with managerial cash-based  
  compensation.   
H3b: Bank leverage is negatively associated with managerial cash-based  
  compensation.   
6.4 Data and Methodology 
6.4.1 Data and sample selection 
The data and sample selection are discussed in Chapter 4. The definitions of 
dependent, explanatory and control variables are reported in Appendix III. 
6.4.2 Methodology 
The objective of this investigation is to examine the association between 
managerial incentives and risk-taking, and the interactive effect of board structure 
governance. Managerial incentives explicitly include the various contractual 
compensation schemes of CEOs, listed below.  
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A. Risk measures 
The primary dependent variables are two - i.e. annualised equity return volatility 
and leverage. These variables have been previously used to proxy risk (Coles et 
al., 2006; Chen et al., 2006; Laeven and Levine, 2009). The standard deviation of 
stock returns captures the total risk of the firm (all-in-risk) related to assets, 
liabilities, and off-balance sheet risk exposures (Demsetz et al., 1997). They 
indicated a positive and significant association between insider holdings and all-in-
risk. Debt ratio (leverage) measures risk-shifting incentives of shareholders’ to 
debtholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
B. Empirical specification 
Following Chen et al. (2006), Coles et al. (2006), and Laeven and Levine (2009), 
the link between managerial incentives and their impact on bank risk-taking are 
explored via board governance. More importantly, the boards formulate policies 
associated with executive compensation and are the determinants of risk. 
According to John et al. (2000), the managerial compensation structure in place 
affects the investment choices. To formally analyse this association, the following 
generalised regression equation (6.1) is estimated. 
 
Risk = α + β1(managerial incentives) + β2(board structure) + β3(control variables) +    
β4(Time.Dummy variables) +ε .............................................................(6.1).  
 
where Risk is represented by standard deviation of stock returns and financial 
leverage. The primary interest focuses on the coefficient estimates of managerial 
incentives (β1). These compensations include natural log of stock ownership 
denoted as CEO-STOCK, natural log of Black and Scholes value of stock options, 
labelled as CEO-OPT, natural log of equity-based compensation, labelled as 
CEOEB, and natural log of cash and bonus, denoted as CEO-CB, and natural log 
of total compensation,  denoted as TC. This includes the summation of the natural 
log of cash-based and equity-based compensation. Cash compensation is defined 
as the natural log of the summation of bonus and salary compensation to CEO. 
The natural log of stock ownership compensation value is calculated by multiplying 
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the number of shares granted to the CEO by closing price as at 31 December each 
year.  
The valuation of the CEO stock option is based on the equation (3.1) pp. 67, 
presented in sub-section 3.3.2.1, Chapter 3. Equity-based compensation is equal to 
the natural of the summation of the value of stock ownership and stock option. In 
theory, risk is a positive function of equity-based compensation (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Smith and Stulz, 1985). Hence, positive coefficient estimates of 
stock ownership, stock option, and total equity-based compensation is expected 
(Chen et al., 2006; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2010). Negative coefficient estimate 
of cash bonus compensation implies managerial entrenchment.  
Negative and positive estimates of board size and the proportion of independent 
directors (i.e., board structure, β2), respectively, are supportive of the popular view 
of smaller boards and larger independent board composition. Moreover, this 
investigation checks for the effects of tenure, market to book ratio, and bank size 
on bank risk. CEO tenure compensation captures the risk aversion of the 
entrenched CEO (Berger et a., 1997). This variable is predicted to be negative. 
Market to book ratio, MTB, serves as a proxy for differences in bank expanded 
investment opportunity sets. Growth firms will select a riskier investment portfolio 
(Smith and Watts, 1992; Guay, 1999), and thus, a positive estimate on MTB. 
Alternatively, negative on market to book ratio captures bank charter value (Keeley, 
1990). This is a self-imposed disciplinary device that moves banking institutions to 
undertake risky strategies. Finally, a positive sign on MTB can suggest presence of 
information asymmetry problems - firms with greater information asymmetry largely 
compensate managers with long-term incentives. Having these positions, a positive 
or negative sign is expected. 
Bank size is proxied by the natural log of total assets. Negative estimates of 
LNSIZE reflect the fact that large banks easily diversify their risk assets portfolio 
(i.e., financial services and business operation), which in turn, reduces bank risk-
taking behaviour (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996). Moreover, a positive sign on 
LNSIZE would be predicted if shareholders of large banks had incentives to pursue 
risky strategies, since in theory they are less vulnerable to higher information 
asymmetry. Thus, managers of these firms should be highly compensated. For 
instance, Guay (2009), Chen et al. (2006), and Low (2009) indicate a positive 
association between firm size and managerial risk-taking incentives. So, one can 
note, that the effect of firm size depends on the risk proxy employed (Demsetz and 
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Strahan, 1997). Time effects which control for inter-temporal variations in market 
conditions, tax effects and bank sector differences are captured by the time dummy 
variable. 
6.4.3 Endogeneity and joint determination of CEO pay, board structure and risk 
 
From the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence examined, managerial 
incentives and corporate value are jointly determined in a simultaneous equations 
framework (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). This is 
intended to account for the possible endogeneity problem, and enhance estimation 
efficiency in coefficients. Following this idea, therefore, it is not surprising to 
hypothesise a reversed causality among bank risk, managerial incentives, and 
board characteristics. These variables are treated endogenously, in the same way 
as other studies do (Sierra et al., 2006; Chen, 2006). Next, this empirical analysis 
conducts further diagnostic check that deals and remedies the endogeneity issue. 
A system of four (4) simultaneous equation models is formulated by using the 
3SLS method. Equity return volatility/leverage, equity-based pay to CEO, board 
size, and proportion of independent directors are defined as endogenously 
determined to each other, as specified in equations (6.2) to (6.5).  
The system of equations comprises four endogenous and eight exogenous 
variables. In every system, managerial incentive compensation, a strong board, 
and risk are dependent on each other. To ensure that order condition for 
identification is satisfied, each equation excludes at minimum three of the 
exogenous variables. To estimate the 3SLS system, the following set of 
instrumental variables is employed: TENURE, SPLIT, AGE, MTB, ROA, CART, 
LNSIDEDU, and LNSIZE. Then, the presence of endogeneity is tested through 
regressing each endogenous variable on all exogenous variables.  Residual values 
of every endogenous variable are obtained and then added to the original equations 
and OLS is estimated. A significant coefficient estimate on predicted value confirms 
the presence of endogeneity. By performing the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test, 
overall, the null hypothesis of no endoegeneity cannot be rejected at 1%. 
Therefore, the first specification is related to risk. Consistent with extant literature 
and managerial risk-taking incentive theories, equity-based compensation is 
modelled on risk (Chen et al., 2006; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2010). These 
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authors show that stock option and equity-based rewards provide managers with 
incentives to undertake risky projects. Based on these arguments, CEO pay is 
expected to be positive. As in Sierra et al., (2006) and Pathan (2009), board 
characteristics are also added to the system. Controlling for these parameters, 
Pathan (2009) indicates that risk is negatively related to board size and the 
proportion of independent directors. However, if a board of directors are 
representing shareholders’ long term preferences, board size and proportion of 
independent directors are expected to be negatively and positively related to risk, 
respectively. Consistent with conventional theory, Sierra et al. (2006) report a 
strong positive association between a strong board and bank performance. Thus,  
 
Risk =f[ln(CEO pay), board size, proportion of independent directors, tenure, 
market to book, ln(firm size)].............................................................................(6.2). 
 
Equation two is on executive pay. In linear specifications, Harjoto and Mullineaux 
(2003) show CEO cash compensation and bank risk (measured by stock return 
volatility) are positively related. John and Qian (2003) show that delta is negatively 
related to bank risk (square of market value of equity multiplied by stock return 
volatility and leverage ratio). Theory suggests that managerial pay-performance 
sensitivity declines in leverage (John and John, 1993). And Chen et al. (2006) 
document that CEO option compensation is positively associated with risk. For 
comparability, in a three-equation system, Sierra et al. (2006) report that CEO pay 
is positively related to standard deviation on return on assets, consistent with the 
theoretical prediction. Taken together, it is hard to predict the direction of bank risk. 
Sierra et al. (2006) also report a negative association between board index and 
CEO pay. If the substitution hypothesis prevails, board size and the proportional of 
independent directors are expected to be negative. Then, 
 
Ln (CEO pay ) =f[Risk, board size, proportion of independent directors, tenure, 
market to book ratio, ln(firm size)].....................................................................(6.3).  
 
Equations three and four relate to board structure. The popular view supports the 
idea of smaller boards and higher proportions of independent directors which are 
seen as better in mitigating agency conflicts (Yermack, 1996). The negative 
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(positive) association between these attributes suggests their substitution 
(complementary) effects in monitoring harmful managerial actions. Pathan (2009) 
reports that board size and the proportion of independent directors are negatively 
related to risk, suggesting that the greater use of either variable affects bank risk-
taking (for corporate firms, see Beiner et al., 2006). The negative pattern holds true 
for the executive pay/managerial ownership coefficient estimate in boards (Booth et 
al., 2002; Sierra et al., 2006). This relationship implies that strong a board motivate 
managers to lower their compensations. Accordingly,  
 
Board size =f[proportion of independent directors, CEO pay, risk, age, ln(market to 
book ratio), CAP, ln(firm size)]...........................................................................(6.4).  
 
Proportion of independent directors =f[Board size, risk, proportion of independent 
directors, CEO pay, split, ln(market to book ratio), ln(firm size)].......................(6.5).  
6.4.4 Summary statistics 
Table 6-1 presents the key descriptive statistics of this empirical analysis. 
Managerial compensation is reported in several different ways. It ranges from 
salary, bonuses, stock options, and restricted stocks of CEOs and top executive 
officers. This empirical analysis focuses on CEO equity-based and cash-based 
compensation, and asks whether managerial compensation schedules influenced 
risk-taking behaviour in the US banking sector. To lessen the extent of extreme 
values, variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels, and natural logarithmic 
transformation is used where necessary. The winsorised variables are market to 
book ratio, return on asset, return on equity, stock ownership value, stock options 
value, equity-based and cash-based compensation, and total compensation. 
The CEOs are paid an average of $0.82 million (natural log $13.04 mil) in salary 
and bonus annually, representing about 2.55% of CEO total compensation. 
Besides this, they receive $32.00 million (natural log $15.95 mil) in total equity-
related compensations. The mean value of CEO equity-based compensation 
exceeds cash-related compensation by 97.45%. The proportion of options via total 
compensation on average is about 29%. This growth entails a dramatic increase in 
equity-based compensation relative to cash-related compensation in the US 
banking industry over the years 200-2005. On average, the board of directors 
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contains 12 members, with a maximum of 33 members, and these seats are largely 
filled by independent directors (76% of board members). Arguably, this board 
composition can influence both the level and the structure of compensation, which 
increases firm value and is likely to monitor executive behaviours. The remaining 
24% of its members are presumed to be less detrimental to board independence.  
Table 6-2 shows pair correlations between explanatory variables at the 5% level 
of significance. The results show that not all correlations are on the high side. 
However, the largest correlations are between: CEO stock ownership and firm size 
(0.447), cash compensation and board size and firm size (0.320, 0.681), 
respectively, and board size and firm size (0.431)55. The remainder of interested 
correlations are below 0.30 in magnitude. As in the proceeding empirical analyses, 
multicollinearity techniques are employed to rectify the problem – i.e. variance 
inflation factors in every regression model is performed, the highly correlated are 
orthogonalised and some variables are replaced. 
6.5 Empirical Results 
A t-test of the null hypothesis that a coefficient is equal to zero is carried out for 
estimated parameters.  The t-value and standard error are computed by clustering 
observations within each bank so as to remove heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation by White’s (1980) method. Year dummies are included in each 
regression model to measure the inter-temporal variations on market conditions 
and banking sector developments.  
6.5.1 CEO-based managerial incentive compensation 
The findings of testing the relationship between the bank risk and CEO equity-
based compensation are presented in Table 6-3(a). The first equity-based pay is 
CEO stock ownership, CEO-STOCK. Since CEO stock ownership and bank size 
variables are positively correlated. They are orthogonalised and residual CEO stock 
ownership incentives used as explanatory variables. In models (1)-(4), there is a 
positive association between CEO stock ownership and equity-return volatility at 
                                            
55 Pathan (2009) reports 0.38 as the correlation coefficient between board size and bank size at 
1% level of significant. He argued that the joint inclusion of them in a single model specification 
would not invalidate the results as their average variance inflation factor is 1.65. 
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better than the 1% level of significance. Positive coefficient estimates on CEO 
stock ownership suggests that equity-based compensation increases the likelihood 
of bank risk-taking. This result confirms the stock ownership findings by Saunders 
et al., (1990), Angbazo and Narayanan (1997), Demsetz et al., (1997), Anderson 
and Fraser (2000), Lee (2002), Brewer et al. (2003), Harjoto, Mullineaux (2003, and 
Laeven and Levine (2009), and others56.  
Nonetheless, this evidence is inconsistent with the results by Houston and James 
(1995) and Chen et al., (1998). It may be logical that stock ownership 
compensation provides incentives which encourage risk-averse managers to 
accept risky and positive net present value projects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Smith and Stulz, 1985). This can be explained by the idea that equity-based 
compensations are more likely to increase those managerial incentives to risk-
taking that lead to maximisation of both bank share price value and firm value. 
Critically, CEO-STOCK continues to enter equity-return volatility positively and 
significantly (at 1% level) when board characteristics, such as board size and the 
proportional of independent directors, and tenure are included in model 
specifications (2)-(3). To correct for the high correlation between board size and 
firm size (at 0.431), these variables are orthogonalised in mode (4). This alternative 
specification uses the residual board size, BDSIZERE. The residual board size 
value is defined in the ordinary least square of board size on bank size. Again, this 
parameter is negative. The results from the orthogonalisation confirm the findings 
in models (1)-(3). Accordingly, the statistically significant positive coefficient 
estimates on CEO stock ownership offer support for hypothesis H1a. They are also 
supportive of the risk aversion hypothesis. 
In models (5)-(8), a second equity-based incentive, CEO stock options, CEO-
OPT is presented. CEO-OPT and equity-return volatility are positively related at 
better than the 1% level of significance. The evidence confirms the expectation. 
The result is consistent with the few examples of extant empirical evidence (Harjoto 
and Mullineaux, 2003; Chen et al., 2006; Mehran and Rosenberg, 2008; Vallascas 
and Hagendorff, 2010). It is inconsistent with findings by Houston and James 
                                            
56 However, this research work does not separate stock ownership and stock options held by 
executives. The separation of wealth by executive is important as each pay contract has a 
different impact on corporate strategies (John and John, 1993; Narayanan, 1996).   
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(1995) and Angbazo and Narayanan (1997)57. The evidence presented is 
supportive of the theoretical view by Smith and Stulz (1985). That option-based 
compensation provides greater convex payoffs, which in turn, reduces managerial 
risk-aversion behaviours. By possessing these incentives, executives may 
undertake risky but rewarding investments that increase the value of the bank and 
their wealth.  
 In contrast to CEO stock ownership, coefficient estimates of CEO stock options 
can also be construed as long term motivators of managerial incentives to greater 
risk-taking for shareholders’ preferences. Moreover, the evidence remains robust 
once the board and firm characteristics and individual year variables are included. 
The interpretation is qualitatively similar to that provided for CEO stock ownership. 
Compared to a study by Angbazo and Narayanan (1997), stock option-based 
usage in banks has become more prevalent (Chen et al., 2006; Deyoung et al., 
2010). Given this environment, the high powered option-based compensation 
culture has escalated risk-taking in banking firms. Subsequently, H1b that bank risk 
varies directly to CEO stock options cannot be rejected.  
Controls for board characteristics - both board size and CEO tenure - enter 
negatively and significantly at the 1% level in all regression models, as expected. 
The positive estimate on board size is consistent with that reported by Staikouras et 
al., (2007). The negative signs may suggest three emerging issues with regard to 
boards. First, smaller boards formulate extreme policies in designing bank 
executive compensation packages that enhances bank risk. And these impact bank 
compensation contract design for executives. In effect, the said compensation 
packages drive managerial incentives to greater levels of risk-taking. In this case, it 
could be argued that compensation policies in place mediate bank risk-taking at 
present compared to the past – see Houston and James (1995). Second, both 
managerial compensation and smaller board (i.e., strong board) are not only 
motivating bank risk-taking, but also, they may be a substitute in disciplining 
executive behaviour.  
 Third, coefficient estimate on tenure is in line with accepted corporate 
governance theories. It supports the arguments that risk-averse entrenched CEOs 
                                            
57 Study by Vallascas and Hagendorff (2010) utilises distance to default (DD) to proxy risk, 
which means that a negative connection between CEO stock options and DD refers to higher 
likelihood to default risk.    
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with longer tenure may display lower risk behaviour by choosing safe portfolio 
investments. This perspective is true as much of their undiversified wealth portfolio 
is embedded in accumulated human capital. The insignificance of the proportion of 
independent directors, FINBD, does not have any strong implication that the latter 
could be an unimportant characteristic in bank compensation policy. Yet, recent 
regulatory reforms, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and the board 
conventional theory recognise the importance of independent directors in the 
governance of the firm.  
With control variables, market-to-book ratio, MTB is negative and statistically 
significant across all regressions. This result implies that banks with higher charter 
values have fewer incentives to pursue excessive risky strategies. And consistent 
with moral hazard, this finding compares with those reported by Demsetz et al., 
(1997), Lee (2002), Anderson and Fraser (2000), and Konishi and Yasada (2004). 
Indeed, banks with higher charter are constrained to engage in excessive risk-
taking (Keeley, 1990). Throughout the regressions, the coefficients of firm size, 
LNSIZE, are positive and statistically significant at better than 1%. This explains the 
view that greater bank risk-taking and less information risk characterise larger 
banking firms. 
In Table 6-3(b) regression results connecting total equity-based compensation 
and risk are reported. Consistent with evidence in Table 6-3(a), bank risk increases 
with the total equity based compensation of executives. This result is supportive of 
H1c. Reinforcing the arguments in Table 6-3(a) above, CEO total-equity based 
compensation encourages risk-averse managers to pursue risky asset portfolios. 
Other control variables carry the same predictions. As such, the interpretation also 
remains qualitatively the same as in Table 6-3(a). As a whole, this empirical 
investigation is unable to accept the null hypothesis that managerial incentives 
based on equity compensation do not influence risk-taking in banks. More 
important, the evidence presented above provides strong support that all-stock 
contracts could lead risk-averse managers to undertake riskier investment projects.  
Findings in Table 6-4 connect CEO vested managerial incentive compensation 
and debt policy. The evidence found is inconsistent with H2 and John and Qian 
(2003). In model (1), CEOs’ total equity-based compensation affects positively 
regression model (1), at 10% level of significance. Consistent with Angbazo and 
Narayanan (1997) and Harjoto and Mullineaux (2003), leverage is positively 
associated with CEO stock options and is statistically significant in models (5)-(8). 
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The interpretation of this result is that CEOs compensated with stock options have 
higher incentives to implement aggressive risky debt policies. This could be due to 
their wealth being tied closely to the value of the banking firms, which in turn, 
involves them in risk-shifting behaviour. In addition, it explains the presence of 
deposit insurance policies that maximise the put-option value at leveraged banks. 
Together with the bailout schemes, bank shareholders have incentives to engage in 
risky activities at the expense of deposit insurance corporations and free riding 
depositors. The evidence is theoretically (Merton, 1977) and empirically (Saunders 
et al., 1990) consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis. The finding is also 
supportive of the argument that equity-based policies can mitigate agency 
monitoring costs and agents’ risk-aversion behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
Based on the link between stock option and leverage, it may be argued that the 
former ownership encourages asset substitution. In effect, the risks shifted to 
bondholders from shareholders who desire more risks raise agency problems. 
Such managerial incentives to riskier debt policies may exacerbate agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders and debtholders and shareholders. 
Controlling for the effect of boards on leverage, CEOs compensated with stock 
options continue to implement aggressive risky debt policies.  
In models (2)-(4), the empirical analysis also found that the coefficient estimates 
of equity-based compensation on leverage are not significant, after controlling for 
board characteristics. This result compares with those in Brewer et al. (2003). 
Since equity-based compensation is composed of stock ownership, it may be 
logical to conclude that the risk-averse entrenched CEOs who are solely stock 
ownership-base rewarded have no incentives to implement an aggressive debt 
policy. That means stock options and not stock holding compensation may lead to 
higher leverage - i.e. an observable risk58. With this portrayal of facts, therefore, it 
is hard to draw a firm conclusion that accepts the null hypothesis that equity-based 
compensation and risky debt are not connected. In addition, it may be contended 
that legal and regulatory institutions restrain higher leverage to safeguard bank 
                                            
58 Compared to industrial firms, Berger et al. (1997) indicate a positive relationship between 
CEO vested option holdings and leverage. Coles et al., (2006) report a positive association 
between lagged CEO vega and leverage. Based on their findings, it could be argued that 
compensations that are linked to firm value may incentivise the CEO to select more aggressive 
debt strategies.   
- 183 - 
 
capital and financial system stability. In fact, banks’ balance sheets are largely 
composed of debt in 90 per cent customers’ deposits. 
Turning to board governance, the coefficient estimates on monitoring board 
characteristics remain with the earlier signs except tenure which lost its statistical 
significance. The negative tension between board size and leverage reinforces the 
insight discussed above over the impact of smaller boards on risk-taking. The rest 
of the control variables are consistent with the earlier predictions. Return on asset, 
ROA is positive and statistically significant in all regression models. With this in 
mind, it can be explained as follows - with the reduction in assets substitution 
intensity which exposes debtholders to higher risk, bank profitability will tend to 
increase. Equally, the positive relationship supports the theory that higher risk could 
generate higher expected returns. 
6.5.2 CEO – cash based pay 
The results examining the association between the bank risk and CEO cash 
compensation, CEO-CS are presented in Table 6-5. As CEO cash compensation 
exhibits a positive correlation with natural log of banks asset size and board size, 
they are orthogonalised to rectify multicollinearity bias. They are defined as residual 
values in OLS, and denoted as BDSIZERE and ln(CEO-CBRE), respectively. 
Consistent with Noe et al.’s (1996) theory and at odds with the expectation, in 
models (1)-(4), ln(CEO-CBRE) and equity return volatility are positively related. The 
possible explanation for this result is that cash-based compensation provides 
incentives to entrenched managers to pursue risk-taking behaviour in highly 
leveraged banking firms. By the same token, all-cash contracts may augment the 
likelihood of bankruptcy in banks. However, it should be noted that this investigation 
does not examine banks that are in weakened financial situations, which are 
examined by Noe et al. (1996). 
One view holds that for banking institutions, short-term fixed remuneration can 
also offer some convex pay-off, as do long-term equity-based pays, and thus - a 
risk rewarding incentive tool. This result is consistent with those by Harjoto and 
Mullineaux (2003) and Benston and Evan (2006), and inconsistent with those in 
Vallascas and Hagendorff (2010). However, Benston and Evan (2006) employ 
market to book value of equity to capture bank risk. Again, the theoretical model by 
Smith and Stulz (1985) is not supported by this result. Controlling for board 
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characteristics in models (2)-(4), the coefficient estimates on CEO cash 
compensation, retained the same negative pattern and is statistically significant. 
Similarly, estimates of other control variables – i.e. market to book, return on asset 
and natural log of bank size preserved their prior signs. Consequently, hypothesis 
H3a is rejected. 
Similarly, Table 6-5 also presents the regression analysis of leverage on CEO 
cash compensation, after controlling market to book ratio, return on assets, natural 
log of bank size and year dummies. The estimated coefficients on CEO cash-based 
pay are negative and significant at the level of 1% in all specification models, (6)-
(8). This finding is consistent with industrial firm evidence by Berger et al. (1997) 
and Coles et al. (2008)59. The evidence confirms the characteristics of entrenched 
CEOs who prefer larger fixed based compensation to converge the interests of both 
shareholders and debtholders. It also suggests that higher charter value 
constrained banks increase default risk by compensating CEOs with cash based 
pay. This leads to lessening the likelihood of financial distress through managerial 
risk shifting incentives. 
 As the magnitude of asset substitution is reduced, the cash compensation effect 
is reflected in higher bank profitability. Indeed, this is confirmed by the positive and 
negative coefficient estimates of the return on assets and market ratio, 
respectively, both statistically significant at the level of 1%. Angbazo and 
Narayanan (1997) and Harjoto and Mullineaux (2003) find near zero tension 
between cash-based compensation and leverage60. More important, the OLS 
estimate remains robust to the specification of ln(CEO-CBRE variable if board 
characteristics are controlled, and coefficient estimates are statistically significant. 
Board size enters regression models negatively and is statistically significant at a 
level of 1%. The evidence goes with the notion that smaller boards would 
encourage greater usage of capital equity than leverage, which in turn, puts 
shareholders’ funds at more risk. This perspective takes the view that lower 
leverage reduces the chances of insolvency and checks bank capital adequacy 
status. Accordingly, H3b is accepted. 
                                            
59 In within firm and not ordinary least squares estimates, Berger et al. (1997), CEO’ model 
leverage (book/market value) on excess fixed compensation and indicate a negative link 
between them.  
60 For nonbank firms, Duru et al. (2005) indicate that CEO cash-based pay increases in 
leverage when bad cash return is less than the face value of a pure discount bond. 
- 185 - 
 
Throughout the analysis, several post estimation tests are conducted and 
reported in the respective tables. These tests are as follows: Wald test (II) to 
ascertain the significance coefficient estimated including year dummies. Their 
significance are reported in values below each parameter estimate. Multicollinearity 
problem – variables that are highly correlated are either winsorised or replaced. 
Many variance inflation factor values (VIFs) are below 5 – i.e. within acceptable 
figure of <10. White (1980) test standard errors test is employed to derive the 
heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.  
6.5.3 Simultaneous equations: Analysis of stock options, board structure and 
risk  
Table 6-6 of Panel A reports the 3SLS parameter estimates in four (4) 
simultaneous systems: CEO stock options, board size, independent board, and 
bank risk. The basis for this analysis is that compensation and corporate 
governance are endogenously determined. Results in models (1)-(4) offer 
potentially valuable insights. It is found that the causality effect can be run as 
follows: for equity return volatility and CEO stock options (Chen et al, 2006; 
DeYoung et al., 2010), the percentage of independent directors and CEO stock 
options, and the percentage of independent directors and equity return volatility 
(Akhigbe and Martin, 2008; Pathan, 2009). In models (1) and (2), equity return 
volatility and natural log of stock options value are positively associated (significant 
at the 1% level). In effect, higher CEO stock options compensation leads not only 
to higher bank risk-taking, but also, banks with higher stock volatility provide 
managerial compensation contracts that promote risk-taking behaviour. This 
evidence is comparable to that of Chen et al. (2006). It is in line with the view that 
securities that enhance the risk-aversion effect simultaneously increase the wealth 
effect of agents (Guay, 1999).  
However, after controlling for the endogeneity effect, in model (1), the 
percentage of independent directors displays a significant negative association to 
risk as reported by Akhigbe and Martin (2008) and Pathan (2009). This evidence is 
appealing relative to that presented in the preceding tables of results (i.e., Tables  
6-3 to 6-5). Moreover, it confirms the role of independent directors in banks. It 
suggests that the latter may shape excessive risk taking in banking firms. There are 
three possible explanations to this salient link: First, regardless of increase in their 
stock options, independent directors have fewer incentives to implement risky 
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policies. Second, the same directors could be more knowledgeable to the full 
spectrum of risk that banks are exposed to. Finally, prudential regulations in place 
are too loose to discipline bank managerial behaviour. Staikouras et al. (2007) 
reveal that loans to total assets ratio increases in proportion to non-executive 
directors which could have an impact on bank risk assets portfolios. Board size is 
negative and statistically significant on equity return volatility as indicated in the 
earlier tables of results. 
In models (2) and (4), there is a positive relationship between the percentage of 
independent directors and CEO stock options (better than the 5% level of 
significance) that runs in both directions. This causation explains that independent 
directors and executive incentive compensations are not substitutes for corporate 
governance, as expected. As such, they are behaving in the complementarily way. 
It also indicates that the more independent boards effectively monitor managerial 
opportunistic actions. This causation implies that both managerial compensation 
and independent board of directors can be employed simultaneously to resolve 
agency conflicts. For comparability, in bank holding companies, Sierra et al. (2006) 
indicate a negative causality between strong board and managerial 
compensation61. Again, in model (4), a negative connection between independent 
directors and equity return volatility (significant at the 1% level), confirms the 
absence of causation between the parameters.  
Other interesting results emerging from this analysis are as follows: One, in 
model (1), a coefficient of market-to-book ratio is negative and significant at 1%. 
Again, this is supportive of the moral hazard hypothesis. This can probably be 
interpreted as the idea that banks with favourable growth opportunities are 
constrained by higher charter value to take on investments with higher risks. Two, 
tenure is negative suggesting that even if entrenched CEOs are granted substantial 
stock options, yet, they are hesitant to engaging in risky strategies in banking firms. 
Three, in model (2), CEO stock option increases with bank size, LNSIZE. This 
evidence confirms the theoretical predictions that executives in large firms (i.e., 
measured by LNSIZEDU) should be proportionately rewarded. It is also consistent 
                                            
61 Supporting the substitution hypothesis, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Mak and Li (2001) 
highlighted that a strong board (i.e., proportion of independent directors) is negatively related to 
managerial compensation (i.e., through managerial ownership) in industrial firms. 
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with findings reported in Chapter 3 and a documented stylised fact – that is in the 
quintile of the largest banks (Q5), their executives receive higher pay62.   
Four, in model (3), the relationship between board size and the percentage of 
independent directors is negative, and they are simultaneously determined 
(significant at the 1% level). This result compares with those indicated by Mak and 
Li (2001) in industrials, but, is inconsistent with Pathan (2009). More importantly, it 
is consistent with the view that greater independent board composition and smaller 
board size are substitutes in robust corporate governance.  
Finally, to conduct this analysis two precautions are observed. One, the selected 
instrumental variables are based on the extant literatures (see section 6.4.3). Two, 
a test for endogeneity presence of CEO stock options, board size and the 
percentage of independent directors on bank risk is performed using the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test. This check is unable to accept the null hypothesis of no 
endogeneity at better than 1% level of significance.  
In summary, the findings lend support to the thesis that managerial incentives, 
board structures, and risk are jointly determined. Indeed, the evidence implies that 
causation runs from managerial incentive compensation and board structure – in 
particular, the percentage of independent directors – to bank risk. As such, it may 
be logical to conclude that the link between managerial compensation and board 
structure is important for dealing with risk-taking in banking institutions.   
6.5.4 Simultaneous equations: Analysis of stock options, board structure and 
leverage  
Table 6-6 of Panel B presents the 3SLS parameter estimates in four (4) 
simultaneous systems, namely, CEO stock options, board size, the percentage of 
independent directors, and leverage. Again, instrumental variables are selected 
with care and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is applied to the leverage equation. 
This test confirms the presence of endogeneity at 1% level of significance. In model 
(5), the finding confirms simultaneous association between leverage and CEO 
stock options. Controlling for variables similar to those in Table 6-4, a positive 
                                            
62 In Chapter 3, banks are ranked with respect to total assets and Tobin’s Q portfolios, and 
sorted into quintiles. Q1 quintile and Q5 quintile represent banks with the lowest and highest 
values, respectively, of total assets and market capitalization.  
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relation between CEO stock options and leverage is indicated. Based on this, there 
is additional evidence that stock option executive incentives lead to the 
implementation of aggressive risky debt policy in banks. This is consistent with the 
finding by Angbazo and Narayanan (1997). It contrasts with those reported by 
Berger et al. (1997) and Coles et al. (2006) in industrial firms. Accordingly, this 
analysis is unable to accept the null hypothesis that bank leverage does not vary 
direct with CEO stock options.   
Other significant findings are as follows: First, the percentage of independent 
directors and leverage are negatively related and endogenously determined. This 
can be explained in that banks with more independent directors implement a 
passive debt policy, and risky debt is not motivated by independent directors. Board 
size is positively related to leverage, rather than vice versa. This result can be 
interpreted as that it takes longer for large boards to conclude matters related to 
bank debt policies. Subsequently, banks may find themselves pursuing an 
aggressive debt policy that can lead to risky debt exposure. Second, contrary to the 
findings of Adams and Mehran (2005) and Andres and Vallelado (2008), it is found 
that board size is negatively related to return on assets. This result is encouraging 
for the popular view that smaller boards are better (Yermack, 1996).  
In summary, there is evidence that CEO stock options, board structure, and 
leverage are also simultaneously determined. In effect, the inter-relationship of 
managerial incentive compensation and board structure is crucial in affecting the 
debt policy of banks. 
6.5.5 Robustness checks 
For further analysis, Panel A of Table 6-7 reports results that re-explore a set of 
regression specifications. This test is intended to evaluate the robustness of the 
potential impact of managerial incentives through board characteristics on bank 
risk. To conduct this check, managerial compensation’s relationship to risk-taking is 
measured by the natural log of total CEO wealth, ln(CEOEB) as in Core and Guay 
(1999). The latter is defined as the summation of the values of stock ownership and 
stock options, and alternative variables are used. Board size is replaced by two 
variables: The residuals board size, BDSIZERE on firm size and the ratio of board 
size divided by natural log of total assets, BDLNSIZE (Anderson et al., 2004). 
Return on assets is replaced by Tobin’s Q and return on equity. As in much of the 
prior literature, the age of the CEO is included in the analysis. The findings are 
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robust to alternative variables and model specifications employed. Throughout the 
models (1)-(4), as expected, the coefficient estimate of total equity-based 
compensation, ln(CEOEB) is positive and statistically significant. Similarly, the 
replaced variables for board size – BDSIZERE and BDLNSIZE are significant and 
retain the negative signs.  
Furthermore, a subsample of the largest banks whose asset value is greater than 
the natural log of the median value (i.e., 21.194) of the total assets is created. A 
corresponding dummy variable is denoted as LNSIZEDU. It takes 1 if LNSIZE is 
greater than this median value, otherwise 0, and is interacted with total equity-
based compensation and board characteristics variables. The question arising is to 
test whether managerial incentive compensation on bank risk is significantly 
different in large banks than in small banks.  
In regression models (1) and (3) the coefficient estimates on total equity-based 
compensation, ln(CEOEB) are positive and insignificant, and the coefficient 
estimates on the interaction term,  are positive and significant. This can be 
interpreted insofar as the impact of equity-based compensation is higher in large 
banks than in small banks. In other words, it implies that higher CEOs equity-based 
pay is linked to higher risk-taking for large banks relative to small banks. 
Subsequently, the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of ln(CEOEB)) 
and its interaction term with the LNSIZEDU dummy equals to zero can be rejected. 
It implies that higher CEOs equity-based pay is linked to higher risk-taking in large 
banks relative to small banks. 
As a further robustness check, a simultaneous system of equations using 3SLS 
is performed. Their results are presented on Table 6-8. Risk, excess stock options, 
board size and the percentage of independent directors are treated as endogenous 
in the system. The excess stock options are defined as the residual in the ordinary 
least square regression model as in equation (6.6): 
 
 
 
Variables in the model remain with the same definitions as above. Market 
capitalisation replaces the natural log of firm assets to measure firm size. The 
   
 
    Ln(CEO-OPT)it =α+β1 σi + β2FINBD+ β3 BDLNSIZE + β4TENURE 
              + β5MTB+ β6MKCAP+ε................................................................ (6.6)
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results for the excess of stock options and equity return volatility in models (1) and 
(2) respectively provide evidence that these parameters are simultaneously 
determined. These findings are consistent with those reported by Chen et al. 
(2006), Mehran and Rosenberg (2008), and Vallascas and Hagendorff (2010). 
Board size to natural log of total assets ratio bears a negative sign (at a 10% level 
of significance). This finding is consistent with those reported in Section 6.4.3, 
Table 6-7. The percentage of independent directors and equity return volatility are 
positively associated. This result is different from that presented in Table 6-6. It 
could be argued that in an environment of smaller boards and larger proportions of 
independent directors, rewarding executives with stock options would generate 
risky activities in banks.  
Finally, turning to CEO’s total compensation, in the ordinary least squares 
estimator, equity return volatility positively and significantly influences the natural 
log of total compensation, in model (5). This finding is supportive of those indicated 
in Table 6-3 (a)-(b) for stock ownership, stock option and total equity-based 
compensation. With this depiction evidence, it is true that after lumping cash- and 
equity-based incentives together (see Narayanan, 1996), yet, CEO total incentives 
lead to risk-taking behaviour (perhaps bonus compensation contract design spurred 
this). Overall, several robustness techniques reveal that the results are robust to a 
number of alternative specifications.  
6.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has investigated the link between managerial incentives and bank risk. 
Its main purpose is to provide understanding on how compensation influences risk 
in banking firms. It does this by controlling board characteristics. The following 
conclusions have emerged from this investigation. One, consistent with Chen et al. 
(2006), CEO stock ownership and stock options values and equity return volatility 
are positive and statistically significantly associated. In contrast, total equity return 
volatility substantially varies with equity-based incentive compensation. That is, the 
combination of stock ownership and stock option compensation is consistent with 
the notion that managerial incentives become more aligned with those of 
shareholders as their wealth portfolios rise. These findings are supportive of Smith 
and Stulz’ (1985) model that equity-based rewarding offers higher convex-payoff. 
Interestingly, these patterns continue regardless of the board characteristics 
present. The evidence suggests that risk-averse managers can be motivated by 
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equity-based pay to take on risky and positive net present values investment 
projects.  
Two, leverage is positively influenced by CEO stock option value. This linkage 
suggests that stock option compensations are more important in inducing 
managers to implement aggressive debt policies that generate risky debt. Three, 
consistent with, Harjoto and Mullineau (2003), cash-based compensation impacts 
positively and negatively in equity return volatility and leverage, respectively. Four, 
whilst the principal-agent model drives the results, the further analysis carried out 
suggests other theories had an impact on the analysis of managerial incentives and 
risk-taking in banks - in particular, the moral hazard hypothesis. In this competing 
view, Keeley (1990) posits that higher charter value constrained banks pursue risky 
strategies to exploit risky investment opportunities. Many of the regression models, 
the coefficient estimates on market to book ratio are negative - indicating higher 
charter value discourages excessive risk-taking as the result of managerial 
incentive compensation.  
Finally, throughout, board size is negative and statistically related to bank risk 
and risky debt. The argument goes that smaller boards can effectively monitor 
managers for bank shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ interests. An alternative 
view is that large boards may come up with extreme decisions that possibly are 
increasing risk and aggravating the bank’s positions. Turning to banks size, 
throughout it is indicated that positively natural log of firm size affects both equity 
return volatility and leverage. This goes with the argument that larger banks 
compensated their CEOs highly, which, in turn, induces risk-averse managers to 
pursue risk strategies leading to banks’ value maximisation for shareholders.   
In conclusion, there is compelling evidence that managerial incentive 
compensation significantly influences risk and the possibility of risky debt in 
banking firms. These bankers’ pay contracts – both in cash and equity packages - 
are excessively generating banks’ risk and risky debt. This probably means that to 
minimise the risks identified, more commitment is needed in the on-going 
compensation scheme reforms in the financial sector. The aim here is to shape 
bank managerial incentives appropriately in the context of excessive risk-taking. As 
a result, the findings in this empirical chapter have got policy implications in terms 
of bankers’ compensation. It is proposed, therefore, that bankers’ pay contracts 
should consider both shareholders’ value maximisation as well as the banks’ 
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volatility assets. Finally, this investigation can be replicated for future research ex-
post the 2007-09 global financial crises.  
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Appendix III. Bank risk and executive compensation variables 
Variables      Definition  
Dependent variables 
Bank risks (policy measures) 
σi   Equity return volatility calculated as standard deviation of daily equity 
returns capturing for uncertainty. 
LEV  Total debt to total assets ratio, measures of financial leverage.  
Managerial incentive compensation variables 
Ln(CEO-CB) Natural log of the sum of annual bonus and salary compensation to 
CEO.  
Ln(CEO-STOCK) Natural log of stock ownership compensation value to CEO valued as 
the number of  stock granted multiplied by the closing price as at 31 
December each year. 
Ln(CEO-OPT) Natural log of Black and Scholes value of stock options compensation 
to CEO  
Ln(CEOEB) Natural log of total equity-based compensation to CEO which includes 
common stock  value and Black and Scholes value of stock options  
lnTC Natural log of the summation of cash-based, stock ownership and stock 
options values 
Board characteristic variables 
BDSIZE  The total number of board of directors on board. 
FINBD Fraction of independent directors refers to the fraction of board seats 
held by non-officers without relationship to the founding family divided 
by the board size. 
TENURE  Measures number of years served by current CEO. 
SPLIT    A dummy variable equals to 1 where chairman is also the CEO, or 
otherwise 0.  
Control variables 
LNSIZE    Natural logarithm of total assets of the bank, a proxy for bank size. 
ROA   Return on equity is defined as net income divided by equity ratio.  
MTB    Market to book ratio, a proxy to control for investment opportunities. 
Year dummy D2000-D2005 captures intertemporal variations in market conditions, 
tax effect and institutional framework effect 
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Table 6-1 Sample Summary Statistics  
This table presents two dependent variables for risk, Riskit measures in sample size of 301 
BHCs in the 2000 to 2005: Equity return volatility denoted as σi and calculated as standard 
deviation of daily equity returns, and total debt to total assets ratio, measures of leverage labelled as 
LEV. Independent variables: Managerial incentive compensation include the following: Natural 
log of stock ownership compensation value to CEO, labelled as ln(CEO-STOCK). Natural log of 
Black-Scholes value of stock options compensation to CEO, labelled as ln(CEO-OPT). Natural 
log of total equity-based compensation to CEO which includes common stock value and Black-
Scholes value of stock options, labelled as ln(CEOEB). Natural log of the sum of annual bonus 
and salary compensation to CEO, denoted as ln(CEO-CB). Total compensation is the natural log 
of the summation of cash-based, stock ownership and stock options values, denoted as ln(TC). 
Board size is total number of board of directors on board denoted as BDSIZE. Fraction of 
independent directors refers to the fraction of board seats held by non-officers without 
relationship to the founding family divided by the board size and labelled as FINBD. Tenure 
captures number of years served by current CEO, labelled as TENURE. Control variables: 
Market to book ratio, a proxy to control for investment opportunities is denoted as MTB. Return 
on assets is calculated as profit before interest and tax divided by book value of assets, ROA. 
Return on equity is defined as net income divided by equity, ROE. Natural logarithm of total 
assets of the bank, a proxy for bank size, denoted as LNSIZE. Market to book ratio, return on 
asset, return on equity, CEO stock ownership value, stock options value, and CEO equity-based 
compensation are winsorised at 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  
Variable  N Mean Median  Std.dev Min Max 
Panel A: Risk measures( policy measures) 
σ  1478 20.76 19.71 6.27 5.23 67.96 
LEV (%) 1746 13.94 12.36 9.42 0.00 62.47 
Panel B: Managerial incentive compensation 
CEO-STOCK ($mil) 1805 22.70 1.76 53.10 0.00 200.00 
ln CEO-STOCK 1718 14.67 14.51 2.33 0.00 19.12 
CEO-OPT ($mil) 1805 9.33 17.50 8.45 0.00 17.50 
ln CEO-OPT 1805 14.27 16.68 2.90 0.00 16.68 
CEOEB ($mil) 1805 32.00 17.70 55.20 0.00 218.00 
lnCEOEB 1805 15.95 16.69 2.02 0.00 19.20 
CEO-CB ($mil) 1805 0.82 0.38 1.38 0.00 6.88 
ln(CEO-CB) 1747 13.04 12.86 0.99 0.00 15.74 
TC ($mil) 1747 32.20 17.70 55.90 0.00 218.00 
lnTC 1747 15.92 16.69 2.04 0.00 19.20 
Panel C: Board characteristics 
BDSIZE (number) 1755 12.01 11.00 4.19 4.00 33.00 
FINBD (%) 1755 75.76 78.57 13.74 20.00 96.00 
TENURE (years) 1756 8.72 7.00 7.99 0.00 49.00 
Panel D: Control variables 
MTB 1805 2.67 2.21 1.36 0.51 4.64 
ROA (%) 1805 1.47 1.45 0.64 -0.82 2.95 
ROE (%) 1805 12.07 12.49 6.33 -18.73 25.90 
TA ($bil) 1782 19.09 1.07 107.89 0.01 1,494.40 
LNSIZE 1782 21.19 20.80 1.70 16.34 28.03 
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Table 6-2 Correlation Matrix 
In this table we present the pair correlation between variables. Independent variables: Managerial incentive compensation include the following: Natural 
log of stock ownership compensation value to CEO, labelled as ln(CEO-STOCK). Natural log of Black-Scholes value of stock options compensation to 
CEO, labelled as ln(CEO-OPT). Natural log of total equity-based compensation to CEO which includes common stock value and Black-Scholes value of 
stock options, labelled as ln(CEOEB). Natural log of the sum of annual bonus and salary compensation to CEO, denoted as ln(CEO-CB). Total 
compensation is the natural log of the summation of cash-based, stock ownership and stock options values, denoted as ln(TC). Board size is total 
number of board of directors on board denoted as BDSIZE. Fraction of independent directors refers to the fraction of board seats held by non-officers 
without relationship to the founding family divided by the board size and labelled as FINBD. Tenure captures number of years served by current CEO, 
labelled as TENURE. Control variables: Market to book ratio, a proxy to control for investment opportunities is denoted as MTB. Return on assets is 
calculated as profit before interest and tax divided by book value of assets, ROA. Return on equity is defined as net income divided by equity, ROE. 
Natural logarithm of total assets of the bank, a proxy for bank size, denoted as LNSIZE..  
 
ln(CEO- 
STOCK) 
ln(CEO- 
OPT) 
ln 
(CEOEB) ln(CEO-CB) ln(TC) BDSIZE FINBD TENURE MTB ROE ROA 
ln(CEO-OPT) 0.2319* 
          ln(CEOEB) 0.6874* 0.7717*
         ln(CEO-CB) 0.5396* 0.0728* 0.2848*
        ln(TC) 0.6959* 0.7712* 1.0000* 0.2848*
       BDSIZE 0.1178* 0.010 0.0494* 0.3196* 0.0576*
      FINBD -0.0951* -0.1043* -0.1034* 0.000 -0.1051* 0.1493*
     TENURE 0.2034* -0.0275* 0.0973* 0.0764* 0.1075* 0.0354* -0.0353*
    MTB 0.1216* 0.1027* 0.1561* 0.0510* 0.1597* -0.1138* -0.011 0.0645*
   ROE 0.2109* -0.0507* 0.0579* 0.3355* 0.0630* 0.0203* -0.0356* 0.1431* 0.2098*
  ROA 0.1845* -0.0235* 0.0683* 0.2670* 0.0662* -0.0183* -0.009 0.0842* 0.1393* 0.6812*
 LNSIZE 0.4467* 0.0491* 0.2098* 0.6813* 0.2099* 0.4313* 0.0305* 0.010 -0.0507* 0.3479* 0.2679*
Asterisk * indicates statistical significance at the level of 5%. 
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Table 6-3 (a) Regression results of stock ownership, stock options, and equity return volatility 
Ordinary least square regression coefficients for models of bank risk in sample size of 301 BHCs in the 2000 to 2005 are reported in two panels: 
Dependent variable: Equity return volatility denoted as σi and calculated as standard deviation of daily equity returns Independent variables:  Managerial 
incentive compensation include the following: Natural log of stock ownership compensation value to CEO, labelled as ln(CEO-STOCK). Natural log of 
Black-Scholes value of stock options compensation to CEO, labelled as ln(CEO-OPT). Board size is total number of board of directors on board denoted 
as BDSIZE. Residual of board size is total number of board of directors on board denoted as BDSIZERE. Fraction of independent directors refers to the 
fraction of board seats held by non-officers without relationship to the founding family divided by the board size and labelled as FINBD. Tenure captures 
number of years served by current CEO, labelled as TENURE. Control variables: Market to book ratio, a proxy to control for investment opportunities is 
denoted as MTB. Return on assets is calculated as profit before interest and tax divided by book value of assets, ROA. Natural logarithm of total assets 
of the bank, a proxy for bank size, denoted as LNSIZE. Year dummies are time dummies. Wald test indicates the significance of all coefficients 
excluding constant. II is the Wald test F-statistics represents for the joint significance of the year fixed-effects. The heteroskedasticity consistent t-
statistics, derived from White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses below each parameter estimate. 
 σi 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Ln(CEO-STOCK) 0.282*** 0.337*** 0.454*** 0.454***     
 (3.142) (3.689) (4.994) (4.994)     
Ln(CEO-OPT)     0.179*** 0.183*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 
     (3.273) (3.395) (3.391) (3.391) 
BDSIZE  -0.186*** -0.167***   -0.228*** -0.227***  
  (-3.900) (-3.549)   (-4.614) (-4.584)  
BDSIZERE    -0.167***    -0.227*** 
    (-3.549)    (-4.584) 
FINBD   -0.001 -0.001   -0.003 -0.003 
   (-0.050) (-0.050)   (-0.239) (-0.239) 
TENURE   -0.085*** -0.085***  -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072*** 
   (-5.278) (-5.278)  (-4.281) (-4.310) (-4.310) 
MTB -0.774*** -0.817*** -0.790*** -0.790*** -0.725*** -0.761*** -0.762*** -0.762*** 
 (-5.398) (-5.542) (-5.422) (-5.422) (-4.473) (-4.666) (-4.664) (-4.664) 
ROA 0.490 0.351 0.419 0.419 0.215 0.103 0.106 0.106 
 (1.149) (0.842) (1.017) (1.017) (0.482) (0.234) (0.241) (0.241) 
LNSIZE 0.508*** 0.687*** 0.642*** 0.464*** 0.417*** 0.654*** 0.654*** 0.412*** 
 (5.080) (6.181) (5.778) (4.652) (4.070) (5.792) (5.807) (4.031) 
Constant 11.659*** 10.393*** 11.775*** 13.533*** 11.366*** 10.000*** 10.225*** 12.613*** 
 (5.448) (5.012) (5.375) (6.234) (4.851) (4.138) (4.187) (5.230) 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
R-squared 0.070 0.087 0.100 0.100 0.051 0.080 0.080 0.080 
Adj. R-squared 0.064 0.081 0.092 0.092 0.046 0.073 0.073 0.073 
Wald test 17.93*** 16.28*** 16.39*** 16.39*** 12.48*** 13.89*** 12.03*** 12.03*** 
II: F-test 4.81*** 6.14*** 5.68*** 5.68*** 4.71*** 5.71*** 5.59*** 5.59*** 
#Obs. 1,402 1,382 1,382 1,382 1,476 1,456 1,456 1,456 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
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Table 6-3 (b) Regression results of total equity-based compensation and equity return 
volatility 
Ordinary least square regression coefficients for models of bank risk in sample size of 301 
BHCs in the 2000 to 2005 are reported. Dependent variable: Equity return volatility denoted as σi 
and calculated as standard deviation of daily equity returns. Independent variables:  Natural log 
of total equity-based compensation to CEO which includes common stock value and Black-
Scholes value of stock options, labelled as ln(CEOEB). Board size is total number of board of 
directors on board denoted as BDSIZE. Board size is total number of board of directors on board 
denoted as BDSIZE. Residual board size is total number of board of directors on board denoted 
as BDSIZERE. Fraction of independent directors refers to the fraction of board seats held by 
non-officers without relationship to the founding family divided by the board size and labelled as 
FINBD. Tenure captures number of years served by current CEO, labelled as TENURE. Control 
variables: Market to book ratio, a proxy to control for investment opportunities is denoted as 
MTB. Return on assets is calculated as profit before interest and tax divided by book value of 
assets, ROA. Natural logarithm of total assets of the bank, a proxy for bank size, denoted as 
LNSIZE. Year dummies are time dummies. Wald test indicates the significance of all coefficients 
excluding constant. II is the Wald test F-statistics represents for the joint significance of the year 
fixed-effects. The heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics, derived from White (1980) standard 
errors, are in parentheses below each parameter estimate.  
 σi 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
Ln(CEOEB) 0.190** 0.217** 0.260*** 0.260*** 
 (1.972) (2.219) (2.687) (2.687) 
BDSIZERE  -0.235*** -0.222***  
  (-4.741) (-4.506)  
BDSIZE    -0.222*** 
    (-4.506) 
FINBD   -0.002 -0.002 
   (-0.185) (-0.185) 
TENURE   -0.081*** -0.081*** 
   (-4.794) (-4.794) 
MTB -0.724*** -0.780*** -0.761*** -0.761*** 
 (-4.469) (-4.730) (-4.664) (-4.664) 
ROA 0.175 -0.022 0.086 0.086 
 (0.390) (-0.050) (0.197) (0.197) 
LNSIZE 0.389*** 0.384*** 0.354*** 0.590*** 
 (3.860) (3.856) (3.474) (5.293) 
Constant 11.557*** 11.808*** 12.408*** 10.068*** 
 (4.560) (4.667) (4.826) (3.903) 
Year dummy Included  Included  Included  Included  
R-squared 0.048 0.068 0.079 0.079 
Adj. R-squared 0.042 0.062 0.071 0.071 
Wald test 10.69*** 11.96*** 12.35*** 12.35*** 
II: F-test 4.61*** 6.05*** 5.59 5.59 
#Obs. 1,476 1,456 1,456 1,456 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 6-4 Regression results of total equity-based compensation, stock options and 
leverage 
Ordinary least square regression coefficients for models of bank risk in sample size of 301 
BHCs in the 2000 to 2005 are reported in two panels: Dependent variable leverage is total debt 
to total assets ratio, measures of risky debt labelled as LEV. Independent variables:  Natural log 
of total equity-based compensation to CEO which includes common stock value and Black-
Scholes value of stock options, labelled as ln(CEOEB). Natural log of Black-Scholes value of 
stock options compensation to CEO, labelled as ln(CEO-OPT). Board size is total number of 
board of directors on board denoted as BDSIZE. The residual board size is total number of 
board of directors on board denoted as BDSIZERE. Fraction of independent directors refers to 
the fraction of board seats held by non-officers without relationship to the founding family divided 
by the board size and labelled as FINBD. Tenure captures number of years served by current 
CEO, labelled as TENURE. Control variables: Market to book ratio, a proxy to control for 
investment opportunities is denoted as MTB. Return on assets is calculated as profit before 
interest and tax divided by book value of assets, ROA. Natural logarithm of total assets of the 
bank, a proxy for bank size, denoted as LNSIZE. Year dummies are time dummies. Wald test 
indicates the significance of all coefficients excluding constant. II is the Wald test F-statistics 
represents for the joint significance of the year fixed-effects. The heteroskedasticity consistent t-
statistics, derived from White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses below each parameter 
estimate. 
 leverage (LEV) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Ln(CEOEB) 0.187* 0.133 0.141 0.141     
 (1.886) (1.317) (1.359) (1.359)     
Ln(CEO-
OPT) 
    0.170** 0.153** 0.158** 0.158** 
     (2.560) (2.292) (2.318) (2.318) 
BDSIZE    -0.139***  -0.138*** -0.142***  
    (-2.771)  (-2.724) (-2.810)  
BDSIZERE  -0.137*** -0.139***     -0.142*** 
  (-2.717) (-2.771)     (-2.810) 
FINBD   0.006 0.006   0.008 0.008 
   (0.364) (0.364)   (0.463) (0.463) 
TENURE   -0.005 -0.005  -0.001 0.000 0.000 
   (-0.182) (-0.182)  (-0.020) (0.007) (0.007) 
MTB -0.599*** -0.670*** -0.670*** -0.670*** -0.596*** -0.676*** -0.677*** -0.677*** 
 (-3.644) (-4.036) (-4.026) (-4.026) (-3.686) (-4.133) (-4.129) (-4.129) 
ROA 2.655*** 2.491*** 2.500*** 2.500*** 2.704*** 2.543*** 2.543*** 2.543*** 
 (6.609) (6.053) (5.986) (5.986) (6.707) (6.100) (6.104) (6.104) 
LNSIZE 1.924*** 1.969*** 1.965*** 2.113*** 1.951*** 2.130*** 2.133*** 1.982*** 
 (15.335) (15.461) (15.141) (15.249) (16.081) (15.779) (15.882) (15.960) 
Constant -
33.170*** 
-
30.517*** 
-
30.982*** 
-
32.447*** 
-
33.263*** 
-
32.388*** 
-
33.050*** 
-
31.554*** 
 (-12.927) (-11.362) (-10.888) (-11.166) (-13.095) (-11.852) (-11.493) (-11.175) 
Year dummy Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Observations 1,734 1,695 1,695 1,695 1,734 1,695 1,695 1,695 
R-squared 0.206 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.207 0.214 0.214 0.214 
Adj. R
2
 0.202 0.208 0.207 0.207 0.203 0.209 0.209 0.209 
Wald test 145.08*** 188.44*** 85.46*** 85.46*** 145.08*** 98.02*** 84.95*** 84.95*** 
II: F-test 2.94** 2.87** 2.87*** 2.87*** 2.97*** 5.70*** 2.89*** 2.89*** 
#Obs. 1,734 1,695 1,695 1,695 1,734 1,695 1,695 1,695 
 Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
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Table 6-5 Regression results CEO cash compensation, equity return volatility, and 
leverage 
Ordinary least square regression coefficients for models of bank risk and debt risky in sample 
size of 301 BHCs in the 2000 to 2005 are reported. Equity return volatility denoted as σi and 
calculated as standard deviation of daily equity returns, and total debt to total assets ratio, 
measures of leverage labelled as LEV. Independent variables:  Natural log of the sum of annual 
bonus and salary compensation to CEO, denoted as ln(CEO-CB). The residual of board size is 
total number of board of directors on board denoted as BDSIZERE. Fraction of independent 
directors refers to the fraction of board seats held by non-officers without relationship to the 
founding family divided by the board size and labelled as FINBD. Tenure captures number of 
years served by current CEO, labelled as TENURE. Control variables: Market to book ratio, a 
proxy to control for investment opportunities is denoted as MTB. Return on assets is calculated 
as profit before interest and tax divided by book value of assets, ROA. Natural logarithm of total 
assets of the bank, a proxy for bank size, denoted as LNSIZE. Year dummies are time 
dummies. Wald test indicates the significance of all coefficients excluding constant. II is the 
Wald test F-statistics represents for the joint significance of the year fixed-effects. The 
heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics, derived from White (1980) standard errors, are in 
parentheses below each parameter estimate.  
  σi Leverage (LEV) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
ln(CEO-
CB). 
0.967** 1.679*** 1.839*** 1.839*** -0.496 -1.592*** -1.604*** -1.604*** 
 (2.465) (3.371) (3.691) (3.691) (-1.408) (-3.742) (-3.762) (-3.762) 
BDSIZERE  -0.195*** -0.176*** -0.176***  -0.156*** -0.155*** -0.155*** 
  (-4.040) (-3.680) (-3.680)  (-2.969) (-2.941) (-2.941) 
FINBD   -0.009 -0.009   -0.003 -0.003 
   (-0.805) (-0.805)   (-0.199) (-0.199) 
TENURE   -0.093*** -0.093***   0.005 0.005 
   (-5.550) (-5.550)   (0.186) (0.186) 
MTB -0.621*** -0.683*** -0.667*** -0.667*** -0.557*** -0.614*** -0.615*** -0.615*** 
 (-3.852) (-4.182) (-4.136) (-4.136) (-3.398) (-3.727) (-3.725) (-3.725) 
ROA -0.076 -0.316 -0.209 -0.209 1.986*** 1.921*** 1.915*** 1.915*** 
 (-0.143) (-0.608) (-0.412) (-0.412) (4.369) (4.170) (4.131) (4.131) 
LNSIZE 0.387*** 0.368*** 0.344*** 0.344*** 1.971*** 2.044*** 2.046*** 2.046*** 
 (3.824) (3.656) (3.411) (3.411) (15.949) (16.549) (16.450) (16.450) 
Constant 14.381*** 15.840*** 17.628*** 17.628*** -
27.827*** 
-
30.576*** 
-
30.395*** 
-
30.395*** 
 (6.606) (7.197) (7.624) (7.624) (-10.489) (-11.743) (-11.083) (-11.083) 
R-squared 0.043 0.069 0.084 0.084 0.195 0.208 0.208 0.208 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.037 0.062 0.076 0.076 0.190 0.203 0.202 0.202 
Wald test 4.20*** 15.05*** 14.69*** 14.69*** 139.90*** 114.23*** 82.15*** 82.15*** 
II: F-test 11.15*** 5.97*** 5.28*** 5.28*** 3.11*** 3.50*** 3.49*** 3.49*** 
#Obs. 1,376 1,358 1,358 1,358 1,643 1,610 1,610 1,610 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 6-6 Simultaneous equations (3SLS): equity returns volatility, CEO incentive, and board characteristics 
Simultaneous regression models of equity return volatility, leverage, CEO stock options, board size and percentage of independent directors are reported. Equity return 
volatility denoted as σi and calculated as standard deviation of daily equity returns, and leverage is total debt to total assets ratio, measures of risky debt labelled as 
LEV. Natural log of Black-Scholes value of stock options compensation to CEO, labelled as ln(CEO-OPT). Board size is total number of board of directors on board 
denoted as BDSIZE. Fraction of independent directors refers to the fraction of board seats held by non-officers without relationship to the founding family divided by the 
board size and labelled as FINBD. Tenure captures number of years served by current CEO, labelled as TENURE. Split is a dummy variable equals to 1 where 
chairman is also the CEO, or otherwise 0, denoted as SPLIT. The natural log of age of CEO in years is labelled as LNAGE. Market to book ratio, a proxy to control for 
investment opportunities is denoted as MTB. Return on assets is calculated as profit before interest and tax divided by book value of assets, ROA. Total risk based 
capital ratio is defined as the summation of tier 1 and 2 capital divided by weighted risk assets, CART. A dummy variable denoted as LNSIZEDU takes 1 if LNSIZE is 
greater than this median value, otherwise 0. Natural logarithm of total assets of the bank, a proxy for bank size, denoted as LNSIZE. 
 Panel A: σ, stock option, board size, 
 and %independent directors 
Panel B: Leverage, stock option, board size, 
and %independent directors 
VARIABLES σ CEO-OPT BDSIZE FINBD LEV CEO-OPT BDSIZE FINBD 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
σ  0.240*** -0.035 -1.453***     
  (5.834) (-0.240) (-4.861)     
LEV      -0.302*** 0.411*** -1.837*** 
      (-10.198) (6.404) (-3.601) 
Ln(CEO 
-OPT) 
1.371***  1.696*** 8.164*** -2.865***  0.989*** -2.721 
 (3.919)  (5.666) (11.464) (-11.463)  (3.422) (-1.532) 
BDSIZE -0.797*** 0.728***  -5.732*** -0.639 -0.105  -2.817*** 
 (-2.753) (6.169)  (-8.913) (-1.247) (-0.551)  (-4.237) 
FINBD -0.019 0.107*** -0.141***  -0.258*** -0.050 -0.061  
 (-0.309) (6.042) (-2.768)  (-2.889) (-1.390) (-1.114)  
TENURE -0.072*** 0.007   0.022 0.009   
 (-3.305) (1.425)   (1.033) (0.950)   
SPLIT    -1.335    -0.243 
    (-1.636)    (-0.601) 
LNAGE   0.462    0.046  
   (1.429)    (0.363)  
MTB -1.293*** 0.662*** -0.788*** -4.984*** 0.328 0.163 -0.466*** -0.597 
 (-5.746) (5.995) (-4.084) (-6.710) (1.001) (1.420) (-2.816) (-0.925) 
ROA   0.114    -1.290***  
   (0.339)    (-3.052)  
CART   -0.010    -0.009  
   (-0.370)    (-0.487)  
LNSIZEDU   0.910***    0.052  
   (2.628)    (0.112)  
LNSIZE 0.777** -0.461***  3.558*** 3.790*** 1.076***  8.265*** 
 (2.306) (-3.396)  (4.440) (6.746) (4.491)  (5.765) 
#Obs. 1,165 1,165 1,165 1,165 1,324 1,324 1,324 1,324 
R-squared 0.890 0.897 0.731 0.768 0.459 0.923 0.767 0.895 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 6-7 Robustness test - Regression results CEO total equity compensation and 
equity return volatility, and leverage 
Ordinary least square regression coefficients for models of bank risk and debt risky in sample 
size of 301 BHCs in the 2000 to 2005 are reported. Equity return volatility denoted as σi and 
calculated as standard deviation of daily equity returns. Independent variables:  Natural log of 
the sum of annual bonus and salary compensation to CEO, denoted as ln(CEO-CB). Board size 
is total number of board of directors on board denoted as BDSIZE. Fraction of independent 
directors refers to the fraction of board seats held by non-officers without relationship to the 
founding family divided by the board size and labelled as FINBD. Tenure captures number of 
years served by current CEO, labelled as TENURE. Control variables: Return on equity is 
defined as net income divided by equity, ROE. Natural logarithm of total assets of the bank, a 
proxy for bank size, denoted as LNSIZE. The natural log of age of CEO in years is labelled as 
LNAGE. Tobin’s Q is denoted as q and defined as market value of equity plus total liabilities 
divided total assets. Board size is redefined as number of board divided by natural log of total 
asset, BDLNSIZE (Anderson et al., (2004). LNSIZEDU takes 1 if LNSIZE is greater than the 
median for all firms, otherwise 0 LNSIZEDU takes 1 if LNSIZE is greater than the median for all 
firms, otherwise 0. Year dummies are time dummies. Wald test indicates the significance of all 
coefficients excluding constant. II is the Wald test F-statistics represents for the joint significance 
of the year fixed-effects. The heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics, derived from White (1980) 
standard errors, are in parentheses below each parameter estimate.  
 σ 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ln(CEOEB) 0.129 0.205** 0.121 0.210** 
 (1.232) (1.974) (1.126) (2.001) 
BDSIZERE -0.224*** -0.236***   
 (-2.630) (-2.950)   
FINBD 0.018 0.024 0.015 0.022 
 (1.182) (1.590) (1.018) (1.433) 
TENURE -0.076***  -0.076***  
 (-3.208)  (-3.230)  
ROE -0.114***  -0.114***  
 (-5.776)  (-5.767)  
LNSIZE 0.282**  0.376***  
 (2.005)  (2.625)  
LNAGE  -2.320***  -2.304*** 
  (-10.808)  (-10.806) 
q  -3.225  -2.778 
  (-1.149)  (-0.997) 
BDLNSIZE   -3.910** -3.751** 
   (-2.334) (-2.459) 
Ln(CEOEB)*LNSIZEDU 0.237** 0.254** 0.254** 0.265** 
 (2.407) (2.574) (2.224) (2.441) 
BDLNSIZE*LNSIZEDU   -0.998 -0.360 
   (-0.502) (-0.193) 
BDSIZERE*LNSIZEDU 0.025 0.049   
 (0.245) (0.514)   
FINBD*LNSIZEDU -0.037* -0.030 -0.033* -0.027 
 (-1.943) (-1.495) (-1.694) (-1.313) 
TENURE*LNSIZEDU 0.009  0.009  
 (0.269)  (0.290)  
Constant 13.750*** 28.156*** 14.251*** 29.712*** 
 (4.355) (7.346) (4.492) (7.299) 
Year dummy Included  Included  Included  Included  
R-squared 0.112 0.177 0.112 0.174 
Adj. R-squared 0.103 0.170 0.102 0.166 
#Obs. 1,455 1,390 1,455 1,390 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 6-8 Robustness test - Regression results CEO options compensation, board 
characteristics and equity return volatility  
Simultaneous regression models of equity return volatility, residual CEO stock options, board 
size and percentage of independent directors are reported. Equity return volatility denoted as σi 
and calculated as standard deviation of daily equity returns, and leverage is total debt to total 
assets ratio. The residual natural log of Black-Scholes value of stock options compensation to 
CEO, labelled as ln(CEO-OPT)RE is defined in equation 6.6. Board size is redefined as number 
of board divided by natural log of total asset, BDLNSIZE (Anderson et al., (2004). Fraction of 
independent directors refers to the fraction of board seats held by non-officers without 
relationship to the founding family divided by the board size and labelled as FINBD. Tenure 
captures number of years served by current CEO, labelled as TENURE. Split is a dummy 
variable equals to 1 where chairman is also the CEO, or otherwise 0, denoted as SPLIT. The 
natural log of age of CEO in years is labelled as LNAGE. Market to book ratio, a proxy to control 
for investment opportunities is denoted as MTB. Return on assets is calculated as profit before 
interest and tax divided by book value of assets, ROA. Total risk based capital ratio is defined as 
the summation of tier 1 and 2 capital divided by weighted risk assets, CART. A dummy variable 
denoted as LNSIZEDU takes 1 if LNSIZE is greater than this median value, otherwise 0. Natural 
logarithm of market capitalisation is the number of share multiplied by total outstanding shares, 
denoted as LNMKCAP. In model (5), ordinary least squares regression model shows the 
sensitivity of equity return volatility to total compensation of the CEO. Total compensation is 
defined as the natural log of the summation of cash-based, stock ownership and stock options 
values, denoted as ln(TC). The residual board size is total number of board of directors on board 
denoted as BDSIZERE. 
VARIABLES σ ln(CEO-OPT)RE BDLNSIZE FINBD σ 
 Mode 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
σ  0.112*** -0.036*** 2.469***  
  (4.339) (-4.807) (6.844)  
LNCEOPTVRE 2.474***  0.227*** -15.891***  
 (2.972)  (7.662) (-8.973)  
lnTC     0.279*** 
     (2.854) 
BDSIZERE     -0.207*** 
     (-4.156) 
FINBD 0.306*** -0.050*** 0.022***  -0.007 
 (8.419) (-12.196) (7.148)  (-0.607) 
BDLNSIZE 0.659 -1.319  -23.404  
 (0.109) (-0.782)  (-0.907)  
TENURE -0.068*** -0.004   -0.088*** 
 (-3.083) (-1.545)   (-5.117) 
LNAGE   -0.013   
   (-1.022)   
SPLIT    -0.377  
    (-0.453)  
MTB -0.812*** 0.094 -0.056*** 1.861* -0.690*** 
 (-3.141) (1.319) (-4.960) (1.687) (-4.137) 
ROA   -0.052***  0.020 
   (-3.607)  (0.044) 
CART   -0.006***   
   (-3.590)   
LNSIZEDU   0.048***   
   (3.332)   
LNMKTCAP -0.018 0.102**  1.719***  
 (-0.117) (2.243)  (2.756)  
LNSIZE     0.264** 
     (2.565) 
R-squared 0.789 -0.127 -0.417 0.605 0.072 
#Obs. 1,165 1,165 1,165 1,165 1,405 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Implications for Future Research 
7.1 Introduction 
This Chapter concludes the thesis. It presents a summary and an overview of the 
main results for the empirical analysis carried out in Chapters 4-6. It also examines 
the strengths, weaknesses and policy implications of this study and, additionally, 
the agenda for further research is analysed. The objective of this thesis was to 
investigate corporate governance and its effect on risk-taking in US bank holding 
companies. This goal has been achieved. It is worth taking into consideration the 
following aspects: Firstly, the thesis has a stand-alone literature review in Chapter 
2, which discusses corporate governance in financial institutions, as well as 
surveying relevant industrial governance literature. At the end of each sub-section, 
a summary, a table summarising the report into sub-headings and surfaced stylised 
facts are provided. Finally, a section of literature gap closes this chapter.  
An empirical study on distance to default, subordinated debt, and market 
discipline in the banking industry, is presented in Chapter 4 – and it is published in 
Accounting and Finance 50, (2010) pp. 853-870. Empirical analyses for Chapters 5 
and 6 utilise the same sample data set, presented and described in Chapter 3, 
under “Data Collection and Construction of Variables”. The remainder of this 
Chapter is organised as follows: The next section recaps the motives behind this 
investigation. Section 7.3 summarises contribution to the thesis and proffer diverse 
policy implications. Section 7.4 summarises the main empirical results. Section 7.5 
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of this investigation, in addition to setting 
out an agenda for further research. 
7.2 Research Background and Motivations 
Amidst the deregulated banking background resulting from regulatory reforms in 
the late 1990s, financial products and the size of financial firms became 
increasingly complex. As a consequence of the more integrated banking system 
and volatile environment, banks were exposed to exploit new investment 
opportunity sets. As such, they transited their operations to unsafe and risky 
lending avenues (Pathan, 2009; DeYoung et al., 2010; Mehran et al., 2011). 
- 204 - 
 
However, these new lines of banking business generated potential non-interest 
income. In contrast, non-banking firms shifted to traditional banking activities. This 
move significantly intensified competition between commercial banks and non-
banking firms, even though regulations were in place. This study takes forward the 
topical discussion and arguments over corporate governance efficacy in shaping 
excessive bank risk-taking. 
From the above arguments, the key research question is whether corporate 
governance of banks influences risk-taking behaviour. Thus, this investigation is 
essentially stimulated by the following deliberations. One, given the increasingly 
excessive risk-taking behaviour of financial institutions, the bank failures and the 
continuing financial crisis; few academic works have closely examined corporate 
governance of banks63. In addition to this, they have produced contradictory 
findings. Most importantly, bank governance research analysis focuses on a single 
agency conflict control mechanism for bank risk (see Tables 2-1 and 2-4). 
For example, there are studies that look at the effect of ownership structure (i.e., 
Saunders et al. 1990; Chen et al., 1998; Laeven and Levine, 2009; and others); 
institutional ownership effect (i.e., Cebenoyan et al., 1995; Gorton and Rosen, 
1995; Knopf and Teall, 1996); large institutional investor on board effect (i.e., 
Laeven and Levine, 2009); market discipline (i.e., Avery et al., 1988; 1990; 
Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Flannery, 1998; Evanoff and Wall, 2001; Sironi, 2003; 
Krishnan et al., 2005; Gropp et al., 2006; Akhigbe et al. 2007; among others); board 
structure relevance (i.e., Staikouras et al., 2007; Akhigbe and Martin, 2008; Pathan, 
2009) and executive compensation impact (i.e., Houston and James, 1995; 
Angbazo and Narayanan, 1997; Harjoto and Mullineaux, 2003; Chen et al. 2006; 
DeYoung et al., 2010; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2010, and others).  
Moreover, although market discipline has been widely examined with regard to 
bank subordinated debts and debentures yield spreads; its role with regard to 
distance-to-default indicator remains an empirical question. Only two papers by 
Gropp et al. (2006) and Akhigbe et al. (2007) utilise distance-to-default to 
                                            
63 For instance, according to the FDIC’s statistics, the bank collapse rate increased 
exponentially over the period from 2007-July 2012. More importantly, a sizeable number of these 
banks were casualties of the subprime property market collapse during the period 2008-2010 
(see Figure 1-1). The general consensus surrounding these failures is that excessive bank risk-
taking and ill-fated decisions endangered both the financial sector and economic prospects. 
Consequently, the extent and the effectiveness of the financial safety net and of corporate 
governance systems in shaping bank risk-taking are enormously important. 
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investigate the presence of market discipline in banks. Banks differ from non-
financial firms in a number of aspects. Banks are highly regulated, dominated by 
informational opacity assets (risky loan portfolios) and many operate under bank 
holding companies (Morgan, 2002). These insights suggest that generalisations 
cannot be made with regard to the corporate governance of banks. Three, the 
excessive remuneration packages of top bank executives also motivates this 
research. The current system of compensation contract design – i.e. excessive 
bonuses - has been attacked by politicians, taxpayers and policymakers alike. 
Lastly, policy deliberation is another of the aims of this investigation.  
In general, the areas which have not been as extensively examined with regard 
to risk taking by bank holding companies are boards, compensation and sub-debt 
distance-to-default. In theory, the interaction of these diversity governance forces is 
preferred in reducing agency problems and enhancing firm value (see Figure 2-1). 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 and Basel 2, the BCBS (2006) all emphasise on 
the sound corporate governance of banks. Therefore, promoting better corporate 
governance of banks is far more important than before. With this in mind and using 
bank and governance-level data of the US bank holding companies, my thesis 
analyses the following ideas. First, it examines whether bank risk-fundamentals 
explain the extent of distance-to-default in sub-debt banks as compared to banks 
that have not issued subordinated debt. Second, it investigates whether board and 
ownership governance affects risk-taking behaviour. Finally, it analyses whether 
managerial compensation incentives lead to risk taking.  Hence, investigation on 
the link between risk and corporate governance in banks is imperative today.  
7.3 Contribution to and Discussion in the Thesis  
The thesis makes five primary contributions to the corporate governance of bank 
literature. Firstly, the thesis provides discussion and understanding of the relevance 
of corporate governance of banks on risk-taking behaviour - i.e. the overall 
contribution. The corporate governance elements examined include board and 
ownership, executive compensation, and market discipline. These diverse 
economic and legal institutions can work together, to limit banks engaging in riskier 
strategy choices, which, in turn maximises the value of the firm for shareholders. 
However, extant empirical research analyses the connection between corporate 
governance elements and bank risk-taking separately. With this, reference is made 
to Tables 2-1 to 2-4. In examining this tension, accounting and market-based 
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information are utilised to proxy risk. It is shown that corporate governance of 
banks is important in risk-taking behaviour. Interestingly, the impact of corporate 
governance of banks on performance is broadly discussed. These facts are 
provided by Adams and Mehran (2003), Adams and Mehran (2005), Sierra et al. 
(2006), Akhigbe and Martin (2006), Staikouras et al. (2007), and Andres and 
Vallelado (2008) for board structure, and Glassman and Rhoades (1980), Pi and 
Timme (1993), Schranz (1993), Mudambi and Nicosia (1998), Caprio et al., (2007), 
and Elyasiani and Jia (2008) for ownership structure.  
Secondly, the thesis constructs a distance-to-default indicator, which is a market 
risk-based metric to predict and compare bank distress in sub-debt and non sub-
debt bank holding companies. Distance-to-default ranks higher to sub-debt yield 
spreads (Gropp et al., 2004). It captures the market value, leverage and asset 
volatility of the firm (Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Gropp et al., 2004; Gropp et al., 
2006). To these papers, the thesis adds the distance to default predictability 
comparison of different sub-samples. This evaluation is of particular interest to the 
supervisory authorities. Market indicators are seen by monitoring agencies as 
complementary to traditional accounting data as a means of assessing bank 
fragility. If changes in distance to-default indicator is significant, private sector 
investors in bank sub-debt instruments will penalise banks by demanding higher 
risk premia. In turn, this behaviour of sub-debt investors is a message to 
supervisors to take prompt remedial actions, and is supportive of market discipline 
hypothesis. 
Thirdly, it analyses the relationship between board and ownership governance 
and bank balance risk and its reflection on banks’ risk exposure. The information 
embodied in capital adequacy, assets quality and liquidity volatility indicators are 
regulatory-based. Indeed, this information is vitally important to both regulators and 
boards in assessing financially unhealthy banks. From a regulatory and supervisory 
context, any deterioration detected in capital, credit portfolio, and liquidity will 
necessitate immediate action.  
Fourthly, my thesis analyses the connection between CEO compensation and 
bank risk-taking through board governance. Limited evidence has been presented 
on the effect of managerial compensation incentives on bank risk-taking, and such 
findings have been controversial (Houston and James, 1995; Chen et al. 2006; 
Mehran and Rosenberg, 2008; DeYoung et al., 2010; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 
2010). Board structure is analysed along with bankers’ pay as both are cited to 
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have triggered excessive risk-taking in banks. More importantly, boards are 
involved in the establishment of managerial incentive compensation schemes and 
they are the apex of the governance internal control system. Therefore, evidence 
presented in this thesis adds to the bank compensation research by analysing the 
impact of managerial compensation incentives on risk-taking. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, these findings throw new light on policy 
implications for a range of emerging issues in the ex-post banking and financial 
crisis environment. There seems little doubt of the need to formulate a number of 
strategies for the survival and sustainability of the overall financial system. The role 
of banks in spearheading economic growth and development are well-known. It 
ranges from crucial financial intermediation, monetary policy, payment system, 
liquidity creation, information gathering, maturity and denomination transformation 
of illiquid assets, to borrowers’ monitoring functions. What policy lessons can be 
drawn from this thesis? The following are, I believe, the policy lessons which can be 
derived from this investigation: 
1. On the market discipline front, the policy recommendation is that, in their capital 
structure, large banks should maintain mandatory subordinated debts and 
debenture securities. Indeed, sub-debt holders, mainly the institutional 
investors, have more incentives to monitor banks and enhance market 
discipline in those firms. 
2. With respect to ownership structure, the policy proposal is that, shareholders, 
executives, and bank directors should hold substantial stakes in banks. Larger 
stock ownership implies that their wealth is now exposed to greater risk 
commensurate with those debtholders including depositors. With reasonable 
shareholdings, bank managers are self-disciplined and they may opt to policies 
that maximise the value of shareholders equity call-put options and avoid those 
encouraging bank failures. 
3. In relation to bank boards, the policy recommendation is in line with the 
requirements by Sarbanes legislation, NYSE AMEX and NASDAQ governance 
models. These frameworks emphasise on corporate firms whose boards are 
largely composed of independent directors. As such, banks’ boards should 
continue with this sprit and their members should be knowledgeable on the 
operations and overall risk management of banks, and financial markets.  
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4. In the ongoing debate over bankers’ excessive compensation, the policy 
suggestion is that banks’ compensation contract schemes should be designed 
not only to focus on aligning the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders. It should also consider the risk-taking factor. The message is that 
executive compensation structure models need to be both risk-incentive and 
risk-disincentive based.   
5. With regard to prudential regulations, the policy lesson is that to ensure a 
healthy banking system and responsiveness to adverse externalities from any 
systematic risk, regulators should extend their supervision to cover liquidity risk 
rather than focusing solely on capital adequacy and asset choices and 
restrictions. Together with credible contingency plans, long-term and permanent 
global institutional framework settings are important and require a joint 
consensus between the US and affluent economies of the G-20. 
6. Concerning the multiple regulatory issue - in common with other sceptics and 
commentators, the current US multitude of bank regulatory agencies ought to 
be consolidated to a single fully-fledged regulator. Otherwise, the prevailing 
legal and regulatory framework has to be reduced from the four-styled federal 
banking regulatory structure. This may pave the way for less banking confusion 
and greater openness leading to more efficiency within the regulatory system.  
7. Pertaining to Basel II and III frameworks, the policy agenda is that a full 
adoption and compliance in line with the Basel II agreement cannot be 
emphasised enough at this juncture. In addition, banks should adjust to looking 
at the underlying rules and requisites on Basel III, for its implementation. 
Nevertheless, regulatory burdens atmosphere should be avoided so that a 
conducive banking business environment can exist for average investors – i.e. 
the recent Wall Street Bank Regulations Act of 2010. The Act is strictly 
regulations-based and is intended to enhance transparency in lending activities. 
Admittedly, the Act has come under fire for having omitted the root cause of the 
recent global financial shock - i.e. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In addition, it is 
alleged to be a barrier to firms attempting to create employment opportunities. 
Taken as a whole though, once the proposed policies are in place, a gradually 
more healthy banking system can be attained. 
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7.4 Summary of main Findings 
The thesis is composed of seven (7) chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the topic. It 
looks at why corporate governance of bank research is important with respect to 
risk-taking. It also identifies three main areas that the ensuing analysis sheds light 
on. Chapter 2 reviews and discusses literature. The chapter surveys four positions 
of corporate governance - boards, ownership, executive compensation, and market 
discipline. Chapter 3 presents data sources, construction of variables, and analyses 
descriptive statistics in the proceeding empirical chapters 4-6. The following 
sections document major findings in the empirical chapters. 
7.4.1 Distance to default, subordinated debt, and market discipline  
The purpose of the first empirical study in Chapter 4 is to investigate the extent to 
which bank fundamentals can explain a market-based distance-to-default metric in 
the US banking industry. It analyses whether banks that issue subordinated debts 
and debentures show an increase in the extent to which bank fundamentals predict 
the likelihood of their default (comparative to their counterparts without 
subordinated notes and debentures). Moreover, it examines whether banks’ charter 
values transmit further information to market investors which increase the reliability 
of bank fundamentals to predict default risk. Lastly, it analyses one aspect of 
government regulation by comparing the default probabilities of banks that are well 
capitalised compared to undercapitalised ones. 
The main findings can be summarised as follows. Firstly, there is some evidence 
that distance to default predicted by bank-specific risks on sub-debt banks is higher 
in comparison to banks that had not issued subordinated debt. For sub-debt banks, 
distance-to-default increases in non-performing loans and leverage ratios, while it 
decreases in the interaction of reserve loan losses and leverage ratios. These 
results coincide with the explanation that market discipline through private 
monitoring increases the information contents of bank risk fundamentals (Flannery 
and Sorescu, 1996; Gropp et al. 2004; 2006; Akhigbe et al. 2007). Consistent with 
the theory, the evidence presented confirms the presence of market discipline in 
sub-debt banks. This is due to efficient market hypothesis in which market prices 
can efficiently accommodate all available information in one convenient distance to 
default. Secondly, for banks with higher charter values (i.e., located in Q5), bank 
risk fundamentals explain a higher share of the variation in distance-to-default. This 
result is consistent with the arguments in Keeley (1990) that banks with higher 
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charter values are self disciplined to undertake excessive risk activities. Finally, 
distance-to-default sensitivity to bank risk fundamentals is higher in 
undercapitalised banks compared to well-capitalised ones.  
7.4.2 Corporate governance and bank risk-taking behaviour 
The objective of the second empirical study in Chapter 5 is to investigate the link 
between corporate governance and bank risk-taking behaviour. More importantly, it 
examines whether board and ownership control mechanisms explain bank-specific 
risks: capital adequacy, asset quality and liquidity. The main findings are fourfold. 
One, managerial ownership significantly reduced the level of bank capital adequacy 
as well as endangering asset quality portfolio status. That is, during times of 
economic uncertainty, banks could be vulnerable to adverse outcomes in their 
credit portfolios. Two, asset risk proxy (non-performing loans ratio) and managerial 
ownership are positively associated. Theoretically, managers’ incentives to 
undertake risky activities increase proportionally with increases in managerial 
ownership. More importantly, in stockholder-controlled banks, managers behave in 
a less risk-averse manner (Saunders et al., 1990; Cebenoyan et al., 1995; 
Anderson and Fraser, 2000; Lee 2002). A decrease in capital level proportionally 
decreased asset quality status,  
Three, non-performing loans, capital to assets, and liquidity assets ratios are 
significant and negatively associated with board size. For non-performing loans, 
larger boards’ decisions have an adverse impact on bank credit portfolios status. 
This perspective might make the argument that there are some board members 
who might have close ties with corporate borrowers, and the former are involved in 
authorising the latter’s borrowings. Theoretically, this will impair the bank’s capital 
position. For capital adequacy, smaller boards make extreme decisions that have 
negative repercussions on bank capital. And for liquidity ratio, smaller boards 
impair bank liquidity creation. Finally, loan losses ratio and z-score indicate risk-
taking is pronounced in ex-ante and ex-post Sarbanes and Regulation A by board 
size. Generally, these findings provide bank balance sheet risk measures-based 
evidence that board and ownership are important in influencing bank risk-taking 
behaviour. 
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7.4.3 Managerial incentives and risk-taking in banking 
The third empirical study, Chapter 6, investigates the link between managerial 
incentives and bank risk-taking. Specifically, it considers whether the structure of 
compensation paid to CEOs induces bank risk-taking. To explore this, board 
structure is controlled. The major findings are four. Firstly, equity return volatility is 
positively related to both CEOs’ stock ownership and stock options. In addition, 
leverage and stock option are positively related. Together, the findings indicate that 
CEOs’ compensation structure influences risk-taking and aggressive debt policy. 
However, higher leverage not only escalates agency costs, it also compounds 
banks’ credit portfolio risks via risk-shifting.  
Secondly, return volatility and leverage positively and negatively are related to 
cash-based compensation. The positive relation can be explained as the competing 
theory that cash compensation can incentivise risk-taking in banks (Noe et al. 
1996). There is also a sense of outcry among politicians, taxpayers, academics, 
regulators and lawmakers over excessive bankers’ big pay packages - especially in 
bonuses. Three, after allowing for board structure, the association between risk and 
equity-based compensation remains positive. Again, both bank risk and leverage 
decrease in board size function. Consistent with the moral hazard models, market 
to book ratio enter risk and leverage regression models negatively. Finally, it is 
found that executive compensation and board structure are jointly determined with 
risk and leverage. 
 Overall, the results support the view that compensation induces banks’ 
managers to undertake risky investment choices and aggressive debt policy. As 
such, managerial compensation should not only invite maximisation of the firm 
value for shareholders, but also, ought to take into account the inherently risky 
element.  
7.5 Study Limitations and Agenda for Future Research 
7.5.1 Study limitations 
I have constructed a data set containing 301 US publicly traded bank holding 
companies in this investigation and have contributed to the existing literature in four 
key areas, as discussed in section 7.3. However, this investigation suffers the 
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following constraints despite its inherent strengths. First, the major problem 
confronting this analysis is that, theoretically, board and ownership structure, and 
risk are endogenously determined. Executive compensation, board structure, and 
risk are also jointly determined. Therefore, it is possible that the simultaneous 
system of equations misspecification attributed to complexity in identifying relevant 
dependent and independent variables is high (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner 
et al., 2006). Secondly, since corporate governance variables are hand-collected 
and time consuming (Anderson and Lee, 1997) human error is likely in the data set 
building process. In addition to this, CEO ownership is combination of stock 
ownership and stock options. As such, separating those required extra attention 
and was extremely time consuming.  
Thirdly, while much research around corporate governance and risk-taking 
centres on industrial firms, less is known about the influence of corporate 
governance on bank risk-taking. This makes comparison of results a bit 
challenging.  Admittedly, existing deficient empirical studies keep a close eye on 
the US banking environment, but the rest of the world is given much less attention. 
Fourthly, as argued by Cebenoyan et al. (1995) and quoted by Anderson and 
Fraser (2000), analysing the relationship between ownership and bank risk-taking is 
an extremely complex task. Equally, in the area of board structure and risk-taking 
there is no existing approved theory detailing how a board should act (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003). Because of these factors, it is hard to draw definitive and self-
evident conclusions.  
7.5.2 Areas for further research 
The following are fruitful avenues which could provide scope for future research. 
One, the effort to investigate risk-taking in banking and corporate governance 
structures post-global financial crisis is far-reaching. More importantly, this will help 
to create a sound bank regulatory framework. The market control measures on 
bank risk-taking are quite timely, given the unprecedented worldwide financial 
episodes of the 2000s. Two, bank default risk and bank fundamentals revealed in 
this investigation can be replicated and compared to industrial firm default risks. To 
what extent default risk exists in industry and also in other markets is not 
adequately documented to date. Three, interdependence in board and ownership 
structure, and subordinated debt in addressing bank risk-taking should be 
examined. Studies by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Beiner et al. (2006) 
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indicate that optimal use of each control mechanism mitigates agency conflicts. 
Subordinated debt is a legitimate market discipline tool of Pillar 2 under Basel II. 
Whether corporate governance structures influence the opaqueness of banking 
firms’ assets is not well known. Nevertheless, interesting areas for future research 
agendas can be developed from this thesis. 
 Taken as a whole, the banking sector has been vulnerable to excessive risk-taking 
from the time of the Great Depression through to the 2007-09 global financial crisis. 
With this, had sound corporate governance been in force, it can be speculated that 
the banking and financial sectors’ volatilities would have been averted and not have 
reached such an appalling intensity. 
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